By Dr. Paul Craig Roberts

On January 23 I reviewed on this website Kees Van Der Pijl’s new book, States of Emergency. Van Der Pijl answers the question so many people have of why and how a fake “deadly pandemic” was orchestrated with worldwide participation in the fraud.

He shows that the event was long in the making by a global elite consisting of philanthropists such as Bill Gates, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Wellcome Trust, elite organizations such as the World Economic Forum, tech companies and multi-billionaire owners, Fauci at NIH, CDC, FDA, WHO, pharmaceutical companies and lobbyists, and elite organizations and groups created for the purpose of concentrating power and advancing and protecting the global elites’ rule by using fear to condition the masses to being controlled and deprived of a voice and alternative explanations. I had been thinking along these lines, but lacked Van Der Pijl’s detailed knowledge of the personalities, organizations and groups and the interactions and cooperation between them. He gives us the story. It was an elaborate exercise in massive deception and censorship that was able to discredit the world’s most renowned medical scientists and to elevate pure fiction to fact and public policy.

We owe it to ourselves to read States of Emergency in order to come to terms with the fact that we are ruled by people devoid of integrity to whom truth is an inconvenience and who are concerned solely with their control and power.

We need to read the book also to understand how things really work, how decisions are really made, how careers are made and ended by whether or not you serve the narrative and how well, how regulatory agencies such as FDA, NIH, CDC, WHO are in fact marketing departments for Big Pharma, how politicians’ positions are dictated by the sources of their campaign funds, why universities and the media must function as Ministries of Propaganda for the ruling elites and their narratives, how Fauci and Big Pharma control content in medical journals via grants to medical researchers. Van Der Pijl writes that pharmaceutical industry research grants make the industry the co-author of many articles and that more than half of all The Lancet‘s revenues come from pharmaceutical companies orders of reprints of articles supportive of their products. Van Der Pijl writes “According to the former editor of The New England Journal of Medicine, who had 20 years of experience, it is simply no longer possible to believe much of the published clinical research.”

The gullible, patriotic American who reads this book will have his eyes opened and become a new person. Van Der Pijl has written the book that can save Americans from their insouciance.

In October 2019 just prior to unleashing the “pandemic” on the world, what was about to happen was first tested in a simulation. The participants were: the Bloomberg-financed Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, the Gates Foundation, the World Economic Forum, the CDC, the (American trained) head of the Chinese health authority, a former deputy director of the CIA, Johnson & Johnson, Pfizer, and so on.

The participants were primarily concerned with protecting the planned deception from being exposed. They relied on social media and the presstitutes to control the narrative and censor the truth. They considered whether to close the Internet altogether, but were assured that Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Google would only allow news in keeping with the narrative and flood the Internet with information that confirms the narrative while discrediting and blocking the truth. Admiral Stephen Redd of the US Public Health Service thought that people on social media with “negative beliefs,” that is, those who took issue with the narrative, should be tracked down by intelligence services. Singapore’s finance minister said dissidents should be arrested and brought to justice. The head of the Chinese health authority worried that suspicion might arise that the virus originated in a laboratory. Johnson & Johnson wondered if the deaths and injuries in the vaccine trials should be suppressed in order to prevent public suspicion of the poorly tested vaccine.

The participants claim they were just playing a germ game, but the simulation ensured that all was in place to control the explanation prior to the release of the “pandemic.”

The research basis of Van Der Pijl’s book is massive and the information earth-shattering. I intend to return to this book in future articles. But don’t wait on me. Buy the book and read it once, twice, three times. Civil liberty in the US cannot survive if people are too lazy to inform themselves.

When the US government ceased meaningful regulation on the basis of Alan Greenspan’s assertion that “markets are self-regulating” and ceased to enforce its anti-trust laws, massive economic concentration resulted, producing individuals whose wealth greatly exceeded the budgets of public health agencies and even some countries. This gave single individuals enormous power over governments. Van Der Pijl writes that from 2004 onwards, just the annual health grants of the Gates Foundation alone exceeded the annual budget of the World Health Organization. Gates Foundation directors are executives from Merck, GlaxoSmithKline, Novartis, Bayer Health Care Services, companies whose stocks are owned by the Gates Foundation. This is just a tiny indication of the power that wealth concentration has given a handful of individuals over government policy.

Van Der Pijl believes that the elite’s use of an orchestrated “pandemic” to solidify their control was too ambitious and has failed. What his optimism overlooks is the possibility that another more dangerous virus will be set upon us and the fear created will sap all resistance. The Covid attempt almost succeeded, especially in Australia, Canada, Austria, Italy, and Germany. In the US it was blocked by the judiciary and by governors such as Florida’s Ron DeSantis. A second run at the unorganized and uninformed peoples of the world could succeed.

Is this an indication that a more deadly coronavirus is about to be released, one for which all treatments have been banned? See this.



There can be either security for everyone or no security at all, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said

The responses to its security proposals that Russia has received so far from the US and NATO demonstrate that Moscow and the western nations have fundamental differences in their understanding of how European security works, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in a statement on Tuesday.

Moscow maintains that a “principle of equal and indivisible security … is fundamental to the entire European security architecture,” Lavrov said, adding that “either there is security for all or there is no security for anyone.”

The principle was formulated in the OSCE Charter for European Security signed at the Istanbul summit in 1999 and later reaffirmed at the Astana summit in 2010.

However, according to Lavrov, the US and its allies continue to pick out only those elements that contribute to their own “exclusive”security as NATO members and justify what the minister called the bloc’s “irresponsible expansion.”

“The Istanbul Charter provides that each OSCE participating state has [an] equal right to security, and not only NATO countries that interpret this right as an exceptional privilege of membership in the ‘exclusive’ North Atlantic club,” he said.

Despite expressing their readiness for dialogue, the western nations “deliberately avoid” mentioning these “inconvenient” principles and prefer to rely on documents that do not contain it, like the 1990 OSCE Paris Charter for New Europe, Lavrov said.

What Russia seeks is that the western nations acknowledge the principle under which no state in Europe can enhance its own security at the expense of others, Lavrov explained. As of now, he argued that NATO aspires to have “military supremacy and the use of force bypassing the prerogatives of the UN Security Council.”

What Russia wants now is a “frank clarification” of the US, NATO, and the European nations’ positions on collective security.

“We want to receive a clear answer to the question [of] how our partners understand their obligation not to strengthen their own security at the expense of the security of other states,” Lavrov said. The Russian foreign ministry sent letters to the top diplomats of the US, Canada, and “several European countries” and expects them to provide answers “in the national capacity.”

At the same time, he said that these letters were not a response to the US de-escalation proposals, which are still being discussed by Russian officials.

Lavrov’s statement came as Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Tuesday that the US response to Russia’s security initiatives reveal that Moscow’s “fundamental” concerns were ignored by Washington.

via RT

By Ivan Timofeev, Valdai Club Programme Director & one of Russia’s leading foreign policy experts.

With Washington rejecting many of Moscow’s security concerns, the prospect of escalation is rising

The US has handed Russia a written response to its proposed security guarantees. While Washington refuses to accept Moscow’s demands for a legally binding pledge that NATO will not expand further towards its borders, it has indicated it is ready to discuss certain issues, including arms control and strategic stability.

Since the end of last year, both sides have been consistently raising the stakes, and Russia has stationed a significant concentration of military forces near its border with Ukraine. The US has announced a set of sanctions and other restrictive measures that it says would be imposed on Russia in the event of a war. It is clear another round of escalation is on its way. In the near future, the situation is likely to unfold along one of the following three scenarios:

Scenario one: War

It is inevitable that amid peaceful conditions, Ukraine will pursue an anti-Russian course. An outwardly loose but sufficiently stable political regime has been formed in the country, for which compromises with Russia are impossible.

The Ukrainian government itself sees no alternative way of ensuring the country’s security other than through NATO membership. The West will also work towards integrating Ukraine into its security structures. It is, therefore, impossible to change Ukraine’s course of action without a war.

Even if NATO membership does not take place for formal reasons in the coming years or decades, nothing is preventing the deployment of striking or other systems on the territory of the country, as well as the large-scale rearmament of the armed forces of Ukraine at the expense of Western countries.

Sooner or later, Ukraine will turn into a springboard for possible military operations against Russia. Given the length of the border, this situation puts Russia at a disadvantage, incomparable with the NATO membership of the Baltic countries. The military development of Ukraine by the United States and the West is a fundamental threat to Russia.

The Ukrainian army could be defeated relatively quickly, and it is possible to avoid a protracted war by carrying out a lightning-fast operation. Furthermore, it would then be possible either to divide the country into two states, one of which (Eastern Ukraine) remains in the Russian orbit, and the other (Western Ukraine) in the Western one. Another option is a forceful regime change in Ukraine, with the expectation that there will be no massive resistance from the population.

Western sanctions will be a painful blow to Russia, but they won’t be fatal. The benefits to military security are greater than the economic damage. The harm to the economy will not translate into public protest in Russia; it can be kept under control. The prestige of the authorities will grow due to their solving a major historical task. Sanctions against Russia will further undermine confidence in the US-centric financial system. Russia will be able to exist as a ‘fortress’. An exit from the global economy is possible, and even desirable. The West itself is in decline. Its imminent death is inevitable. A victory in Ukraine will deal another blow to the authority of the United States and the West, and will accelerate their global retreat.

In this scenario, we should expect a radical breakdown in relations between Russia and the West, incomparable with any previous crisis. It will lead to (a) massive loss of life; (b) a serious and long-term economic crisis in Russia as a result of Western sanctions; (c) significant militarization of eastern Europe by NATO.

It will be possible to talk about the formation of a fundamentally new order in Europe. It will be rooted in an arduous confrontation. The only obstacle to a major war will be nuclear weapons, although the risks of escalation into a conflict between Russia and NATO cannot be ruled out either. Russia in this scenario becomes a kind of European North Korea, but with much broader opportunities.

Scenario Two: Permanent tension

The costs of a military solution to the Ukrainian issue are too high. Even in the event of a quick defeat of the armed forces of Ukraine, the problem of control over the territory arises. The puppet regime will require significant financial injections. At the same time, it will certainly be inefficient and corrupt. In the face of the damage from sanctions, fuelling the regime will further exacerbate the shortage of resources within Russia itself.

Even complete control of the territory of Ukraine will not prevent the West from forming and arming Ukrainian formations in adjacent territories, financing a wide underground in Ukraine itself. The war will lead to economic decline in the occupied territories, which will make their population even more susceptible to Western propaganda.

If part of the territory is retained by the pro-Western regime, the conflict becomes permanent. At the same time, none of the problems of Russia’s security would be solved, and their number would only grow, due to the militarization of eastern Europe.

The internal stability of Russian society is not guaranteed, considering the economic damage from sanctions, the cost of war, and injections into Ukraine. Inevitable inflation in this case and the reduction of already-low incomes are fraught with the growth of protest moods.

It could be possible to compensate with military victories, but only for a short time. A protracted economic crisis or, at best, stagnation creates the basis for a long-term protest. At the same time, certain standards of consumption and lifestyle have developed in Russian society. It is hardly ready to be a European North Korea.

The global role of the West is declining. For the US, the Asia-Pacific region is indeed a growing priority. But this does not mean that the West is weak enough not to inflict significant damage on Russia. There is no guarantee that sanctions against Russia would critically harm the West itself. In Europe, the West has significant reserves to contain Russia, even in the event of rivalry with China. Beijing’s support for Russia isn’t guaranteed in the event of war.

Maintaining permanent tension in relations with the West is producing results. At least the Western powers are beginning to listen to Russia. Tension is a useful tool for diplomacy. It is necessary to keep it on Ukraine’s borders, and to also apply it in other regions – Latin America, the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific Region (together with China), and Africa. If possible, Russia can operate with relatively cheap but effective campaigns, similar to the Russian operation in Syria.

This scenario does not radically change the situation in Europe. Relations between Russia and the West remain categorized by rivalry, but do not cross red lines. The West is slowly building up sanctions pressure, as well as consistently integrating Ukraine into its security space.

Scenario Three: Smile and wave

Ukraine is a toxic asset for the West. Large-scale aid is stolen and institutions remain corrupt. The country is not a supplier, but a consumer of security. Its NATO membership is counterproductive for the bloc due to unresolved conflicts and dubious contributions to common security. On the contrary, Ukraine is a source of numerous problems. Bailing it out is troublesome and costly.

If the West goes for it, then Ukraine will make NATO an even more unbalanced structure, in which the number of’’free-riders’ will grow. While it remains in the Western sphere, Ukraine is doomed to further degradation. There will be a ‘Moldovisation of Ukraine’ – that is, an outflow of citizens to the West and the primitivisation of its economy. The West has no reason to support Ukraine for a long time with its help. Aid will dwindle as Ukraine’s position slides in the West’s list of priorities. Without any military intervention, Ukraine will degrade, turning into a peripheral country and a third-order priority in the global agenda.

Russia has significant military capabilities to stop any threat emanating from the territory of Ukraine and the NATO countries. Even without the use of nuclear weapons, Russia in a regional conflict can inflict unacceptable damage on rivals in Europe. Control of Crimea ensures dominance in the Black Sea. The deployment of strike weapons or missile defence elements on the territory of Ukraine is possible in the long term. But it does not prevent Russia from improving its own offensive systems, which in any case are capable of inflicting inadmissible damage on a potential adversary.

The Ukrainian political regime is unstable. Competent and long-term work will allow Moscow to find its levers of influence on the regime and communication with society. It will be difficult for Russia to remain indifferent. Russia retains humanitarian opportunities in the form of a labour market and education system. They are much more modest in comparison with the EU, but this does not negate the possibility of their use. When playing the long game, humanitarian mechanisms produce good results.

Relations with the West are not limited to Ukraine. Russia has many dimensions in which it can bargain with the West. The marginalisation of the Ukrainian agenda is quite possible, and even desirable. The rivalry between the US and China is likely to set the pace for global politics in the coming decades. It is advisable to avoid direct participation in this clash and make room for manoeuvre.

The Russian economy remains fragile and dependent on commodity markets. Overstraining it through war and sanctions is inappropriate. Breaking economic relations with the West is also counterproductive.

In this scenario, there is a partial de-escalation of the Ukrainian issue, although rivalry with the West remains. Moscow skilfully manages such rivalries, facilitating them where possible, and thereby overloading the West with toxic assets in the form of free-riders and fiery liberals. At the same time, it continues to play the game on all the fronts of the global agenda – from climate action to arms control.

Which way to go?

The first scenario is obviously fraught with significant risks for Russia. For the West, it is also undesirable, but it also has some advantages in the form of an accelerated consolidation of NATO and the exhaustion of one of the major global adversaries.

The second scenario is quite acceptable for the West. For Russia, it has fewer risks, but the benefits are limited. Its main danger is the gradual build-up of Western pressure. There is such a danger in the third scenario. The West also feels quite comfortable in it, but Russia’s success is not predetermined and will depend on strategic patience, plus the ability to manage limited resources and use the opponent’s energy in their own interests.

The main task for the West will be to “calm down” Russia and bring the competition into a sluggish mode that is convenient for itself. The main task for Russia is to avoid excessive overexertion and, at the same time, not get bogged down in a costly confrontation, maintaining and using levers of pressure on the West where its own interests require it.

This article was first published by the Valdai Discussion Club

by Elena Chernenko interview with Dmitry Trenin via: Kommersant

“Russia’s foreign policy—both under Yeltsin and Putin, including the Medvedev presidency—rested on the shoulders of Gorbachev’s policies. In one way or another, Russia continued integrating into the West, finding its place there, searching for a certain balance of interests in relations with the United States and other Western countries, with an emphasis on cooperation.”

—ARE WE ON THE BRINK OF AN ACTUAL MILITARY CONFLICT?

In the immediate future, say, the coming month, I think the answer is no. As for the longer term, I have questions for both sides.

A question for the West: Could the government in Kyiv—its constituent parts or some elements it doesn’t fully control, acting in concert with some shadow players—stage a provocation to draw Russia in? The answer to this question is likely negative. This scenario won’t do much good for those standing behind Kyiv. Any such provocation is certain to end with the defeat of Ukrainian forces.

The scale of this defeat for Ukraine may vary. And however high the cost of victory would be for Russia, that wouldn’t make up for the colossal reputational losses the Joe Biden administration would sustain, particularly on the domestic arena. After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, losing another prominent regional ally would be extremely dangerous for the administration, especially in the domestic political context. In addition, there is the NATO context and the factor of U.S. international prestige. After all, countries like China and Iran have been monitoring the situation closely.

—IN OTHER WORDS, YOU BELIEVE THE GEORGIAN SCENARIO TO BE UNLIKELY?

Yes. I believe that the Americans have sufficient control over the Ukrainian government and other elements active in Ukraine [to make a provocation unlikely].

—AND WHAT’S YOUR QUESTION FOR RUSSIA?

I have many questions for Russia. I think everything comes down to how the commander-in-chief, the president of the Russian Federation appraises what’s happening right before our eyes. I am talking about all of the latest diplomatic efforts supplemented with military moves and allusions to measures in the military and military technology realm. Indeed, there are many questions here, since we can’t know what exactly is on Vladimir Putin’s mind. What’s his plan? What’s his strategy? What options does he see for various situational scenarios? It’s very hard to judge from the outside.

What’s clear is that the demands that Russia has advanced and describes as imperative cannot be met by the West, at least not as they were framed. And since that’s obvious to everyone, the president certainly knows it too. The question is what his answer will be to the rejection of those demands.

-SO YOU ARE RULING OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES COULD IN SOME FORM AGREE TO RUSSIA’S DEMAND TO GUARANTEE NATO NON-EXPANSION?

There will be no legally binding agreement on non-expansion. Nor will there be written political guarantees—as Russia insists—that Ukraine and Georgia will “never ever” be admitted to NATO. The question is how Russia will act when it becomes completely clear that the demands that Russian officials have frequently described as an “absolute imperative” will be rejected by Western states.

—WHAT DO YOU SEE AS POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR HOW THE SITUATION MIGHT DEVELOP?

The first scenario is ostensibly a logical one. It will be announced that we actually didn’t expect them to agree to that. We are sensible people and understand everything perfectly, but we had to break the impasse, shake up the Western political and diplomatic scene, especially in Washington, and demonstrate our seriousness to them. And we managed to get something out of it. First, they didn’t reject our proposals outright, but started responding. Moreover, they agreed to submit a written response to our proposals, which is a major step. This means that they effectively recognize the seriousness of our concernsand demands.

Second, they agreed to discuss important subjects that they previously ignored, for instance, our proposals for a moratorium on the deployment of INF-range missiles. They previously wouldn’t even hear of it, but now they themselves propose to negotiate. They are also prepared to discuss limitations on military exercises in close proximity to our borders: all those naval and air force training exercises, including the ones imitating nuclear missile launches. We have proposed mutual restraint in this sphere numerous times, but they have only taken heed now. There have been responses to some other Russian initiatives as well.

Russia presented its demands in such a decisive fashion to induce Western powers, primarily the United States, to take action that benefits us from the security standpoint. It was important for us not just to diffuse the situation on our Western borders but, above all, to force the West to finally negotiate with us on issues of European security.

This has already happened: a dialogue is underway. For the first time since talks on German reunification, the West has agreed to discuss European security with Russia.From 1999 to 2021, European security hinged on the goodwill—or its opposite—of the United States, which relied on NATO as its main instrument. Now, just as at the times of the Yalta and Helsinki summits, the United States and NATO have been negotiating European security with Russia, so the security rests on two pillars rather than one.

—UNDER THIS SCENARIO, SHOULD WE EXPECT THE WEST AND PRIMARILY THE UNITED STATES TO PUT MEANINGFUL PRESSURE ON UKRAINE TO COMPLY WITH THE MINSK AGREEMENTS [AIMED AT ENDING THE CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE]?

I really hope so but wouldn’t count on it at this time. The Minsk Agreements are a Russian diplomatic victory that followed on from the military victory that the Donbas militia and its supporters scored against the Ukrainian military in February 2015. I am not sure that the United States realizes that the key to diffusing the situation around Ukraine is complying with the Minsk Agreements, although this is certainly the case.

Essentially, these agreements can still be implemented. Donbas can return to Ukraine under the terms of the Minsk Agreements, which would guarantee the rights of those living in the area and preserve Ukraine’s territorial integrity within Russia-recognized borders. But for the time being, I don’t see willingness from Washington to pressure Kyiv into complying with the Minsk Agreements.

The lack of resolution in the Donbas conflict is the best formal pretext for continuing to put pressure on Moscow. In recent years, U.S. policies have been aimed at intensifying pressure on Russia, and Ukraine is but one element of that. If I understand the Western strategy correctly, this pressure will peak when the transfer of power in Russia gets underway. Amid its confrontation with China, the United States needs a more compliant Russia. But that’s a long-term goal.

—OKAY, THAT’S THE FIRST SCENARIO. WE’VE SHAKEN THINGS UP, AND WE SETTLE FOR WHAT THEY GIVE US.

Yes. In this regard, we could also remember that politics is the art of the possible, as well as a host of other arguments in support of this scenario.

As for the second scenario, it assumes that things have actually gotten way too serious, and we’ve reached the point when new politics have come to replace the old ones in Russia. In my book The New Balance of Forces, I wrote that Russia’s foreign policy—both under Yeltsin and Putin, including the Medvedev presidency—rested on the shoulders of Gorbachev’s policies. In one way or another, Russia continued integrating into the West, finding its place there, searching for a certain balance of interests in relations with the United States and other Western countries, with an emphasis on cooperation.

But what if this course is being radically overhauled now? This relates not only to foreign policy, but Russia’s general direction. What if we are distancing ourselves from the period in which the main goal was to integrate into the world at large, albeit on our own terms?What’s more, what if the severance from the West that President Putin talked about in response to the prospects of U.S. “sanctions from hell” becomes reality? What if Russia eventually embarks on a completely different foreign and domestic policy course, which would also include the economic, social, and ideological spheres?

Perhaps a separate “Russian project” is already being constructed, and it no longer anticipates integration into the world where the West still plays a leading, though not dominant, role. Given its rupture with the West, Russia may establish much closer and even de facto allied relations with key non-Western states, primarily with China, as well as Iran and U.S. adversaries in the Western hemisphere: Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Under this scenario, Russia may conduct a significantly more active foreign policy. Moscow may start doing the very thing that the West has so often accused it of doing.

—ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT CREATING SPHERES OF INFLUENCE?

Both spheres of influence and the right to use force to overthrow unwanted regimes. For instance, the United States overthrew a dictatorial regime in Iraq. True, they found no weapons of mass destruction there, but, on the whole, the West believes that it did a good thing by eliminating a dictator.

I’ve noticed now that Russian diplomats and the foreign minister have been increasingly using the term “regime,” especially when talking about the Ukrainian government. Regime is something illegitimate, at least from a moral standpoint. And if the government is illegitimate, why not help the forces of good to overthrow it?

I have a feeling that Russia has been looking for a new starting point around which to reassemble territories in the post-Soviet space. A variety of options could be employed here. For instance, Russia could expand on the concept of the Union State [which currently consists of Russia and Belarus] by incorporating new territories into it. Loosely speaking, if the Russian authorities come to the conclusion that it’s impossible to get the Minsk Agreements implemented, they may recognize the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics as one or two states and incorporate them into the Union State of Russia and Belarus. Hypothetically, that entity may also include Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

This will happen if Russia decides to destroy what it dislikes and use force since it can’t get what it wants nicely. The United States most likely won’t be able to do much about it. It won’t engage in a direct confrontation with Russia.

—YOU HAVE DESCRIBED TWO VERY DIFFERENT SCENARIOS. TO DRAW A CHESS ANALOGY, THE FIRST ONE IS А SHREWD GAME WITH DELIBERATE MOVES AND CALCULATED RISKS. IN THE SECOND, ONE OF THE PLAYERS SIMPLY OVERTURNS THE CHESSBOARD AND ALL THE PIECES ON IT. SO WHICH OF THE SCENARIOS IS BEING IMPLEMENTED NOW?

I don’t know. Only one person in our country can answer this question. It’s impossible to figure out his answer from the outside. Russia has the capabilities to implement both scenarios. The Russian state and its armed forces will be prepared to accomplish any task assigned to them.

Both scenarios come at a certain cost and involve known risks. In the first case, we are talking about reputational losses, both internationally and domestically. If Russia abandons its demands, which it declared to be an “absolute imperative,” it may be accused of bluffing. Great powers don’t bluff. If Russia is bluffing, it’s descending to some other level in terms of its global status. But even if some sections of the population view this negatively, it’s no big deal overall. The government’s position at home is quite strong. It will be more of a blow to its international reputation: Russia may be taken less seriously in the future. But we can live with this too.

The second scenario, which entails the use of force, calls for a very serious rupture in relations, including within Russia itself. It would destroy the hopes of a small but influential part of the Russian elite that still hopes that relations with the West will be normalized someday. In the radical form described by some Western think tanks— the “Ukraine occupation” scenario—it would also test broader segments of the Russian population.

—THIS WILL HAPPEN IF RUSSIA GOES BEYOND RECOGNIZING THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE DONETSK AND LUHANSK PEOPLE’S REPUBLICS?

Yes, if the Russian authorities decide that the only guarantee of Ukraine not joining NATO and not having American missile bases on its territory is Russia’s direct control over Ukraine or establishing a friendly regime in Kyiv. In any event, the use of force scenario won’t be similar to what happened in Crimea, where not a single shot was fired, and there were no casualties.

—DO YOU BELIEVE THIS USE OF FORCE SCENARIO TO BE AT ALL PROBABLE?

I think it’s unlikely. It’s fraught with many negative consequences, and great human and financial losses.

—IS IT THE WORST-CASE SCENARIO?

It all depends on your preferences and interests. For some, it’s the best-case scenario, for others, it’s the worst. In my view, it would entail a tremendous risk for Russia itself.

—FROM YOUR BOOK I CONCLUDED THAT, IN YOUR VIEW, NATO EXPANSION DOESN’T POSE SUCH A BIG THREAT TO RUSSIA. IS THAT SO?

No degree of NATO expansion, including to incorporate Ukraine, will threaten the military balance and deterrence stability. The United States won’t gain a serious strategic advantage over the Russian Federation by deploying missiles close to Kharkov.

—WHAT ABOUT ALL THE STATEMENTS ABOUT SHORTENED FLIGHT TIME: 5–7 MINUTES FOR A MISSILE TO REACH MOSCOW?

They don’t contradict what I have said. Because what’s going to happen in that situation? Russia will deploy its hypersonic missiles—say, Zirkon—on its submarines that will cruise along the U.S. coast, thereby ensuring the same flight time to reach the most important American targets. [It’s much more expensive to have missiles on subs and you can never reach the same mass. Also they can be sunk especially if they’re being taxied off the US coast and not in heavily-protected bastion seas off the coast of Russia as is the Russian-Soviet missile sub doctrine.] Deterrence will be preserved, albeit at a higher and more dangerous level. Nor can a U.S. army brigade in Poland or a NATO battalion in the Baltics seriously diminish Russia’s security. The only aspect that could be of serious concern to Russia is the missile defense elements in Romania and Poland. Nothing else poses a significant threat.

Therefore, in terms of military security, it’s correct to say I don’t see NATO expansion as such a terrible threat.

But there is another factor: a country that becomes a NATO member undergoes profound reformatting, which touches upon all walks of life. The country transforms politically and ideologically. While Ukraine is outside of NATO, it’s still possible that the entire country or some part of it may decide that the Slavic identity, the “Russian world,” and other things matter, and this may lead to a normalization of relations with Russia, and even closer relations with it. At least, from Moscow’s vantage point, such a possibility remains. But if a country joins NATO, that’s it: that ship has sailed. In this sense, yes, there is a threat but not a military one; rather, it’s geopolitical and geocultural. Then again, judging by the articles published, the commander-in-chief and the country’s military and political establishment have completely different ideas on this subject, and that must be taken seriously too.

—RUSSIA HAS THREATENED THE WEST WITH A “MILITARY TECHNOLOGY RESPONSE” IF ITS DEMANDS ARE NOT MET. BESIDES THE THINGS YOU ALREADY MENTIONED, WHAT MIGHT THAT BE?

If the recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics follows the Abkhazia scenario, Russian troops and military bases may be deployed there. But I think that the bulk of the “military technology response” will have to do with deploying some weapons systems to new locations.

—FOR EXAMPLE?

For a long time, the conventional wisdom was that if Russia was unhappy about some military components in Europe, it might deploy additional missiles in Kaliningrad. The Kaliningrad region was seen as a frontline base of operations. From there Russia could threaten all kinds of enemies. But Kaliningrad is physically separated from the rest of Russian territory. It’s hard to deliver things there and maintain communication lines, especially amid antagonism with the West. It’s possible, but not easy. It’s much easier to deploy something on the territory of friendly Belarus: an ally that hasn’t hosted any Russian military bases or missiles, never mind nuclear missiles, so far. Especially since the Belarusian president himself…

—…IS INVITING RUSSIA TO DO SO?

Yes. He has great political acumen and is willing to provide such an opportunity to Russia for an unstated but easily discernible price. That’s one possibility.

There are other, more global options, for instance, close cooperation with China, close coordination between Moscow and Beijing in the military sphere, more active cooperation on military technology. Closer ties on military issues with countries like Iran are also possible. Finally, in the midst of the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian president has had phone conversations with the leaders of Venezuela and Cuba.

—SO RUSSIA MAY ACT AS A SPOILER IN A SITUATION WHERE THE UNITED STATES EXPECTS IT TO REMAIN QUIET AND STAY OUT OF ITS CONFRONTATION WITH CHINA?

That’s a possibility, of course. And this would be normal practice. Countries that are hostile to each other, like Russia and the United States today, influence each other through force. That’s the reality. They don’t use reason and persuasion; they resort to force—not necessarily military force. Apart from its military capabilities, the United States possesses economic and financial strength, and increasingly uses this instrument against Russia. For its part, Russia’s strength lies in geopolitics, the energy sector, the military, and military technology.

—THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT RUSSIA MAY DEPLOY MISSILES TO VENEZUELA OR CUBA.

I don’t think that South or Central America are being seriously considered as possible Russian missile bases. Essentially, there is no need for that. In fact, if Russia starts making efforts in this regard, it will create the exact threat it’s trying to avoid. If Moscow begins to bother the United States in Latin America, Washington will respond in Europe, where a number of countries would gladly host INF-range missiles on their territory. Why would Russia need that?

—WHAT HAS HAPPENED THAT WE ARE SUDDENLY TALKING ABOUT SUCH DISTURBING SCENARIOS? WHERE IS THE WORLD HEADED?

It’s moving along a very dangerous trajectory, but I don’t know where it’s heading.However, if we look back at history, it’s obvious that if, after any large-scale confrontation—be it “hot” or “cold”—the losing side is not included in the new security arrangement on conditions it finds acceptable, its pride will be wounded and it will not be prepared to give up on its sovereignty. Then, having gained strength 20–30 years down the line, it will demand respect for its national interests.

—AND NOW THAT TIME HAS COME?

Yes, I think that time has come. It took thirty years to reach this juncture. The Cold War victors initially believed that Russia had lost its prior significance; they were no longer interested in it, and no one really wanted to engage with the difficult task of integrating it into the Western world.

Moreover, such integration would require Western powers—primarily the United States—to agree to substantial limitations on their own influence, to granting Russia the right to cast the deciding vote. The United States wasn’t ready for that. It wasn’t ready to share its influence, even with its closest allies. Washington always had to have the final say. So Russia chose not to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic on the terms of uneven partnership offered by the West. No one particularly regretted that back then: it was believed that Russia had a weak economy, bad demographics, and a fragile political system that may collapse a few more times. So there was no real need…

—…TO CARE MUCH?

Yes. Attitudes toward Russia started to change after the annexation of Crimea, and especially after the beginning of the military operation in Syria. You remember that Barack Obama called Russia a “regional power.” Then everyone saw that not only had it come back as an actor on the international stage, but also that it can act far beyond its own borders.

But here Moscow’s actions diverged from the interests of the West. Russia came to be seen as an adversary that must be punished and put in its place through pressure, especially through sanctions. Conciliatory gestures or concessions to Russia came to be viewed as appeasing an aggressor. Feeling its weakness, the West has generally become much less amenable to compromise, less willing to sit down with other competing and even hostile regimes, and to negotiate with them on equal terms. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West has not negotiated with anyone on equal terms, not even with China.

You can understand the West, too. It’s going through tough times; we really are talking about the twilight of Western dominance and eventual end of its global leadership. It’s hard for them. I think we are moving toward a serious crisis in international relations. We can probably gain some degree of clarity after serious tests of strength in different regions and domains. Not all issues will be resolved at the negotiating table, but the outcomes can be formalized. That’s how the new world order is going to emerge.

by  Thierry Meyssan via VoltaireNet

Wendy Sherman and Sergey Riabkov have found that the U.S. does not want to talk with Russia

During the whole week, Moscow has been waiting for an answer to its proposal for a Treaty guaranteeing peace. Washington has never mentioned it. On the contrary, it has accused Russia of preparing to attack Ukraine and of planning a false flag operation to justify it. Russia can no longer back down, but any action on its part risks opening a third world conflict.

This article is a follow-up to :
1. “Russia wants to force the US to respect the UN Charter,” January 4, 2022.
2. “Washington pursues RAND plan in Kazakhstan, then in Transnistria,” by January 11, 2022.

The Western press fails to follow the relationships between the Big Three (China, the United States and Russia) because it segments them. It considers each issue separately and ignores the links between them. Above all, it ignores the difference between Anglo-Saxon and UN law, which leads to many misinterpretations.

The United States and Russia met three times this week to discuss peace guarantees:
in Geneva at the level of deputy foreign ministers ;
in Brussels in the NATO-Russia Commission ;
and finally in Vienna, at the OSCE.

The United States reiterated its warning against the stationing of 100,000 Russian troops on the Russian-Ukrainian border, while Russia expressed indignation at the US refusal to discuss its peace proposal.

At the same time, the US Congress debated sanctions against Russia, while the State Department extended its attitude towards Russia to China, and the Department of Defense is considering increasing its nuclear arsenal.

In the background, Washington has been conducting a destabilization operation in Kazakhstan and the European Union has set up a total economic blockade of Transnistria.

If the United States refuses further to take into account the reproaches addressed to it and to respond to Russian arguments, Moscow is now threatening to deploy troops in the Caribbean basin.

The only positive step forward is a possible relaunch of U.S.-Russian negotiations on the control of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, a treaty rejected by President Donald Trump.

THE CONTENT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

When the U.S. delegation arrived in Geneva, it first had a friendly dinner with its Russian counterparts and then, the next morning at the start of the talks, informed them that its mandate was limited to discussing the deployment of U.S. and Russian troops in Ukraine.

“Other priorities are more important for us: non-expansion of Nato, elimination of the infrastructure created, refusal of certain measures, and not on a reciprocal basis, but on a unilateral basis on the part of the West”, Sergey Riabkov had already declared on arriving in Geneva [1].

So the Russians responded that the mandate of the US delegation was only incidental to the official purpose of the meeting: guarantees for world peace. Then Wendy Sherman and Sergey Riabkov reviewed the topics they could discuss later and found only one: a new Intermediate Nuclear Missile Reduction Treaty; the INF Treaty having been denounced by President Donald Trump.

The next day Wendy Sherman attended the NATO-Russia Commission meeting in Brussels. Allied ambassadors were having difficulty assessing Washington’s intentions after its abandonment of Afghanistan to the Taliban and its betrayal of France with the AUKUS agreement. Ms. Sherman let them speak first, and then she told the Russian delegation: “Of course, there are thirty of us here facing you, but we are only one on our positions”. Then she drew a picture of what Europe would become if Washington gave in to Moscow: once again a continent divided into two zones of influence, one Atlanticist, the other Russian, as during the Cold War.

This presentation awakened terrible memories so that the Allied ambassadors heard nothing else. The Russian delegation’s denials that it was not Soviet and did not want to share the continent were just background noise. Perhaps the Russians again presented their demands to respect the UN Charter and their word, nobody remembers.

The US press commented on this meeting by saying that it had given Nato, decried by Presidents Donald Trump and Emmanuel Macron, a new reason to exist: to fight Russia.

Under these conditions, the third meeting, that of the OSCE in Vienna, was only – in the words of Sergey Lavrov – “dilatory”. The OSCE has no decision-making power, it is just a forum created during the Cold War to evaluate positions. The Swedish chairmanship of its Permanent Council reflected the image of this country, officially neutral, but internally debating its next membership in NATO. The allies were on the defensive, while the United States itself sought to gain time. The meeting did not even produce a final communiqué.

Moscow was expecting a wholesale rejection of its proposals by Washington, but it was astonished by the way US diplomats managed to manipulate the members of NATO and the OSCE. This is the second time that Vladimir Putin has come up against the irrational behavior of the European Union. Remember, in 2007, he thought he could distance Western Europeans from their American overlord by going to the Munich Security Conference and asking them to ask themselves what their interests were [2]. He mistakenly believed that he would get their attention, especially that of the Germans. The same thing is happening today.

It is clear that most European leaders, with the notable exception of the Russians, do not want to be independent. They renounce their own responsibility and prefer to grovel before an illegitimate and cruel world order.

HYSTERIA IN WASHINGTON

In Washington, the White House is aware that it can no longer afford its global policy, but the ruling class is not. Congress has been the scene of grandiloquent pronouncements denouncing Russian impudence and particularly that of its president, Vladimir Putin. Parliamentarians have gone so far as to discuss sanctioning him in name, which would mean breaking off diplomatic relations with his country. None of them seem to be aware that the United States is no longer the world’s leading military power and that Russia and China have replaced it.

Less stupid than sanctions against President Putin, Congress has mostly been squabbling over the possible reinstatement of sanctions against the Russian Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. Republican Senator Marco Rubio defended the idea that the Germans should be punished for making a pact with “the devil”, including the former Social Democrat Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who piloted the construction of the pipeline, so that they would have no choice [3]. Instead, the Democrats, on the advice of the White House, argued that it would be better to get the Germans to choose the right side themselves, rather than forcing them to do so. The Ukrainian government supported this common sense approach by pointing out that the Germans had negotiated guarantees with Russia that it would not use its gas supplies as a weapon [4].

This ludicrous debate was only possible because everyone has forgotten the reason that led President Joe Biden to lift the sanctions against Nord Stream 2 just before the Russian-US summit in Geneva [5]: it was a way to pass on to the Europeans the bill for the war damage in Syria. They would pay for cheap Russian gas, but a little less cheap than expected. Nobody even remembers that the United States lost this war.

EVERYTHING CONTINUES AS IF NOTHING HAD HAPPENED

Far from giving in on the substance, the State Department has extended its Russian narrative in the face of China, which supports Russia. Not only would Russia like to invade Ukraine and extend its rule to all of Eastern and Central Europe, but China would like to conquer the entire China Sea.

While the dispute with Russia post-dates the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the dispute with China goes back much further, to the tragic colonial period.

The State Department relies on a 2016 Hague Court of Arbitration decision, condemning China in a territorial dispute with the Philippines, to dismiss Beijing’s arguments [6]. However, an arbitration court is not a tribunal, and since China does not recognize this court, it did not arbitrate anything, but only endorsed the Philippine version of the dispute. Far from establishing anything, this episode attests to the way the United States interprets international law in general and the UN Charter in particular.

China rightfully claims the islands it ruled in the 18th century and abandoned when it collapsed under the onslaught of colonization. Most of them remained uninhabited until about 30 years ago, that is, until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The United States, in claiming them for its allies in this area, is demonstrating the same conquering imperialism as in placing Central and Eastern Europe under the command of Nato.

Moreover, during this week, Washington has continued its operation of destabilization of Kazakhstan and support to the calls for the overthrow of the regime proclaimed by Mukhtar Ablyazov from Paris. Finally, it encouraged the European Union to organize a blockade of Transnistria, the unrecognized state wedged between Ukraine and Moldova [7]. If it seems to have lost in Kazakhstan, it is already preparing the next episode in Transnistria.

The United States is cloistered in its denial and is sending emissaries to each of its vassals to warn them of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine following a false flag provocation.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSION

This week has predictably shown that the United States does not intend to respect either the UN Charter or its word. It will not back down anywhere on its own. Its proposals are at best aimed at preserving the status quo.

The US strategy seems to be based on the idea that the Russians and the Chinese will not dare to confront. It is the “madman theory” once used by President Richard Nixon against the Soviet Union: yes, I am wrong and I may not be the strongest, but I am crazy and my reactions are irrational and unpredictable. I don’t care if I win, I can break everything. This attitude is like a gamble. It did not allow the USA to win the Vietnam war.

Russia had obviously foreseen the next move when it published its draft treaty guaranteeing peace. However, it will have to adapt it because Washington has succeeded in rallying all its frightened vassals. If there is to be a confrontation, it will be nuclear and will surely result in hundreds of millions of victims.

If Washington is planning the next skirmish in Transnistria, Moscow is preparing to play the next move, probably in the Caribbean basin, on the model of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. It would be a matter of provoking a shock that would make the American ruling class realize that it no longer has the superiority that it has been using and abusing so much.

Translation
Roger Lagassé

[1] “Riabkov expects US to face up to its responsibilities”, Voltaire Network, 10 January 2022.

[2] “The unipolar governance is illegal and immoral”, by Vladimir Putin, Voltaire Network, 11 February 2007.

[3] Fact Sheet on the Ted Cruz bill on Nord Stream 2, Voltaire Network, January 12, 2022

[4] Document send by Naftogaz to the US Congress, Voltaire Network, January 12, 2022

[5] “Biden-Putin, a Yalta II rather than a new Berlin”, by Thierry Meyssan, Translation Roger Lagassé, Voltaire Network, 22 June 2021.

[6] “Propaganda: the Chinese are expansionists”, Translation Anoosha Boralessa, Voltaire Network, 14 July 2016.

[7] “Josep Borrell sets up siege of Donbass and Transnistria”, Voltaire Network, 10 January 2022.

By Layla Guest

2022 is a year for crisis between Moscow and Washington, according to one of Russia’s most senior senators

Hopes that rock-bottom relations between Moscow and Washington can be turned around are unlikely at present, a top Russian politician has claimed, arguing that only when a new world order is established will there be less conflict between the two states.

Speaking as part of an interview with Ukraina.ru earlier this week, Aleksey Pushkov, a close ally of President Vladimir Putin, who previously served as chairman of the State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee, cast his view on the current power dynamic on the world stage.

“The US is a hegemon that is gradually losing its position in the world,” he claimed. “They suffered a very serious defeat in the Middle East, they lost Syria, they lost the battle for Afghanistan, they were forced to withdraw almost all of their troops from Iraq at the end of 2021.”

According to the Russian senator, US officials “are trying to maintain their dominant influence by having conflicts simultaneously with Russia and China, although with different degrees of intensity.” Pushkov noted that this creates a nervous environment both in America and the rest of the world.

“The US no longer treats us as a secondary power,” he explained. “They treat us as a paramount power, which is why they cite Russia, not China, as one of the main problems facing the Biden administration in 2022.” Pushkov warned that it will be “a year of crisis between Washington and Moscow.”

“As I understand it, they now want to solve the ‘Russian problem,’ that is, to subjugate practically all of Europe, pushing Russia to its very outskirts,” he said. “This is exactly what they need Ukraine for. The next phase will be a political or even military confrontation with China.”

Pushkov added that America’s political and financial elite “believe that they are the only ones who can run the world,” and do not intend to let anyone else take the helms. “So, until a new world order is established in which the US is weaker and its role is diminished, we will be in more or less acute political conflict with them.”

His remarks come amid an increasingly tense stand-off between East and West, with senior American officials accusing Moscow of amassing troops and hardware near the Ukrainian border ahead of an invasion. Last week, Biden threatened to hit Russian President Vladimir Putin with sanctions like “he’s never seen” before in the event of an incursion, which the Kremlin has repeatedly denied having any plans of staging.

Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, warned against a move such as this earlier this month, stating that “the imposition of sanctions against the head of state and against the leader of Russia … is a measure that is comparable to severing relations.”