by Thierry Etienne Joseph Rotty, Senior Controller at NATO

Sort of.

Her grandfather, Carl Albrecht, worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and arranged the economic aspects of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939.

Originally he was a cotton merchant but his dealing with the Soviet Union (and the fact he spoke Russian), made him important to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Now the problem with Nazi Germany was that responsibilities were never clearly defined. Divide and conquer was Hitler’s motto.

Once Germany invaded the Soviet Union, her grandfather was once again important for the Foreign Ministry as Ukraine was meant to be divided up in colonies between Germany, Hungary, and Romania.

Economic activity in Ukraine was divided between the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry for Armaments and Munitions, and the Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and the Foreign Ministry

The SS and the Foreign Ministry of Hungary and Romania also had a say in the matter.

Your status with Hitler improved as you could increase economic output (Hitler loved statistics). Increasing economic output for areas and factories falling under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fell to Carl Albrecht.

The shifting alliances within the Nazi leadership mean that one Ministry would help out another when it suited them. If the Ministry of Labour needed more workers in Germany, other Ministries were happy to round up locals and deport them so as to gain favour with the Ministry of Labour … of course, later a favour in return would be asked.

Carl Albrecht was mainly active in Ukrainian matters from 1941 to 1943. From 1943 onward, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had almost no input in economic affairs any more and he went back to running his private businesses in Bremen.

But he was one of those pencil-pushers responsible for thousands of deaths. Of course, he was not the only one, there were hundreds like him working in all Occupied Territories for various Ministries.

by Gilbert Doctorow via Gilbert Doctorow

[ . . . ] So much for Belgium.* As for Russia, what I have just described is not very promising for bringing in a change of policy in the West that would hasten the end to the war by cutting military and financial support for Kiev. It is in line with with the realistic appraisal of what Russia is up against that is being aired on state television with ever greater frequency. Today’s morning edition of the ‘Sixty Minutes’ news and commentary show was a case in point. As panelists and hosts were saying, the results of yesterday’s elections in America hold no promise of a quick reversal in Washington’s foreign policy. And for its part, Western Europe does not yet appear to be collapsing economically or politically. The conclusion: the war will end only as a consequence Russia’s victory on the battlefield, not thanks to outside events.

So, how is the war going on the ground? According to the expert panelists on ‘Sixty Minutes,’ the 80,000 or so recently mobilized Russian troops now at the front have achieved the objective of holding the lines, so that for several days now they are stable, hardly moving this way or that despite daily Ukrainian attacks on given points. The attackers are repelled with great loss of life on the Ukrainian side, but without any strategic implications. The Russians speak of 10,000 Ukrainian deaths in the Kherson zone of combat over the month of October. At the same time, the Russians say they are withdrawing from the city of Kherson, having decided that presently the logistical challenge of supplying their troops on the Western banks of the Dnepr are too great; they will continue the fight from across the river, on the Eastern banks. They have already evacuated 110,000 civilians from the city of Kherson to the East, meaning essentially to the Crimea and the southern regions of European Russia.

Thus, for the moment the war is at a stalemate. That may change only when the further 140,000 or so reservists complete their training and are sent into battle for what will be the Russian counter-offensive of 2023. That may be a game changer, or maybe it won’t, depending on what new cutting edge weaponry Washington begins shipping to Kiev between now and then.

All of the foregoing brings me to an issue that I had dismissed out of hand…a ‘tactical nuclear strike.’ However, an article in today’s Financial Times put it into a very specific form, quite different from the low yield nuclear weapons designed for use on the battlefield that the Russians say they have no need of. What we are talking about is an ‘electromagnetic pulse strike’ to knock out Ukraine’s military potential at one blow by disabling any and all electronic and electrical equipment on the ground throughout the country and…including satellites in the space above. Here we have a nuclear device delivered by hypersonic missile and detonated at high altitude. There would be no cloud, no physical destruction to buildings, nor deaths to people on the ground. And the Russians are said to have already tested this over the Barents Sea.

This state of the art weapon used by no one till now would, indeed, conform to Vladimir Putin’s saying at the start of the war that Russia had ‘military technical means’ to prevail, an expression that had many Western analysts guessing when it was said. It would also put in a proper context Putin’s recent mention of the American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In both the 1945 case and the possible present case, the motive of those using the new weapons was and would now be to spare the lives of tens of thousands of one’s own soldiers while putting a swift end to a war. The difference, of course, is that the American use of nuclear weapons cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians whereas Russia’s possible use of a tactical electromagnetic pulse would cost virtually nothing in human lives.

I leave it to the reader to decide if this would amount to opening the Pandora’s box of nuclear horrors as Washington is intimating.

Postscript, 10 November: One reader has correctly commented that an EPM attack could also be brought about using a non-nuclear explosive, which the Russians are also said to possess. This issue will merit very close attention. And I further emphasize that Russia’s possible move on to totally new methods of warfare in which they are, with the United States, world ‘leaders’ will only come about in response to escalation in capabilities of weaponry supplied to Ukraine by the USA and NATO. Russia remains a ‘reactive’ power.

Note: Here is the discussion about Belgium.

After my recent explanation of the way the Europe-wide energy crisis is forcing the household finances of the vast majority of Belgians into red figures each month, and after speculating on whether and when this untenable situation will lead to civil unrest, I am duty bound to report on today’s “nationwide strike” in Belgium: namely what were the demands of the union leaders who called the strike, what impact their action has had on daily life here and, most importantly, whether this in any way prefigures changes with respect to Belgian support for the EU policies of sanctions on Russia and military-financial aid to Ukraine.

This was called a ‘nationwide strike’ rather than a ‘general strike’ because the strike action was called by the country’s two biggest labor unions acting on their own and representing several clearly defined economic sectors, chief among them being transportation. The Belgian railways were nearly shut down, as were most municipal public transportation networks, meaning metros, trams and buses, though certain lines were provided with sharply reduced service. Of the two national airports serving commercial flights, Charleroi was completely shut, while Zaventem outside Brussels cancelled 60% of its flights. In retailing, the main supermarket chains were shuttered. Post offices, hospitals, prisons and many other public services were maintained at minimal levels typical of Sundays. However, the schools remained open. For that matter, most shops, eateries and other private enterprises remained open.

The union bosses called the day’s action a success. It was a shot over the bow of the government to warn of the demands that the unionists want to see satisfied in the weeks ahead. These demands are strictly economic, seeking government assistance in putting a cap on energy bills to households and scrapping controls on allowable salary increases set in law, so that workers can negotiate new contracts that raise wages sufficiently to compensate for the ongoing high inflation. For his part, Prime Minister De Croo says that the provisions of wage indexation in place protect Belgian workers better than in most other countries and he has called upon the people to pull together and avoid discord.

What are we to make of this? The outstanding conclusion is that both sides to the issue are intentionally ignoring the elephant in the room, namely the sanctions on Russia which have driven up energy costs so dramatically over the course of this year. Most likely by intent, the unions have decided not to infringe on the prerogatives of the government by making political demands. Thus, to borrow a line from the BBC Business News programs, they are not ‘making the connection’ between the country’s foreign policy and the rising cost of living.

The problem here is that indexation or still higher salary awards in the months ahead will only aggravate the inflation, making it more intractable and longer-lasting. Moreover, since so many of those who were out on strike today are government workers, their pay increases in months ahead will push the federal budget into still greater deficit, violating EU financial rules and risking penalties of one kind or another. Meanwhile, private employers are likely to resist any large wage increases over the levels set in law since that would drive up costs and their own sale prices to uncompetitive levels on world markets. We may expect the arm wrestling to continue for some time, possibly engendering wildcat strikes and other labor unrest.

©Gilbert Doctorow, 2022

Military expert Daniel Bezsonov @neoficialniybezsonov writes :

There is good news today, if you can call it news. I’ve written about this before, but I think it’s worth repeating it in more detail, as it’s more relevant than ever.

In the eight years before the Special Military Operation (SMO), the Ukrainian army was actively fighting in the Donbass, in the cauldrons and experiencing many other upheavals. During the eight years, the Armed Forces of Ukraine made most of the mistakes possible in war at all levels of army management and were just as active in correcting them. The whole process took place with the active participation of NATO advisers and instructors, as well as with the financial and logistical support of the West. In fact, at the start of SMO, the Ukrainian army was almost at the peak of its capabilities. Yes, since the start of SMO, the enemy has also gained more experience, but it has not improved dramatically, as its capabilities are already almost at their limit.

The Russian army, on the other hand, began the special military operation without any experience of large-scale combat operations against a high-tech adversary. The Syrian experience was, to put it mildly, not that. The enemy there was not as developed in terms of weapons and technology, and the function of the infantry on our side was performed and gained this experience mainly by the Wagner PMC, and not the regular infantry. Only with the beginning of the SMO in the Russian Armed Forces errors at all levels were exposed. Mistakes in logistics, errors in the management of troops and interaction between the armed forces, and the tactics of warfare were outdated in today’s conditions. And many other mistakes and problems were exposed only with the start of the SMO.

Now these errors are being corrected. Slowly, but they have started. If this trend continues (and I am sure it will), very soon the Russian army will be a completely different organism, with stronger components both in the personnel system and technical equipment.

In other words, the Ukrainian army entered the modern war at the peak of its capabilities, and the Russian army was at one of its lowest levels of potential. Considering that at the moment the “NATO” Armed Forces and the Russian Armed Forces look like equal opponents on the battlefield, in some time the Russian army will be a head higher if it continues to develop and unlock its potential – and this will not be the limit of its development yet. The main thing is that mistakes will continue to be corrected and problems solved.

via Gpovanman

Sergei Surovikin may be the new kid on the block in Russia’s Ukrainian operation, yet the move made by both himself and Shoigu today was a very mature decision indeed.

Preamble.

Much has been said over previous days regarding the setbacks suffered by Russian forces in the Kherson region, and today Sergei Shoigu has ordered Russian forces to withdraw from the city and return to the eastern bank of the Dnieper river. Whilst an army of armchair warriors are throwing their hands in the air, rather than speaking of doom and gloom, the current situation needs to be regarded both objectively as well as being part of a much larger overall plan both in the East and the West. This article will examine what has happened, why it has happened and where it all may lead.

A Change of Chief.

In October of this year, General Surovikin became the overall commander of Russian operations in the Ukraine. With that, for the first time since hostilities began, the Kremlin had a commander dedicated to this one operation, yet with that, there were problems.

The first was that although he was the overall commander, he was inheriting a situation of others’ making, and the first few months of the conflict had seen some big mistakes on the part of high-ranking officers in Moscow. Other issues were that with the conflict already being in full-swing and attempting to achieve certain objectives, he had to carry them through even when he believed that this may have not been the wisest plan.

He has now been in the job long enough to begin to steer affairs in a direction that he sees more appropriate, and it is beyond any doubt that it was he who decided to first order an evacuation of the population and then the withdrawal of Russian forces from Kherson and to the other side of the river.

The Situation that Was.

Russian forces had spent a lot of time and blood securing the city of Kherson as well as the western bank of the Dnieper river in this region. With Russia’s advances having come westwards, this meant that the river became a barrier to resupply due to bridges having been destroyed by retreating Ukrainians as well as constant bloody assaults from Kiev’s forces. Another danger was the attacks that Ukrainian forces have been making on dams and hydroelectric installations further up the river. Should any of these be breached, this could flood the area causing immeasurable casualties.

Carnage for Kiev.

As we have seen on countless occasions over the last eight months, the manner in which the Ukrainian High Command often conducts operations beggars belief. Never since the stupidity of the Somme have men been herded into battle with no consideration whatsoever of their chances of returning. Attack after attack in the Kherson region has been repulsed by the Russians, the toll of deaths and casualties becoming critical for the Ukrainian government. That said, in every attack, Moscow’s men have also been suffering, and in stark contrast to the way in which Kiev throws lives away, Russia is simply not willing to hemorrhage in order that others bleed more. Moreover, a stagnant frontline with constant attacks is never good for the morale of any fighting unit, the soldiers stationed there being better employed elsewhere.

A Giveaway of Guns.

Another miscalculation on the part of Moscow was the support that the West would give to the Ukraine. We all expected rational support to be given, yet not only have Western states cleared out their arsenals for Kiev, they are putting certain weapons manufacturing programs into overdrive in order to keep their proxy war going.

With the West throwing unlimited arms at Kiev whilst Zelenskiy throws the lives of Ukrainian soldiers away, Russia would also be throwing men and munitions against an opponent in a very dangerous scenario.

The Russian Plan.

The first thing that has to be remembered is that the Special Military Operation in the Ukraine was not planned in a heartbeat the day before it started, but was years in the making; planners obviously wish to make specific gains in a certain manner, but always as part of a larger strategy. Not only that, certain constraints are in place which mean that Blitzkrieg-type conflicts with the horrendous civilian casualties that they cause cannot be waged. If the territories acquired by the Russian Federation are not to be a depopulated wasteland, caution is most certainly the better part of valor and this to a great degree explains why Moscow’s previous advances were as slow as they were. Not only that, in the face of both the risk of Ukrainian attacks as well as of a possible flood, time will show us that the decision to evacuate the population of the city was a very wise move indeed.

With Moscow now moving its positions to the other side of the Dnieper, not only does the river now offer defensive help rather than a logistical handicap, the local geography means the area occupied by Russian forces is less susceptible to the ravages of water should the dams be attacked.

To date, we have looked only at Kherson yet there are also other areas of concern for Russia, some in which battles are already being fought, and others where they may soon start.

U-Turns, Wrong Turns and Turning the Course of the War.

As mentioned, since February Russian forces have suffered setbacks, yet Moscow is not just operating on one roadmap. Should the primary plan hit difficulties, contingencies are in place to ensure that losses are reduced in order to increase advantages later. In the case of the regrouping near Kherson, the high command has decided to prevent lower casualties on the Russian side rather than imposing far greater ones on its opponents. Western media will doubtlessly go into raptures over Moscow’s setback, yet it is not they who are paying in blood whilst never reporting the true costs paid by the Ukrainians.

This in turn means that for now at least, many of the resources engaged in this region can be deployed elsewhere. With battles raging near Bakhmut and Avdeevka, there is no lack of places where they can be used, it better to win individual battles one by one rather than hold a stalemate across multiple fronts.

Losing a Battle can Win a War.

A huge regrouping such as this is the result of lives and equipment lost, yet had Surovikin continued to hold the lines, over time the toll would have been been even higher. Everything that is saved by a withdrawal today will be available tomorrow, materiel being recovered and casualties being avoided. What is also important is that for now at least, thousands upon thousands of Ukrainian troops are occupying an area from which it is much more difficult to launch the suicidal attacks seen of late.

Learning a Lesson.

As bitter a pill as Kherson is, by swallowing it, both the Kremlin and its forces will come away wiser for the experience. Rather than entering into a war to fight for Russians, this has turned into a proxy war, the US having pockets deeper than the Grand Canyon to pay for arms and knowing that Zelenskiy will fight whoever he is told to the last man. With that, we have to look at other aspects of the conflict.

Transportation Troubles.

With logistics as bad as they are in the Ukraine, should Kiev wish to move its assets elsewhere, this will prove a challenge in itself. This means that if the Kremlin is quick, the rapid redeployment of men and machines can score much-needed victories elsewhere.

Infrastructure Issues.

One of the prime objectives of Russia’s assault on the Ukraine’s infrastructure was to force Kiev’s hand into negotiations for a truce. Whilst this has not brought Kiev to its senses, it has been a great success from a Russian perspective, and more of the same would likely yield the same. A faraway war is brought into the houses of the capital every time a Geran visits the capital, and should their use become more widespread, this will bring the country to its knees.

Fresh Fields.

It has not gone unnoticed by many that both Moscow’s and Minsk’s forces have been massing in Belarus over recent months. Quite what is planned or when it will happen is still a closely guarded secret, yet with pressure taken off Moscow to the south, Ukrainian forces concentrating on areas that Russia will vacate and there only being around sixty miles from Kiev to the Belarusian border, perhaps the relief that a withdrawal from Kherson will give Russian forces may signal that the time is ripe for some operation in this area. If strikes on infrastructure cannot bring Kiev to the negotiating table, perhaps bringing the table closer to Kiev may yield results.

Summary.

At first glance, this is an absolute debacle, yet when viewing this objectively, a lost battle is part of a war, and for all the blood being spat by some, it is not as disastrous a move as so many doomsday merchants would like us to believe.

A local conflict was launched which has in time turned into a war which the West cannot afford to ultimately lose. To that end, countries have quite literally bankrupted themselves to support the Ukrainian cause, this being a factor which Moscow did not foresee.

A new commander is in charge now, and if he is to make the current and future situations good, he has to dispense with some of the decisions that went before him.

History has on numerous occasions shown that one apparently ignominious step back can later prove to have been a vital step towards victory. With the conflict having changed so much since February, the world has also been changed by this conflict.

Today, those in the know understand what Russia’s withdrawal from Kherson means; those that do not know will only understand as this step back takes a new meaning in the weeks and months ahead.