Category Archives: remember?

“Trump’s Plan” is Putin’s Plan

Points of the peace plan for Ukraine, which are now being leaked and published by the media. Obviously, “Trump’s plan” is Putin’s plan.

  1. State status for the Russian language. That is, a refusal of forced derussification.
  2. Official status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. I will add: and the return of the seized churches to it.
  3. Reduction of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by half (this is easy. After all, a non-warring army will be much easier)
  4. Complete withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Ukraine from the DPR and LPR. (and the cities of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson remain under Ukraine, this is a big concession)
  5. Russia also transfers part of the territory, referring to parts of Kharkiv, Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv regions.
  6. Ban on having long-range weapons.
  7. Official recognition of Crimea and the DPR and LPR as parts of Russia and
    Also, they forgot, but there will be more.
  8. Introduction of a demilitarized zone so that the Armed Forces of Ukraine cannot shoot at Donbas.
  9. Denazification. Ban on the glorification of Bandera and other fascists. Dissolution and ban of Azov and its units and similar fascist detachments.
  10. Political amnesty. Release of political prisoners, lifting the ban on media and political parties.
  11. Free elections of the president and parliament.
  12. Official neutrality of Ukraine, which must be recognized by NATO countries. No foreign troops.
  13. This is all the minimum program.

‘It’s like they’re coming out of a cult’: Ukraine tackles Russian indoctrination of repatriated children

Le Monde

By Faustine Vincent (Special correspondent in Kyiv)

https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/11/06/it-s-like-they-re-coming-out-of-a-cult-ukraine-tackles-russian-indoctrination-of-repatriated-children_6747195_4.html

To date, 1,762 Ukrainian children have been repatriated after being forcibly transferred by Moscow. Ukrainians are working to de-indoctrinate them and are warning that today, all children living under occupation, Russified and militarized, are being torn from their country without even having to be physically deported.

In three and a half years of full-scale war, Oksana Lebedeva thought she had seen everything. But since she began caring for children repatriated to Ukraine after being forcibly transferred by Russia, the founder of the NGO Gen. Ukrainian discovered an even darker side of the conflict. “Their behavior is very different from children traumatized here by the conflict,” she explained. “When they come back, after being indoctrinated by Russia, they don’t speak, don’t play, don’t trust anyone and don’t even look at you.” One aspect particularly surprised her: “They are all extremely docile. That shocked us. They are ready to give everything and behave like little soldiers.” She gives each child a notebook to write about their experience. One boy took a red marker and wrote in large letters: “Top secret.”

To date, 1,762 Ukrainian children have been repatriated out of the 19,546 identified by Ukrainian authorities as having been deported to Russia or forcibly transferred within occupied territories. Moscow began mass transfers of these children at the beginning of its invasion in February 2022. Since then, Ukraine has worked to recover these “stolen children,” some of whom were adopted by Russian families, with Moscow erasing their identities by changing their names and dates of birth, and moving them around frequently. In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and the commissioner for children’s rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, for the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children. That same year, Russia boasted of having “welcomed more than 700,000 Ukrainian children.”

The fate of these children torn from their country has provoked international outrage. But the threat has now grown, insist Ukrainian officials overseeing the issue. “The situation is much worse than at the start of the invasion,” warned Maksym Maksymov, project manager for the Bring Kids Back Ukraine program, created by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to coordinate efforts by the government, partner countries and international organizations to return “kidnapped” children. “Today,” Maksymov explained, “1.6 million Ukrainian children live in occupied territories and in Russia. Moscow is indoctrinating them with the same goal: to change their identity.” He said it’s important not to “focus solely on the figure of 20,000 deported children, because even if we manage to bring them back, it won’t solve the problem. Today, Russia doesn’t even need to physically transfer children to tear them from Ukraine; it does it psychologically and mentally.”

‘War machine’

Young Ukrainians are a prime target for the Kremlin. To erase their identity and turn them into future soldiers under its command, Moscow subjects them to forced re-education, Russification and militarization beginning in elementary school. “Whether the children are in Russia or in the occupied territories no longer has any impact on the level of indoctrination, it is the same everywhere,” noted Yulia Sidorenko, head of the Save Ukraine center in Kyiv, which assists repatriated minors. With this indoctrination, “deportation has become a process” affecting all Ukrainian children living under Russian control, according to Olena Rozvadovska, founder of the organization Voices of Children. “The Russians are brilliant at brainwashing,” she sighed. “It’s a war machine designed to make them hate anything Ukrainian.”

The methods used at times resemble laboratory experiments, particularly in “filtration camps,” giant checkpoints set up by Moscow in occupied territories and in Russia to control and filter Ukrainians trying to leave, where they may be detained for months. “A young girl told me that when the Russians showed them videos of Ukraine in these camps, it was cold, they were hungry and it smelled bad,” recounted Natalia Masiak, a psychologist at Voices of Children. “But when they showed videos of Russia, they handed out cookies, the atmosphere was comforting and it was warm.”

Daria Herasymchuk, the Ukrainian president’s commissioner for children’s rights and rehabilitation, regrets that indoctrination is “not taken seriously enough” by international bodies. “Yet it’s a burning issue that represents a considerable threat.” She cited the case of Ugandan commander Dominic Ongwen. Kidnapped and indoctrinated by the rebel LRA group as a child, he was sentenced by the ICC in 2021 to 25 years in prison for crimes against humanity. “That’s why we must immediately save all our children,” Daria Herasymchuk insisted, “and not wait until they all turn against Ukraine.”

Oleksandr (a pseudonym), 19, spent three and a half years under Russian occupation in Dniprorudne, in the Zaporizhzhia region, before managing to escape in August. This young Ukrainian, who was tortured by Russian security services (FSB) for two months for forming a small resistance group, described how the environment radically changed since 2022. “Russia is everywhere, on the radio, on flags. Staying there without having your brain melt is extremely difficult,” said the student, now living in Kyiv. “Young people are particularly affected. The effect of propaganda is so powerful that even those who were against Russia are starting to believe it. Even 14-year-olds don’t really remember what life was like in Ukraine [before the Russians arrived].”

Oleksander (who is using a pseudonym) was subjected to interrogations, electric torture, psychological pressure and imprisonment by Russian forces for two months when he was only 16 years old, in the occupied territories of Zaporizhzhia. In the offices of the Bring Kids Back Ukraine organization, in Kyiv, October 4, 2025. VIRGINIE NGUYEN HOANG/HUMA FOR LE MONDE

The more traumatized a child is, the more receptive they are to propaganda and the easier to manipulate. “That’s why the Russians create this trauma, by completely isolating the child, hammering home the message that no one is coming to get them and that no one needs them,” explained Myroslava Kharchenko, co-founder of the humanitarian organization Save Ukraine, which searches for, repatriates and rehabilitates abducted Ukrainian children. “It works very well: The child, broken, feels abandoned. The Russians empty them of their identity and values, and replace them with others.”

Adoptions for payment

Ksenia Koldin, 21, saw the effectiveness of this method on her younger brother, who was forcibly transferred to Russia in August 2022 at age 11 from Vovchansk, one of the first Ukrainian cities to be occupied, in the Kharkiv region. As a student, she had to fight to get him back. When she finally found him in May 2023, the boy, placed with a Russian foster family, initially refused to go with her. “He told me his life was now in Russia, that he had friends there and that Ukraine was a bad and dangerous country. I was desperate,” recounted the young woman, her black hair pulled back and face grave. She spent three and a half hours trying to convince him. “His foster family and the Russian school had completely brainwashed him. Then, I had a stroke of genius and told him: ‘OK, but I’m your sister, I love you, I missed you a lot, so let’s just go for a month.'” Since then, her brother has been cared for in Ukraine and has not gone back to Russia.

Upon their return, all repatriated children are questioned by a psychologist about their experience. Hidden behind a one-way mirror, representatives from Ukrainian security services, the prosecutor general’s office, the police and child protection services pass along their questions. The information gathered helps to better understand Russian methods. After spending up to three months in filtration camps, the youngest and healthiest children are adopted by Russian families, who receive the equivalent of $200 per month (€173) and sometimes take in seven or eight children. “These families aren’t interested in the child, but in the money,” explained Masiak, who has conducted about 50 interviews. “Many adoptive parents threatened the children: ‘If you don’t obey, we’ll tell everyone you’re Ukrainian. You’ll see what happens to you.’ There are many cases of abuse.”

The de-indoctrination of children repatriated from Russia and the occupied territories is a complex process, and a step considered necessary for their rehabilitation. “We have to ‘deprogram’ them because, among those who have returned, some believed that Ukraine no longer existed and that Russia had won the war,” explained Kharchenko. Others display strange reflexes. “An 18-year-old boy, rescued from Russian-controlled territories, went to the Kyiv memorial honoring fallen soldiers. Seeing all the Ukrainian flags, which are banned in occupied zones, he suddenly began singing the Russian anthem.” Police intervened, believing it was a provocation, and opened a criminal investigation. “We had to prove he had suffered a psychological breakdown,” Kharchenko added.

So far, most of the Ukrainian children who have been repatriated are teenagers who wanted to return and have not been completely brainwashed by propaganda. “But the longer children stay in occupied territory, the harder it will be to help them when they return and to convince them everything was false,” said Rozvadovska. Aware of the scale of the challenge, specialists in de-indoctrination are developing different methodologies.

‘Deprogramming’

The approach used by the Save Ukraine NGO, developed in collaboration with clinical psychologists, neuropsychologists and Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv, has a telling name: “deprogramming.” This involves preparing the environment for repatriated children by training their teachers, classmates and community to restore trust and help them feel “expected.” That is not always the case today. After being harassed in Russia, where they were accused of starting the war and being responsible for the death of a father or brother killed at the front, some are sometimes harassed upon their return to Ukraine, where they are criticized for not leaving earlier or for not speaking Ukrainian well.

The specialists in charge of these children are careful not to use the same violent methods that the Russians used to indoctrinate them, favoring instead a “gentle” and individualized approach. “But it will take years for them to readjust, because it’s like they’re coming out of a cult,” observed Masiak. Ukraine has sought advice from Finland, which is working to reintegrate children from the Islamic State. “At first, these children refuse to leave Syria, but after leaving the camp, their perception changes. That gives us hope,” said Maksymov.

Ukrainians know the hardest part is yet to come and that time is against them. Not only because tracing the youngest becomes almost impossible, but also because the longer the war lasts, the more children trapped in Russia and occupied territories grow up believing they are Russian and that Ukraine is the enemy, undermining any deprogramming efforts – if they ever return at all.

Anticipating these difficulties, the authorities launched a national campaign in the spring, “Let’s Bring Ukrainian Children Home,” to collect the DNA of families whose children were transferred to Russia and create a database. “That way, if these children come back in 10, 20 or 30 years, they can be identified,” explained Maksymov. “It will allow us to prove what happened.” And help these Ukrainians discover their true story.

Russia’s New Middle Class Can’t Afford for Putin’s War to End

‘Deathonomics’ is transforming Russian society. Few would welcome peace

By Eir Nolsøe economics Correspondent and Tim Wallace Deputy Economics Editor via The Telegraph (UK)
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/08/24/russias-new-middle-class-cant-afford-for-putins-war-to-end/

The Russian city of Volgograd was the location of one of the bloodiest fights in world history. The seven-month-long Battle of Stalingrad, as the city was known in 1943, claimed half a million Soviet lives.

More than 80 years later, the Russian version of Facebook is awash with government ads encouraging men in the city to join today’s war effort in Ukraine.

“Men aged 18 to 63, we consider those with diseases – HIV, hepatitis. We accept those on parole and convicts,” reads one such ad on Vkontakte, or VK, as it is known.

Having flat feet, an intellectual disability or being a foreigner also need not be a disqualifier, it adds. In return, big prizes await.

One advert offers 8m rubles (£74,000) for the first year of military service – more than 10 times the region’s average wage of 712,883 rubles (£6,592) last year.

This includes hefty sign-on bonuses, extra payments for those with children and other perks like priority nursery places, discounted mortgages and tax breaks.

The payments are one example of how Russia’s war economy has created a new middle class in the country’s industrial heartlands.

Military families are receiving big cheques while men are on the frontlines, many of them facing death.

Blue-collar workers’ wages have also surged in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine.

While money is a paltry way to make up for the death of a loved one, there are some Russians on the home front who do not want the war to end.

It comes as Donald Trump and European leaders try to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, seemingly with little success.

Running out of patience with Moscow’s tricks and bombardments, Volodymyr Zelensky warned: “They don’t want to end this war.”

While the comment was aimed at Vladimir Putin, Russians lifted out of poverty as a result of the conflict may also feel apprehensive. For many of the new middle class, they cannot afford peace.

‘They are getting respect’

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, many Western economists predicted it would face impending economic collapse in the face of the world’s harshest sanctions.

As the war approaches its fourth anniversary, the economy is under strain – but there has been no crisis. If anything, for some Russians life has improved.

The biggest benefactors are impoverished industrial areas that have suffered decades of decline, experiencing a fate similar to once-wealthy parts of the West.

Many towns and smaller cities across Russia that relied on a single industry such as defence or manufacturing never recovered after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

“In the years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these areas went into decline, and people struggled to find jobs. But the facilities were still there,” says Tatiana Orlova, from Oxford Economics.

A safer world meant the need for ammunition, guns and other types of manufacturing had faded. That was, until Putin brought war to Europe.

“All that changed three years ago when the Russian leadership realised that it could not wrap up the war quickly. So it started moving the economy into a different mode,” says Orlova.

“Suddenly, these mothballed industrial facilities were hiring new workers, and new investment started flowing. These enterprises were competing with other sectors for workers, and they were offering good wages.”

Factories under pressure to churn out goods to support the war – munitions, uniforms and so on – started running three shifts a day.

Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of working-age men joined the military, and Moscow restricted immigration – creating crippling worker shortages.

The result can be seen in wage data from Russia’s statistics office, Rosstat. Pay has surged in sectors related to the war effort, while other professions typically lucrative in peacetime have suffered.

Wages for workers making “finished metal items” rose by 78pc before accounting for inflation between 2024 and 2021, the fastest of any occupation.

In contrast, healthcare workers such as doctors and nurses and employees in the oil industry have seen the slowest growth, at 40pc and 48pc respectively.

“If you look at teachers or doctors, the increase is much, much smaller than in manufacturing,” says Orlova.

Putin has effectively done what Trump has promised American voters: creating well-paid factory jobs en masse in the poorest parts of the country. Workers with no education and few skills are benefiting.

“These people live in underdeveloped regions. They work in once underperforming industries. They don’t have higher education. But now these assets and skills are in demand,” says Ekaterina Kurbangaleeva, a visiting scholar at the George Washington University in Washington DC.

“They are getting higher salaries. Their savings are growing. And they are also getting social respect.”

It is a good time to be a Russian factory worker. But the real money comes if you join the military.

“When a man in the family joins the army on a military contract, first of all he gets his bonus and he starts getting monthly wages. The wages are decent. It’s something like $2,000 a month. All that money started flowing mostly into the Russian regions because people are less keen to sign up for the contractual army in the big cities,” Orlova says.

“I call this deathonomics,” says Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev. He co-founded the Cyprus-based Centre for Analysis and Strategies in Europe in 2023 alongside Dmitry Gudkov, one of the leaders of the Russian opposition in exile.

“This was actually a fascinating know-how on the part of Putin’s regime because he transformed the lives of – I’d say very impolitely – people [who were] kind of social waste, into a vehicle for economic development.

“These people were almost useless. Many of them had no work in the small towns and villages and were conducting a very anti-social way of life. Then all of a sudden, these people were taken out of the environment.”

The environment in which they now find themselves – a war zone – is a grim one. But Inozemtsev believes many of those left in Russia will have little sympathy.

“In some cases, I would say their neighbours were absolutely happy they disappeared from their lives. Their relatives got a lot of money and became quite prosperous people in their local communities.

“You take useless resources from the economy and you pour money instead of that. But of course, this all is only a temporary solution because the stock of these people is limited.”

Soldiers are offered big financial incentives to join the army, ranging from sign-on bonuses to debt forgiveness.

“Russian regions have been literally competing to sign people on military contracts. They got targets from above, and they had to fulfil them. They started offering sign-up bonuses in central regions, which reached something like $25,000-equivalent in rubles,” adds Orlova at Oxford Economics.

One can catch glimpses of how the lure of the big financial rewards is playing out all across Russia on Vkontakte.

A 23-year-old married father asks in a group discussing the military effort where he can get the most money by signing on, adding that he has heard in some areas families wait months for the payments.

Others express remorse. “I stupidly signed the contract, now I don’t need the money. I don’t know what to do, I’m not a warrior at all. I’m 21 years old,” despairs one man.

While the soldiers receive handsome salaries and bonuses, the biggest financial rewards come in death. Families of Russian soldiers killed on the frontline are entitled to payouts of up to 11m rubles – equivalent to around £100,000.

This includes an automatic “presidential” payment of 4.9m rubles, insurance worth 3.3m rubles and a “governor” payout of up to 3m rubles, according to independent Russian economic news outlet The Bell.

Officials from Russia’s ruling party have also been known to hand bereaved mothers and widows gifts, ranging from fridges, bags of onions to actual meat grinders.

On Vkontakte, a user whose account has been deleted replied to the 23-year-old father urging him not to sign up as he will be “cannon fodder”.

“Stay home, I buried mine, he died on his first mission. Enough deaths already,” another message reads.

Coming in from the cold

The influx of cash into Russia’s poorest regions has helped fuel a spending boom, as impoverished families have suddenly come into money.

“Many soldiers came from the very poor regions. This provoked a huge increase of real disposable incomes in very remote and poor regions in Russia like the Republic of Altai, the Republic of Tuva and some others – mostly North Caucasus and Siberia regions,” says Inozemtsev.

Families in tiny villages and small towns received “enormous” sums of money by local standards, he says. Many bought apartments in big regional cities with better schools and universities for their children, he adds.

The influx of cash has also fuelled redevelopment in some of Russia’s poorest areas.

“It gave rise to development of services in the poor regions where people previously, for example, could not even think of spending money on something like a monthly gym subscription,” says Orlova.

“Suddenly, new gyms and beauty salons started springing up. More cafes and restaurants opened as well. People really started spending on services.”

Visa restrictions and high costs mean foreign holidays are out of reach for most ordinary Russians. Instead, domestic travel has flourished.

“The number of hotel rooms is increasing 15pc-20pc per year. The whole hospitality industry – hotels, restaurants, catering – is growing. So the salaries of waiters, chefs and hotel managers are increasing too,” says Kurbangaleeva.

And so, a new social class is emerging.

Experts like Kurbangaleeva point out that what we refer to as middle class usually reflects three things: income levels, education and social standing.

In other words, becoming middle class isn’t something that happens overnight.

But there are signs of a bigger shift. One of the perks military families are entitled to is that soldiers and their children get priority access to Russia’s competitive public universities.

In families where no one has gone to university, the barriers have been lowered substantially.

“The Russian government imposed a special university admission quota for soldiers and their children. They can apply without contest,” says Kurbangaleeva.

“Before this quota, they had no chance. They don’t get a good education [growing up] or a high enough level of knowledge. So they could not compete with other children who live in big cities or go to better schools. They now face an obstacle-free road to apply to the best universities in the country.”

This year’s quota is 50,000 places across the country. Actual enrolment figures will only be available in September. However, last year nearly 15,000 students made use of the offer, up from 8,000 in 2023.

Kurbangaleeva believes it is the start of a bigger trend. “The social hierarchy is changing right now,” she says.

‘Social disaster’

Putin has achieved what many Western leaders have failed at: lifting the fortunes of some of the very poorest in society in a short period of time.

The price? One million Russian casualties, and counting.

In recent weeks, the promise of an end to the war briefly seemed closer than ever. The Russian leader flew to Anchorage, in Alaska, to meet President Trump on Aug 15, under the guise of peace negotiations.

Coverage was dominated by the images of Putin beaming as he strutted down the red carpet to engage in a warm handshake and chummy catch-up with America’s president.

If the war does end, Russians who have grown accustomed to much higher living standards may pay the price. Surviving soldiers returning from the frontline and their families are likely to quickly slip back into their old lives, believes Inozemtsev.

“These people are not accustomed to accumulate and to save money. They will spend it in a year or two, and return to the type of life they were accustomed to. The service in the army will not change your social behaviour,” he says.

“If 500,000 people will come back to the regions with very low wages and their savings from the service time will be exhausted in months, or in one or two years, it might be a huge social disaster.”

Such returns can prove hugely destabilising, as in Germany after the First World War in the 1920s. After returning from the war, Adolf Hitler founded the Nazi Party and assembled a private army made up of mostly unemployed and disillusioned veterans.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was in part driven by the end of the Afghan war, experts also point out.

“It’s a big question for the government, for Putin – how to take care of those people after the war is over,” says a Russian economist based in Europe who did not want to be named.

“I wouldn’t be that optimistic about their future. The government will do everything to disseminate those people and not allow them to turn into a powerful group. Cynically, the Russian political class have experience, or at least prior knowledge of how to deal with that.”

Other workers who have benefited from the war are also likely to take a hit once the economy normalises. Blue-collar workers, business people buying up stranded Western assets and state employees working in law enforcement are all likely to lose out in a demobilised economy.

“All these people are not interested in the return to peacetime,” says Kurbangaleeva. “It seems to me that the Russian authorities feel that. These beneficiaries would be more confident if they could sustain the current situation, because when and if the war ends, a lot might change.

“For them, it’s more beneficial to continue.”

While the summit in Alaska was billed as an effort for peace, Putin made sure to dangle the promise of lucrative commercial deals in front of Trump at the brief press conference that followed their talks.

“When the new administration came to power, bilateral trade started to grow. It is clear that the US and Russian investment and business cooperation has tremendous potential,” the Russian president said.

“My best guess is that Putin is trying to sow division between the US and Europe,” says Robin Brooks, at the Brookings Institution.

US exports to Russia so far this year have jumped by a fifth compared to the same period of 2024. Much of that is pharmaceuticals and medical products. Sales going the other way – including nuclear materials and fertilisers – are up by one third.

Putin’s strategy may be to make Zelensky’s and Europe’s concerns seem like a sideshow compared to the real business of carving up resources, whether in Russia’s far north or in newly conquered lands in Ukraine.

“Trump is a real-estate guy, and Russia has a lot of real estate and a lot of resources. Why don’t we strike a great deal on that?” says Holger Schmieding, at Berenberg Bank, of Moscow’s approach.

“From all we know about Trump, that appeals to his gut reactions – who cares about laws and rules, there is land, there is stuff you can make money on, there is someone with whom he can strike a business deal.”

As a result, many fear peace is no closer. That means more misery in Ukraine – but there will be those cheering in Volgograd.

“It’s easy to begin the war, but it’s so hard to end it,” says Kurbangaleeva

Putin as the Tsar?

by Sergey Markov

Putin as the tsar? Which tsar in Russian history is he comparable to?

  1. Patriarch Kirill has compared Putin with Alexander Nevsky. The logic here is that Nevsky repelled the West’s attack on Russia. Putin has the same task.

  2. Putin often associates himself with Prince Vladimir, the baptizer of Rus’. Logic is: Putin erected a monument to him near the Kremlin and right where he himself enters the Kremlin, as if he were his guardian angel.

  3. The opposition often compares Putin to Ivan the Terrible. Logic: the same repressions. And the KGB-FSB are like Ivan’s guardsmen.

  4. The West compares Putin with Stalin. They say omnipotent and repressive.

  5. Patriots in Russia demand that Putin be like Alexander the Third. That is, build an empire on your own national basis.

  6. And the population of Russia would like Putin to be like Brezhnev. And this, by the way, is the Chinese ideal of a ruler: he does nothing, and everyone lives very well because of it.