What the Russians are saying:

No kidding.

In Russia, the opinion about the Bradley IFV was greatly influenced by the comedy “The Pentagon Wars”, in which corruption in the American army is scourged by the example of this project.

Indeed, the legendary long-term construction lasted 17 years, and $14 billion was spent on development, but in the end the United States still got still got a fairly serious combat vehicle. Although not without drawbacks, they are still of much higher class than what was supplied to Ukraine earlier.

The AFU will receive M2A2 ODS, an upgraded version based on the experience of the Gulf War, saturated with relatively modern electronics. By the way, during that very war, the Bradleys destroyed more Iraqi tanks than the famous Abrams. No matter how much the skeptics laugh at the “aluminum” armor of this IFV, it’s not so easy to punch a Bradley in the forehead from a 30-mm cannon of our BMP. The armored vehicle holds 14.5 caliber armor-piercing bullets from all sides, and the presence of dynamic protection ensures high chances of survival of the crew when fired upon from an RPG or ATGM.

The 25-mm M242 Bushmaster cannon is quite comparable to the domestic 30-mm 2A42 and 2A72 guns mounted on the BMP-2 and BMP-3, and 2 TOW-2 ATGMs can effectively resist tanks at a distance of up to 3.7 km. In addition, NATO information and control systems are integrated into the Bradley, and it can be not just a means of strengthening the infantry squad, but also serve as a kind of mini-headquarters.

Does this mean that the Americans have supplied the AFU with a “miracle weapon” that will change the course of the war? No! Bradley has many shortcomings and we have something to destroy this IFV with. The presence of dynamic protection does not guarantee the survival of the vehicle after a cumulative grenade hit from an RPG, and the side armor will not cope with the guns of our BMP. About what will happen to the Bradley when meeting with a tank shell, we will simply keep silent.

Russian military commanders and patriotic bloggers promise mountains of gold to whoever destroys the first Bradley, not because it is such a terrible enemy, but because it is priceless to show the world footage of burning modern American technology.

Extremely rare and epic footage of the assault on Ukrainian positions in the Kreminna region

A Russian soldier attacked a trench with Ukrainian soldiers, went to their position, and tried to force them to surrender. However, the Ukrainian soldiers, either from fear or stupidity ,did not understand who was in front of them or what to do and tried to convince the Russian soldier that they were “his own”,(They probably thought that the Russian soldier is a Ukrainian soldier,may be these Ukrainians were in shock) and they refused to drop their weapons.

Risking his life, the fighter tried to take the machine gun from the enemy, but he could not, and in the process of a scuffle, he destroyed the Ukrainian soldiers who continued to resist and refused to surrender.

Apparently one of the Ukrainians who met their tragic end was a popular Nationalist blogger, Vitaly Milevsky.  He liked to make videos about how they were “fun’ up the Russians”, but it didn’t ended up well for him.

*

“War causes immense psychological damage to soldiers, who may return from war without a physical scratch yet be ruined as human beings. Tormented by an inextinguishable internal Hell, they may struggle to adjust to “normal” life. They may suffer from constant rage or anxiety, and be prone to substance abuse, nightmares and more. This is known as PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder). Psychologists who study war-related PTSD say not only combat veterans can suffer from its consequences. Frequent exposure to images of extreme violence such as combat footage can have serious psychological effects, similar to those resulting from combat.”

“A helmet-mounted camera shows a Russian soldier’s view as he grenades, then storms an AFU defensive pit. There, he confronts 2 injured Ukrainian soldiers, shooting them dead at point blank range after a brief attempt to take them prisoner. The video is explicit and horrifying. Most reviews of the video focus on analysis of fault; attempting to justify (or condemn) the actions of the Russian soldier, or conversely the dead AFU troops. Others provide a doctrinal critique of the Russian’s infantry skills and discipline. People want to nit-pick the video, draw conclusions aligned with their preferred narrative, and move on. Along the way, the pure horror in the clip is forgotten.”

“..thanks to the released footage, this isolated horror will be witnessed by thousands. Including perhaps your neighbour’s teenage child.  Including friends and family of the deceased men. Including the type of people who seek out violent content as entertainment. War is Hell, and we are all in it.”

https://t.me/SLGAnalytica/289

Machine Translation

“The US State Department has published a pep talk to the people of Russia, saying, “We love you all.” It ends in their typical vile Jesuit style: “We stand in solidarity with every one of you who seeks to create a more peaceful future.” And the war in Ukraine, they say, is not worthy of everyone’s attention.

Even for these top-notch freaks, this is the height of cynicism and the limit of moral degradation. The United States is spending tens of billions on the war in Ukraine, supplying its weapons on a gigantic scale, exterminating thousands of people by proxy. This is extreme cynicism in the best traditions of the Nazis. Yes, in fact, sons of bitches, by conveying such nonsense, are the real heirs of the Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels.

Only this stillborn nonsense no longer affects anyone. And you will not receive the answer to it in the silence of the office.

[But] The main present for the New Year, a set of Zircon missiles, went to the shores of NATO countries yesterday. Their 1,000 km range, a hypersonic speed of Mach 9 and the ability to use any charge are guaranteed to overcome any missile defense. Let it stand about 100 miles offshore, close to the Potomac River. So rejoice!  

It will bring to mind anyone who poses a direct threat to Russia and our allies. 

You and your henchmen who kill our people will never be forgiven. We will speak to you in the language of power, if you don’t understand it any other way. And we’ll produce even more modern weapons. And grind with them the Nazi scum you spawned in the twenty-first century.  Revenge every criminal for every murdered citizen of our country.”

by Aleks (edited by Algora)

Introduction

Welcome to my analysis of the third phase of the Russian Special Military Operation (SMO) in Ukraine. Phase 3? Yes, Phase 3. We have only a few references from Russian officials about the phases. Especially, when Phase 2 officially started, we had some remarks from Russian officials about that. And that’s all. That’s why I decided  to make my own classification of phases of this war. I have presented them already in a few articles. Especially, you can read about it in the analysis of Phase 2.

According to the Black Mountain classification, we are still in Phase 3. That means that this analysis will contain events that have already happened, and inevitably it will contain some predictions of how events could unfold going forward. Phase 3 roughly began in August 2022 and is still ongoing.

Since many important events took place and are going to take place, I will need to keep my chapters short.

Even so, as I pointed out in the reference to my phase classifications, I will summarize the definition of Phase 3 below:

Phase 3 was activated when NATO escalated its supply, command and control of the Ukrainian forces. This prevented them from collapsing in Phase 2. The purpose of Phase 3 is to destroy the Ukrainian matériel and human potential in regions that are militarily favorable for the Russians, and to overstretch both the Ukrainian and the NATO logistics in Ukraine as much as it is possible, and thus to trigger a total Ukrainian collapse and hence its total defeat. This would be accomplished by using strikes on both its logistics and energy infrastructure, to accelerate the result.

This article is going to explain this in detail.

Preconditions

Phase 1

Read my article about Phase 1.

Phase 2

Read my article about Phase 2.

Objectives

I will cite Clausewitz here, as I did several times already. “War is merely the continuation of politics by other means.” One wins a war by achieving the objectives set by the political leadership. And here I will point out the objectives, as I did in the last two analyses. This is important to reiterate as many times as possible. Why? Because most commentators always forget what the objectives are and keep trying to analyse or criticize the war based on the assumption that the war is fought for the sole purpose of fighting a war. This is utterly wrong.

These are the objectives, set by the Russian leadership:

1. Denazification of Ukraine.
2. Demilitarization of Ukraine.
3. Bring to justice those Ukrainians that have committed (war) crimes against its own population from 2014 onwards.
4. Free the Donbass and ensure its independence and security.

These are the sole objectives of the Special Military Operation (SMO).

I will explain in detail how the implementation will most likely be achieved.

Personnel Situation in the Russian Army

Phase 3 began in August 2022. August was a difficult month for the Russian army.

Many Russian soldiers signed up for a certain period. For example, for half a year. Due to the necessity of secrecy, most soldiers didn’t know for certain that there would be war and that THEY would participate in this war. All contracts were issued with normal service periods in order to preserve secrecy. This eventually led to the situation that a not insignificant part of the Russian professional invasion army saw their contracts expire at the end July 2022.

I don’t have exact numbers and I won’t throw around made-up numbers. What I do know is that far more soldiers left the army, due to expiring contracts, than new troops could be brought in. In fact, this means that from August 2022 onwards, the size of the Russian forces in Ukraine decreased significantly.

However, the line of contact still had the same length. Which means, less troops per mile (density) than before. Since in reality we don’t have Y soldiers every X miles, this is just an average. In reality less regions/villages were manned with Russian troops. Yes, Russia used the Donbass militia extensively, but they were not enough to fight off the whole rest of Ukraine and NATO mercenaries. Which, by the way, they shouldn’t do at all.

Summarizing, we can conclude that the personnel situation for the Russians deteriorated sharply in August 2022.

Training and Equipment from Abroad for Ukraine

Ukraine, on the other hand, started to mobilize as many able-bodied citizens as possible from the beginning of the war. First, they were used to plug the gaps and to establish a defence along the whole line of contact and to build up reserves. Then, newly recruited soldiers were used to plug the holes on the frontline. In Phase 2, the grinding consumed tens of thousands of troops at the frontlines in dead and wounded.

But during Phase 2, Ukraine reached a point where they stabilized the situation. The ratio of casualties on the frontlines and the recruiting of new troops became stable and the best of the mobilized people could be separated to be sent abroad for training. The situation occurred that Ukraine mobilized people, on the one hand, to be immediately and almost without training, into the trenches to plug holes, and on the other hand, to be sent abroad for training.

Why send them abroad? Why train them at all and not use them right away on the frontlines, to turn the war? NATO correctly understood that Russia has superiority in almost everything. Only not in the numbers of troops committed to Ukraine. That’s why plans were designed to train and equip huge numbers of troops abroad, where they can’t be targeted during or right after the training. They would be trained according to NATO standards to be used in particular in predesigned operations, to fully exploit Russia’s biggest weakness: the number of soldiers it has in Ukraine.

Several tens of thousands, some sources say up to one hundred thousand, troops were trained in the EU states. Equipped with NATO equipment, their task would be to attack strategic Russian positions with human wave techniques and stress Russian logistics and their concentration of forces at several sections so much that Russian forces simply would collapse. As described in the analysis of Phase 2, the Ukrainians’ only chance is to exploit the fact that Russia is conducting a SMO and not a full-scale war. Thereby it has only a limited number of troops committed. If these troops were outmanoeuvred, they would do one of the following things:

• Retreat from a certain section to avoid being overrun and defeated.
• Find themselves cut off from supplies and eventually either captured as POWs or killed for propaganda purposes.

We have already experienced the first of the two possibilities several times. Not the second.

Ukraine’s approach

Russia was fully aware of the fact that it needs to handle a war with limited human resources, while NATO is trying to exploit this fact, by using a pool of human resources that must not  be extended so much as to collapse vital functions of the state. This point has already been reached, as I write this text.

Therefore, the Russian planners needed to design a strategy that would include a lot of manoeuvres, pinning down, and deceptions. Only in this way could Russia handle such a far-larger enemy force. In the end we saw that it still was not enough, but I will come to this point later.

Now let’s take a look at several events to work out the strategies applied .

The Ukrainians announced early on that they would start an offensive on Kherson and eventually on Crimea. Obviously, it is rather strange if someone announces its military strategy in advance. But it looks like the Russians had intelligence that it must be true and they prepared accordingly. A large Russian formation was deployed west of the Dnieper. Not only a large force, but a very elite one as well. Many paratrooper units were deployed here, which are not designed for such long-term defensive operations. It is a sign, of being overstretched.

As far as I can see, the forces committed to the Kherson front were absolutely sufficient to hold the line. And they did. Eventually the Ukrainians actually started the announced large-scale offensive on Kherson in August. Every wave of Ukrainians was defeated. The situation caused several tens of thousands of casualties on the Ukrainian side by the time of its preliminary end in November 2022.

I heard many sources and scenarios. And I concluded that the following scenario was the most probable. It looks like the NATO command planned to block huge numbers of Russia’s troops, especially the most elite ones, in Kherson, while secretly preparing another large-scale offensive in Kharkov (Russian held territories of Kharkov) and use it as a lever to apply maximum pressure on the Russian Donbass operations. Eventually, that would trigger a collapse of the front in Donbass, coming from the North.

This could have worked indeed, had Russia not mobilized. (Most soldiers that left the army after their contract expired in July/August 2022 were directly re-mobilized and recommitted on their positions without additional training. They were already experienced. So, the northern Donbass front could have been directly stabilized.)

The NATO plan was thwarted. Now the next approach was to cut off the most experienced Russian troops on the West Bank of the Dnieper. Defeating them or taking them prisoner would have been the last big chance to win the war. Why, win the war? We need to remember, as I pointed out in the analysis of Phase 1 and 2, that if a party achieves the objectives, as set by the political leadership, it has won. It doesn’t matter how many casualties etc. were taken. Well, I pointed out in these articles that Ukraine’s goals are the Western/NATO goals and these are simple… We can break them down to: “Collapse Russia as a state and remove President Putin.”

If we think about it, it becomes clear that if 40,000 Russian troops, many of them elite ones, were trapped at the West Bank of the Dnieper, they couldn’t be saved. They would be either annihilated or taken prisoner. What does it mean to be “trapped” on the West Bank? Well, after the mobilization was announced, it was pretty clear to the West that the former plans were void. They had one last chance of triggering a collapse in Russia: cutting off the Russian grouping on the West Bank of the Dnieper . . .. by destroying the dam at the Kakhovka reservoir.

Ukraine accumulated some 60,000 troops, or more, for such an operation. If the dam were destroyed, Russian logistics would collapse immediately. Without logistics Russia couldn’t hold the West Bank. Especially not against such a large grouping.

Whether this plan had any chance to succeed or not, I don’t know. What I know is that the newly appointed commander of the SMO, General Surovikin, decided that it’s not worth the risk and decided to withdraw all troops to the left side of the Dnieper.

This decision has two implications:

1. The Russian troops are safe.
2. NATO’s last chance to win the war was thwarted. Considering the fact that soon, most likely in December, another 220,000 Russian mobilized troops will arrive on the battlefield or in the rear, there is no theoretical chance or possibility left that would conclude in a Ukrainian victory. Essentially, by withdrawing from Kherson city, Russia killed all hopes the West had of achieving any kind of victory or negotiation leverage (several thousand Russian POWs). It is over. Only, the killing will continue now, until the Ukrainians collapse.

For a detailed analysis of the withdrawal and all military implications (as opposed, to the geo strategic considerations, pointed out above) read my according article.

The main front, though, is neither Kharkov nor Kherson. It is indeed the Donbass, since it is the strategic goal of Russia to free it. Most troops and equipment are concentrated in Donbass and offensive operations are being conducted, since the beginning, along the whole line of contact.

You might ask why there is no progress? I will come later to this, and I explained it already in the analysis of Phase 2, but it is very favourable for Russia to fight exactly at this position. Let the Ukrainians transport all their troops, supplies, equipment across the whole of Ukraine and go the same way back for repairs. Fight in a hostile environment. The Donbass population is clearly most pro-Russian of all regions in Ukraine. Most likely most of the civilians are already gone anyway. Which means, Russia can simply let the Ukrainians come and kill them over and over again. This is exactly what is happening. The Ukrainians are frequently rotating  totally reduced formations (brigades and battalions) out and replenishing them with newly formed and mobilized ones. Some call it a meatgrinder.

Moreover, Russia has total air dominance in Donbass and very short supply lines to Russia. It is the perfect spot now, to keep fighting there. The only reason why it is still working is that the Ukrainians can’t give up one inch of their territory, because all the support of the Western citizens would immediately collapse if they saw the truth, that their support and their own suffering (Europe deindustrializing and deenergizing) is in vain. Perfect conditions for Russia to destroy the whole Ukrainian army at favourable places under its dictated conditions.

Mobilisation

I mentioned it in several articles. NATO knows exactly that their only possibility to win the war is to deliver such a defeat in a single battle to Russia that it would cause mass protests in Russia. And eventually a coup against Putin. Hence, taking prisoner some 40,000 troops or similar events (I know, exaggerated, but only to highlight the strategy). This is only possible as long as Ukraine is able to exploit the biggest Russian weakness: the finite and low number of Russian troops in Ukraine. I described above the Ukrainian approaches to exploit this fact. Even though the probability is low that such a disaster would take place, the probability is still too high. Don’t get me wrong. Russia would be able to conclude the SMO even without mobilisation. But with a far greater effort from every single soldier and with the risk that through some feint or subterfuge entire  Russian formations could be taken captive. Or as President Putin said, that there are not enough troops available to keep such a large frontline properly manned and equipped.

Well, to fight off the Ukrainian army safely is one reason for mobilisation. Later in this article we will see that Russia will be forced to take, one step at a time, as the Ukrainian army keeps collapsing, all the territory of Ukraine. In the first two Phases this wasn’t necessarily mandatory . In Phase 3 it is necessary. I’ll describe it later in detail. Nevertheless, Russia will need many troops available while it keeps advancing into central and western Ukraine, in order to keep the rear secure and maintain order. As well as maintaining logistics and infrastructure works and taking care of huge camps of POWs. This will be needed when the collapse begins. This is the third reasons for mobilising.

This was the second reason. The third reason is a little unpleasant. Depending on what strategy General Surovikin (I will discuss this in the strategic planning chapter) has chosen, Russia will need far more soldiers than not. If General Surovikin decides to execute head-on deep penetration operations in a front section, that is well defended (somewhat unlikely), then Russia logically sustains huge losses. Not because it has a bad army, but because that’s how warfare works. You can easily calculate losses in such a scenario. This is what every general staff does when planning such operations. And in turn it would mean that these calculations would be passed in advance directly to Moscow to the recruitment offices and the second mobilisation wave would be activated before the offensive starts. Why? Because the estimated losses would occur and the reserves would be needed to be built simultaneously to replenish the losses and fill up in real time the depleted frontline formations. These mobilisations would continue until the war is concluded. Second wave, third wave etc. etc. etc. Essentially what is going on in Ukraine currently.

I personally consider reason three as very unlikely, that’s why I won’t argue further on this. What I want to do is to say that reason one and two combined will materialise. Russia will need to cover a large frontline with enough soldiers. And Russia will advance and with a high velocity in the western direction, as soon as the last material and human reserves of the Ukrainians are depleted. Along the way Russia will need to leave soldiers behind to maintain everything mentioned above. So, I assume that we could see another 2-3 mobilisation waves. Roughly for every 400 miles of territory another mobilisation wave.

What is possible as well is a total collapse or total surrender. In this case it is possible that Ukraine could be “handed over” into a Russian military administration. No more hostilities and mobilisations would be needed. Since we all assume that the West will avoid this scenario and fight literally to the last Ukrainian, I don’t give this, very desirable scenario, a high probability. Even though I assume that this is and always will be President Putin’s favourite outcome, to stop the bloodshed between brothers.

By Aleks (edited by Algora)

Russian Objectives

Introduction

This article is a direct continuation of the article “The Path to War in Ukraine,” so it makes sense to read the former article first. The goal of this article is to give you an overview of how the war started and what the first actions and results were. Moreover, I want to highlight some high-level procedures of military planning. This article does not intend to go into details, since one could write whole books on that topic. It only aims to give a brief overview.

There is another thing that I want to highlight here. I do not have a military education. Basic training, yes, but that’s all. Given that I have been analysing military conflicts since approx. 2010, having read a lot of military history and being a strategic planner and executive, professionally, I assume that I’m capable of predicting military results based on given facts. If you have any doubt, or if you want to listen to a true and very capable military expert, I recommend listening to Scott Ritter’s interviews and articles or read his book.

Objectives Set by the Russian Leadership

On February 21, 2022, Putin addressed the nation with a set of decisions. I highly recommend to re-listen to his address or read the transcript here. Since it is not my goal to analyse his speech, I will break it, and the decisions that were announced, over the following several days into three main objectives:

• Denazification:
• The Soviet Union sacrificed over 26 million people in the second world war, to defeat Nazism. Every family in Russia has some family members that died in that war. It is a big wound in the Russian soul. And the best attack vector against Russia. Unfortunately, Ukraine had huge cells of Nazi collaborators during the world war. [They were] Led by Stepan Bandera. The Western “services” knew about the Russian wound and cultivated followers of Bandera, especially in western Ukraine, even during Soviet times. This trend exploded exponentially since the Western services took control of Ukraine during the events in 2014. Basically, an Anti-Russia was created and armed to the teeth, right on Russia’s border. And not far from Moscow, at that. Especially difficult is the fact that there is a huge Russian-speaking part of the population in Ukraine, which is being discriminated against, if not worse, by the Bandera followers. Russia’s goal is to roll back this development and to remove the whole Nazi and Bandera ideology from Ukraine. Thoroughly, this time, since it wasn’t done properly after WW2. How? I’m not an expert in such questions, so I honestly don’t know what the approach will be. It remains to be seen.
• Demilitarization:
• Ukraine, if it remains as a nation state, which I doubt, by the way, would be allowed to have only a small self-defence force. Which implies that its whole military has to be destroyed, or handed over to Russia, beforehand. Moreover, it means that no foreign military, that is hostile to Russia, would be allowed to station its personnel or equipment on Ukrainian soil.
• Ukraine could have surrendered. In this case it would have handed over its military equipment to Russia. It could have kept what was necessary for basic self-defence as Russia would define it.
• Absent surrender/negotiation, demilitarization is being implemented by force. This means that all military equipment and troops on Ukrainian soil that are not Russian or allied with Russia, will be destroyed. This includes both Ukrainian and NATO equipment and troops.
• Since the West is committed to defeating Russia on the battlefield, through Ukrainian proxies, we can assume the following: Russia will demilitarize Ukraine AND the West, as long as the West is committed to sending its equipment and as long as there are Ukrainians still alive who can use that equipment. This would lead to the total demilitarization of both the West and Ukraine, unless the West surrenders (Ukraine) or Russia is defeated on the battlefield.
• Bringing to justice all Ukrainians who have committed crimes against the Russian-speaking population:
• Over eight years, Ukraine has committed all kinds of crimes against its Russian-speaking population. There were three main incidents
• The Ukrainian-held Donbass in general: The Russian-speaking population has suffered different atrocities, which I won’t explain here.
• In Mariupol, which is part of Donbass, in particular: The most fanatic Nazi formation, called the Azov Regiment, had its headquarters in Mariupol. There are endless reports of atrocities.
• Odessa: A city founded by the Russian czarina Catherine the Great,  Odessa s considered by most Russians, and as far as I am informed, by the city’s inhabitants as well, to be a Russian city. Nazi formations conducted a massacre there, in 2014, against Russian-speaking inhabitants. Putin specifically mentioned this massacre, and its perpetrators,  in his speech. He said all the perpetrators are known and will be brought to justice.
• Putin wasn’t aiming at Donbass alone with these goals, but at the whole of Ukraine. This brings us by logical deduction to the conclusion that the whole of Ukraine will need to be captured in order to be able to fulfill the stated goals. There is no other logical way.

Strategic Planning: Basics

First of all, there is no red line that a professional military woold adhere to, no matter what.

Hence, there is no “Russia planned X and didn’t achieve it”.

The only thing that is constant in military planning is the political goal, given by the political leadership of the country. Those objectives are the three mentioned above. The way one sets out to achieve those goals can change, depending on the development of circumstances in the field. Ultimately, the political objectives can change as well, if the military force is too less or too big or the political circumstances change.

If the military force is too weak, then the objectives might be adjusted to more achievable smaller ones — if the political leadership agrees. There are unfortunately examples in human history where such adjustments did not take place. If the military might is strong enough, and the political leadership agrees, then the goals could be expanded.

For the time being, and as is constantly reiterated by Russia’s leadership, all the goals will be achieved and there has been no change.

The military is planning a strategy for how to achieve the political goals. The most crucial thing in military planning is that you have options to cover all potential deviations from the original plan. As many people know, the best plan is only valid until the first bullet starts to fly.

Every military campaign is planned with many options, in case things do not go the way initially planned for. And every campaign can consist of x military operations.

If a country plans its military strategy thoroughly as well as the derived campaigns and operations, and if it takes into consideration the realistic worst-case scenarios, then it will have as a result all the resources and time that will be needed to sustain the project. This means that it is highly likely that Russia had several scenarios of outcomes, including a best case, middle case and worst case. To start this war, Russia would have needed to be prepared for the worst-case scenario. I personally assume that this is the reason that Russia waited for eight years to conduct this Special Military Operation (SMO) — to prepare its economy and military to be able to sustain the worst (realistic) military scenario.

Strategic Planning: Options A, B and C

I will present three scenarios/options that I assume  Russia has planned for in Phase 1.

Again, these are assumptions and of course they can be wrong:

• Best-case scenario (A):
• Conducting a massive penetration on a broad frontline to cause a shock and quick collapse of the enemy. In this case Ukraine would have fully surrendered within days or weeks after the invasion. Having analysed the facts, which are available, I assume that it was one of Russia’s realistic goals which were not, in the end,  achieved. The result would have been the handing over of Ukraine to the Russian military.
• Middle-case scenario (B):
• Fighting with Ukraine, gradually increasing the intensity, and thereby the Ukrainian military and infrastructural casualties, until Ukraine is ready to negotiate a favorable post war agreement.
• This was almost achieved at the end of phase 1. Unfortunately, the West intervened and held back Ukraine from concluding a negotiated agreement.
• In theory such a scenario could still be concluded if Ukraine were a sole actor. However, since it is not Ukrainians who control their own country but foreign powers, the timeframe for scenario B obviously is closed.
• Worst-case scenario (C):
• This scenario foresees that Ukraine will not surrender under any circumstances, as long it is physically able to resist. This means that it would fight until the last soldier is killed and the last piece of equipment destroyed, so that the Russian army can drive through to the Polish border. Moreover, it implies that NATO will assist and supply Ukraine with most resources, except those that are “red-lined,” to prevent Ukraine from collapsing too fast. As far as I understand, this is the scenario that is currently being implemented. Of course, everyone involved is hoping that the collapse takes place before too much damage has been done.
• I have just presented three of what, at least in my opinion or assumptions, are possible scenarios.
• Scenario A and B would have been possible to achieve within Phase 1. Both scenarios became impossible after Phase 1 was concluded. Now, unfortunately, only scenario C is left. I will go deeper into it, in the articles covering Phase 2 and 3.

Deception and Cover Up

As mentioned above, Russia needed to plan for three scenarios. Considering scenario B and C, we can conclude that Russia would need massive amounts of mobilized and trained troops, properly equipment and hardware, and all the intelligence capacity in place for target acquisition and many more purposes.

We can recall the beginning of phase 1. Very few details, troops and equipment were in place and the troops, except of some staff and general ranked officers, did not have any idea whether it was serious or only a bluff. This means that the troops were not properly prepared and informed for the invasion. We can also recall that 12 hours before the invasion, Russia did alert and started to mobilise its intelligence services. Of course, there are some top-secret parts of the intelligence community, which helped to plan everything. But most parts were not involved and started being mobilised for war intelligence duty just 12 hours in advance.

One could argue that what I just described amounts to poor preparation on the part of the Russian side. This is not the case. My opinion is that the Russian General Staff and the departments of the Russian Intelligence Services that were involved in planning, created a multi-level mixed military-political campaign taking into consideration the three (or however many there are) scenarios mentioned above a well as what escalation steps would be activated, if Ukraine didn’t surrender after this or that event on the battlefield.

The first step was made in total secrecy, to confuse Western intelligence services about the scale and objectives of the first push into Ukraine. If we take into consideration the public communication of the United States days before the invasion, we can understand the deception that was in effect. The Americans were absolutely sure that Russia would invade Ukraine and conquer it within days. Russia could have done that. The Americans know that. That’s why maximum confusion was created .

Only after scenario A failed did Russia activate the next pre-planned steps that led to phase 2, which I will discuss in the next article.

What I simply want to highlight is that all escalatory steps by the Russians are pre-planned and the resources are already allocated. They are only released if needed. That means that, unless Ukraine should surrender, more and more Russian resources will be released, resources that were already earmarked before the invasion for exactly this escalatory step.

The last thing to say is that, as described initially, the Russian troops were not informed about the war and their objectives, to keep everyone in total secrecy. The second the war started, everything was set in motion, to set aside and train the troops allocated for various  purposes that are assigned to them in later escalatory steps. Unfortunately, the Donbass militia took the brunt of the greatest part of the fighting and casualties, especially within Donbass. The reason is to keep Ukrainian troops at bay, grind them down and buy time until the main Russian troops are prepared and trained for their designated purposes.

Preconditions

Depending on the source  you consult, Ukraine did have approx. 300,000 – 500,000 troops at the beginning of the conflict. And the number of troops in Donbass were (also depending on the source), between 100,000 – and 200,000 troops. These were the most experienced and elite troops, assembled for an attack on the militia-held territories in Donbass.

Since the Americans knew for sure that there would be an invasion, they prepared with the Ukrainians, especially with most of their special forces, ambushes and traps on all the roads that would likely be used in the event of an attack. All means of guerrilla warfare were prepared. In this case, we mean high-tech guerrilla warfare, with drones and satellite reconnaissance and communication.

All other regions were thinly defended.

My estimation is that the American services calculated there would be a push on Kiev and on Donbass, and they established the defences accordingly. In Donbass — the regular professional army. In northern Ukraine, Kiev included — with mixed components of the regular army, popular defence and most importantly, almost all the special forces units of Ukraine, training for the mentioned guerrilla warfare.

Russia prepared North and South strike groups, Special Forces (airborne VDV), Donbass militia brigades and Wagner mercenaries. Of course, there were more sub formations, but those were the most important.

Penetration

As announced before, I don’t intend to go into detail. However, I want to call attention to some highlights.

1. Russia’s airborne special forces, called VDV, were responsible for pinning down the Ukrainian elite Special Forces troops in and around Kiev. Moreover, to apply maximum pressure on Kiev and the Ukrainian government, to either assist the negotiations or to bring a collapse of the government and achieve a quick total surrender by Ukraine. These troops did the most heroic fighting under the worst possible conditions. They also suffered huge casualties. The formations involved were awarded special decorations by President Putin.
2. The southern strike group was quite successful. As far as I can judge it, they achieved most, but not all the goals set for the first phase. They captured the whole of Kherson, a huge part of Zaporozhe and fought in the battle for Mariupol. Moreover, they expanded buffer zones around Kherson, Mariupol and Kakhovka. This was in anticipation of future defensive battles, to have space for maneuvering, regrouping and tactical retreats.
3. The northern group was tasked with pinning down troops across northern Ukraine from Donbass up to Kiev. As far as one can judge the reports (I could be wrong here), these group were not that successful and suffered heavy losses. This could be explained either by bad leadership, or because, as mentioned above, my assumption is, that the Americans expected this would be a main attack vector and accordingly prepared all guerrilla warfare elements in this direction.

There were several purposes, apart from the already mentioned scenarios A, B and C:

• Ukraine prepared a large-scale attack on the Donbass, which was ready to kick off any time. By attacking on a large front, Russia cut off most of the logistics and reinforcements for the frontline troops in Donbass. A large-scale attack on Donbass was no longer possible. Instead, the Donbass militia utilized the situation and went on the offensive on their own.
• Creating a permanent land bridge to Crimea. The bridge is good, but in wartime useless. Ukraine maybe isn’t capable, apart from terrorist attacks, of attacking the bridge, but NATO is. It would be one of the first targets that couldn’t be defended.
• Securing the permanent water supply to Crimea, out of the Kakhovka reservoir.

Ambushes

As initially stated, NATO did prepare Ukraine very well for the likely Russian attack vectors. Several tens of thousands special forces units were trained by NATO in Ukraine and on foreign soil, over eight years, to conduct this kind of guerrilla and stay-behind warfare. Taking this into account, one can understand one of the reasons why Russia has chosen the approach of invading entirely with uniformed soldiers — to avoid having offensive plans trickle through to NATO, and that thereby even more successful ambushes could have been planned.

Having invaded in winter, Russia had even more problems with ambushes. Snow gives good opportunities for preparing ambushes. Especially because columns are forced to drive in an array on roads. Next, I will explain, why this is a problem:

• Ukraine pre-registered by artillery most of the road sections where Russian columns likely would need to pass. And they did. And many columns have been destroyed. It was a very successful approach. Nevertheless, it was far from enough to hurt the Russians substantially.
• The Ukrainian military applied the strategy of hiding in civilian buildings on all the roads where the Russian columns had to pass. So, either the Russian shot at civilian houses or they tried to rush through and sustained heavy damage, due to NLAW fire out of windows of civilian buildings. The worst of this approach is that most civilians there are Russian–speaking. This forced the Russian army to shoot at people that they wanted to protect. Rightfully, Amnesty International recognized this approach as a war crime by the Ukrainians.
• Of course, it absolutely makes sense, to mine the roads where Russians would have been forced to pass. And that’s what Ukrainians did. Many tanks and other vehicles that weren’t equipped properly to detect or remote-detect mines were blown up.
• A part of the propaganda warfare of Ukraine was to demoralize the Russian public, to trigger it to overthrow President Putin. To achieve that, many ambush kills were filmed by drones and broadcasted immediately. The idea was to make the Russian public demand an end of the war; by refusing it, Putin would lose the confidence of the population and would be eventually overthrown. The broadcasting was very successful. But not the idea that Russians would lose their morale and demand an end of the war. That failed badly.
• To achieve the exact same goal, to trigger the Russian public to overthrow Putin, Ukraine staged many videos where they tortured captured Russian soldiers horribly. I won’t describe it here in detail. This attempt failed as well. There were no calls for overthrowing Putin. Instead, the Russian public and soldiers got angry and demanded a far more resolute approach against Ukraine. Soldiers didn’t surrender that quickly. Instead, many fought to the death, because they knew what awaited them.

Negotiations

I described the main strike directions of the first phase. As mentioned in the possible scenarios, those strikes were intended to achieve scenario A or B. Unfortunately, A was never an option. Ukrainians were remote controlled, down to the unit level. There was never the possibility that orders could be issued from a central command to the various units, to surrender. This still applies today.

Nevertheless, there were some pre-negotiations during phase 1 in Minsk. They led to a meeting on March 29, 2022, in Istanbul. These negotiations officially had the potential to end the conflict. Ukrainian neutrality should be declared and the recognition of Donbass and Crimea as Russian. The parties were close to a conclusion. In the following days, the proposals should have been discussed in the capitols and then an agreement should have been reached at the top level. As a sign of goodwill, Russia withdrew all troops from northern Ukraine, including Kiev.

Unfortunately, the West had other plans for Ukraine. Boris Johnson flew immediately to Kiev and after a meeting between him and Zelensky, Ukraine completely withdrew from negotiations.

This event triggered the activation and announcement of phase 2 by the Russian leadership at the end of March 2022.

Further thoughts

• Russia decided to apply a special military operation in Ukraine. Not a doctrinal war. The big question is, why? Many people, including Western intelligence services, thought there would be a doctrinal push. It would have many advantages, but some disadvantages as well. This is a topic for another article. But I will go a little bit into it here. By applying a special military operation, Russia had the following opportunities:
  • Proceeding slowly (if we exclude phase 1), so the West has all time it needs to deplete itself militarily and economically. Thus, Russia would be able to force the West down on its knees and implement the new draft security framework for Europe, without getting into an actual military conflict with NATO.
  • Drawing all Ukrainian troops and (NATO) equipment out of the big cities and western regions, and to destroy it in a place with short supply lines, a friendly population and total air domination. This is the Donbass and Kherson. Thereby a collapse of Ukraine can be triggered, slowly but surely, without the need to fight devastating battles in Ukraine’s large cities.  Thereby further scenarios like Mariupol are avoided.
• I want to emphasize that I’m by 100% convinced that the Russian leadership calculated and still is calculating with confidence, on a full Ukrainian surrender. And the handing over of Ukraine as a whole by its military to Russia’s military. This is what eventually will happen. Unfortunately, we can assume that many people still will have to die before this happens. I wrote that I think that this was planned from the beginning. This is to be explained by what I wrote in the “Strategic planning” section of this article. Russia is following a predefined but flexible escalation process:
  • It was clear from the beginning that Ukraine as a whole needs to be captured, to reach all the geopolitical and security goals set by the political leadership of Russia. Nevertheless, Russia needs always to show the whole world, and first and foremost its BRICS allies, that it is always ready to negotiate. Even though all parties are fully clear that this is an existential war between the West and Russia. The party that loses vanishes into geopolitical insignificance. There will be either a strong Russia with BRICS afterwards and NO West (geopolitically) or there will be the West, and the BRICS project would be over. Therefore, all parties involved will always find a reason not to negotiate or why negotiations failed. As many say, “until the last Ukrainian.” I personally think that Russia proceeds carefully and will execute a quick final blow, when the time comes that suits Russia, to preserve as many Ukrainians and their infrastructure as possible. Why? Because it will inherit it and will need to either incorporate it and rebuild it or find another solution.
  • Why was I sure, from the beginning, that the whole of Ukraine is on the plate? Because the leaders of Hungary and Serbia started to be very bold in their communication with the West. They did and said things that would have been a no-go before. Things for which they would be sanctioned into oblivion. Hungary, for example, blocked many EU sanctions against Russia. This is huge. This tells me that Hungary and Serbia had information in advance as to what the Russian plans are and how the future landscape between Russia, Hungary and Serbia will look: without Ukraine. Since I believe that there will be a land-bridge between Russia (with the whole of Ukraine as federal subject) and Hungary, I think that  finally military ground and air support will be possible, as well as trade by land and the Black Sea. So, Hungary and Serbia are no longer afraid of a military attack by NATO and by Western sanctions, that will be obsolete after the implementation of the multipolar world order. I have further thoughts about this, which I will explain in detail in another article.

Results of phase 1

Here I want to give a quick overview of the achieved objectives of phase 1:

• Denazification was not completed yet.
• Demilitarization was not completed yet.
• Bringing war criminals to justice was not completed yet.
• Huge territorial gains were made, and deep buffer zones around big cities were created for maneuvering in defence. Both sides suffered huge casualties, which are normal under such circumstances.

Part 2

Introduction

This article is a continuation of the article about Phase 1. Therefore, I highly recommend to first read the first article, before continuing here. Here is the link.

The second phase of this war still was carried out as a special military operation. Nevertheless, one step higher on the escalation ladder. The second phase still was carried out in an offensive way. Many strategic villages and towns were captured by the Russians. Buffer zones were expanded around strategic spots.

Phase 2 has been conducted, roughly, between April and July 2022. Officially Phase 2 never was concluded. That’s why the conclusion of Phase 2 at the end of July 2022 is according to my own definition.

The qualities of Russian officers were tested and some passed the test and others didn’t. Which reminds me of the Winter War between the Soviets and Finland. Moreover, first problems with the contracts of the Russian soldiers occurred, that were direct consequences of secretive planning.

The most interesting event, apart from the capturing of important cities, of phase 2, were the occurrence of HIMARS in Ukraine.

Most of the able-bodied men of Ukraine, that didn’t flee, were mobilized and underwent training abroad. Most of these men haven’t been committed to the fight during phase 2.

Last but not least, one major Russian political objective was achieved.

I will NOT cover the economic aspects of the war here. For economics look at my separate article here.

Well, this was a short introduction to my article. Now we will go into the details.

Objectives

Russia still followed the same objectives as in Phase 1. Nevertheless, now without the possibility of a shock and awe victory. It was now absolutely clear, that Russia will need to defeat the Ukrainian army, to be able to implement the stated objectives. I will reiterate the most important:

• Denazification of Ukraine
• Demilitarization of Ukraine
• Bring to justice those Ukrainians, that have committed (war)crimes against its own population from 2014 onwards
• Free the Donbass to ensure its independence and security

Of course, Russia had a sufficient force assembled at this time, to achieve all of this goals. But what does that mean exactly? I will deepen this later in another chapter (deception), but we need to consider the following:

• Russia planned through the whole ladder of escalations and prepared and provided (even today and going forward) exactly the resources on the battlefield, that are needed for the current configuration of the battlefield and the enemy.
• Russia was planning to fight the UKAINIAN army and has been provided forces accordingly.
• Ukrainians are Russian brothers and relatives. In Phase 2, Russia still planned to destroy only the Ukrainian army. Not civilians and not civilian infrastructure. If the army falls, the rest of the country would fall quickly as a whole.
• Conclusion: Russia had provided enough troops, resources and equipment to Phase 2, to destroy the Ukrainian troops and the UKRANINIAN equipment. I will deepen this later.

Ukrainian Objectives

Since Ukraine absorbed the first shock without collapsing, it started to plan with its allies (Western countries) how it can win the war. Now we need to remember. To win a war doesn’t mean to defeat the enemy army on the battlefield. That is an impossible task for Ukraine. To win a war means, to achieve its political objectives.

We need to consider, that “Ukraine” as a state didn’t have any objectives, since it lost the whole of its control and independence to US/UK services in 2014. That’s why it is a little hard, to write about Ukrainian objectives here. I will rather refer to Western objectives IN Ukraine:

• Keeping as much territory under control near big Russian cities, to keep a leverage over Russia. Which included the Donbass, Kharkov, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Kiev.
• Inflicting such heavy casualties on the Russian military, to influence the political situation in Russia.
• Collecting as much intelligence over Russian tactics and strategies, as well as military equipment as possible.
• Test as much own (NATO) tactics, strategies and military equipment under real conditions as possible to improve them.
• Activate Europe as much as possible to sever all ties with Russia.
• Not losing an inch of territory, to keep the Western public activated to keep on suffering (economically) to support Ukraine further on.
• Concealing all own casualties, to keep its own population motivated. Moreover, the Westerners activated. The Western population would have struggled more, to support the war, when they would have known, for how many deaths they are responsible, by supporting and prolonging the war.
• Collapsing Russia and especially activating the Russian population to stage a coup against Putin.

One might think that these objectives are totally unrealistic. But there were not. More about that in the next chapters.

Authored by Dave DeCamp via AntiWar.com,

The CIA has been using a European NATO country’s intelligence services to conduct sabotage attacks inside Russia since the February invasion of Ukraine, investigative journalist Jack Murphy reported on Saturday, citing unnamed former US intelligence and military officials.

The report said that no US personnel are on the ground in Russia but that the operations are being directed by the CIA. The US is using an ally’s intelligence services to add an extra layer of plausible deniability, and a former US special operations official told Murphy that layer was a major factor in President Biden signing off on the attacks.

Murphy said he didn’t name the NATO country whose intelligence services were being used in the report because “doing so might endanger the operational security of cells that are still operational inside of Russia.”

The report appeared on Murphy’s personal website, and in a note at the end of the piece, he explained why it wasn’t published by a media outlet. “While working with editors at mainstream publications I was asked to do things that were illegal and unethical in one instance, and in another instance I felt that a senior CIA official was able to edit my article by making off the record statements, before he leaked a story to The New York Times to undermine this piece,” he wrote.

According to the report, the covert campaign inside Russia has been years in the making. Two former military officials said that the NATO country’s spy services had hidden a cache of explosives and equipment in Russia more than a decade ago, and some of the gear has been used recently.

A former US special operations official and US person briefed on the campaign said that the CIA didn’t get involved with the NATO country’s operations inside Russia until 2014. The first time sleeper cells entered Russia that were directed by both the CIA and the NATO ally’s spy service was in 2016, and more entered the country in the following years.

The NATO ally provided the undercover operatives with stories to explain their presence in Russia and documents to back them up. The report said that around the time Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, the NATO ally’s spy service activated its sleeper cells inside Russia using covert communication, and they were ready for orders on what targets to strike.

It’s not clear how many attacks the sleeper cells have been responsible for, but there has been a series of mysterious explosions at Russian military facilities, powerplants, and railways since the invasion. The report suggested that the saboteurs could have been behind an April fire at the research institute of Russia’s Aerospace Defense Forces, which killed over 20 people.

The sabotage operations that the CIA is overseeing require a presidential finding. President Obama signed a finding before he left office that allowed covert action against Russia over allegations that Moscow interfered in the 2016 election, a claim that has never been proven.

According to The Washington Post, Obama’s finding allows “planting cyberweapons in Russia’s infrastructure, the digital equivalent of bombs that could be detonated if the United States found itself in an escalating exchange with Moscow.” Murphy cited a former CIA official who said the finding also allowed sabotage operations against Russia, although other former officials he spoke with said the current operations would have required an amendment or an entirely new finding.

A CIA spokesperson denied the allegations made in the report, but Murphy pointed out that the spy agency can legally deny the existence of its covert operations.

The CIA directing sabotage inside Russia risks a major escalation between NATO and Russia and could lead to a nuclear escalation. Ukraine has recently stepped up its own attacks inside Russian territory, and according to The Times, the Pentagon tacitly endorsed recent drone strikes that hit air bases deep inside Russian territory, adding to the risk of escalation.

In his note at the end of the report, Murphy said that he published the story to inform the public:

“Indeed, the Russian government knows perfectly well who is sponsoring these sabotage strikes. Moreover, the intelligence community wants them to know. The only party left in the dark is the public at large, left unaware of the shadow war taking place behind the scenes,” he wrote.

Murphy said that the article “went through a vigorous fact-checking process, and was deemed newsworthy as the strategic bombings of Laos and Cambodia or the CIA’s secret drone campaign in Pakistan.”

* * *

Note: Jack Murphy is a US special forces combat veteran turned journalist who specializes in reporting on clandestine operations, including investigative reports for Yahoo News and other major publications.

CHINA / DIPLOMACY
Russia-Ukraine conflict ‘could further escalate in 2023；’ negotiation impossible before ‘key change in battlefield’
By Yang Sheng
and Xu Yelu

Black smoke rises over Ukraine’s capital Kiev on October 10, 2022. Photo: VCG

Russia and Ukraine recently accused each other of having no sincerity for negotiations to end the conflict, and Russian President Vladimir Putin said he will sign a decree on retaliatory preventive measures against the introduction of a cap on prices for Russian oil on Monday or Tuesday. Analysts said the confrontation between Russia and the US and the military conflict in Ukraine could be further escalated in 2023.

“I think I will sign the decree sometime on Monday or Tuesday. These are precautionary measures,” Putin told reporters on Thursday, according to TASS. As of press time, there has been no information released by Russia about the decree.

The Russian side will wait until the final parameters of the EU embargo are clear, as it doesn’t understand what can take the place of Russian oil products in Europe, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said, according to TASS on Monday.

“Europe used to be a key market for the sale of our oil products. Let us wait and see what decisions they will make in the long run. So far, we don’t know what can take the place of our fuel,” Novak said.

On December 5, an embargo on maritime oil supplies from Russia to the European Union came into force. The EU, the Group of Seven (UK, Germany, Italy, Canada, USA, France, Japan), as well as Australia, agreed on a price cap for Russian oil supplied by sea at $60 per barrel. The US, EU and UK are banning their companies from providing transport, financial and insurance services to tankers carrying oil from Russia at a price above the “agreed level.”

Chinese analysts said Russia is showing its determination and strength for a long-term struggle with not only Ukraine but also the US and other Western countries, and not only in the military field but also in the economy. And in 2023, Russia may take decisive action to end the conflict as the Kremlin needs to create a relatively stable and positive environment for the 2024 presidential election. Meanwhile, to what extent the West can continue offering huge amounts of financial and military assistance to Kiev is in question, so it’s very likely that there will be a further escalation of the conflict next year, they noted.

Far from negotiations

Russia is ready to negotiate with all parties involved in the war in Ukraine but “Kiev and its Western backers have refused to engage in talks,” Putin said in an interview with Russian state media aired on Sunday.

“We are ready to negotiate with everyone involved about acceptable solutions, but that is up to them – we are not the ones refusing to negotiate, they are,” Putin told Rossiya 1 state television.

However, Mykhailo Podolyak, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, said on his Twitter account that Putin needed to return to reality and acknowledge it was Russia that did not want talks.

The current deadlock over the Russia-Ukraine conflict is due to the fact that the Kremlin says it will fight until all its aims are achieved, and Russia will not abandon the territories it has already gained, while Kiev says it will not rest until every Russian soldier is ejected from all of its territory, including the Donbass region and Crimea, which Russia treats as its own territories, experts said.

Yang Jin, an associate research fellow at the Institute of Russian, Eastern European and Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that neither side wants to give up something it already has to make a deal with the other, which is why hopes for negotiations are still far away.

Song Zhongping, a Chinese military expert and TV commentator, said, “If you can’t get it by force from the battlefield, then you won’t be able to get it from the negotiating table,” and this applies to both sides, which believe that they are able to further change the current situation by military means, and this is the reason why intense battles in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine continue, and Ukraine-launched attacks within Russian territories will also increase.

Cui Heng, an assistant research fellow from the Center for Russian Studies of East China Normal University, told the Global Times on Monday, “For Russia, 2023 is a crucial year, because the Putin administration needs to prepare for the 2024 election. If Russia cannot consolidate what it has gained or even makes too many compromises to the US and Ukraine, Putin’s 2024 agenda would be in trouble, so it’s impossible for Russia to adjust its conditions for talks.”

“For Ukraine and the US, room for negotiations is also limited, because Zelensky’s speech to the US Congress during his visit to the US has also set a high tone at the moment. At this point, US policymakers are pressured by ‘political correctness,’ so even if they want to talk to Russia to find a way to ease tensions and let the difficult economic situation at least take a break, they won’t dare change their tough stance against Russia,” Cui noted.

For US President Joe Biden and the Democrats, pulling support from Ukraine in 2023 is also unlikely. With a US presidential election taking place in 2024, the topic of Ukraine will not be challenged by Republicans too much due to “political correctness,” and when Biden performs poorly on domestic issues, he will not hesitate to use Ukraine as a card to serve his reelection chances, Cui said.

More importantly, US policymaking is greatly influenced by the military-industrial complex and the strategists who want to keep using Ukraine to weaken Russia and undermine the EU, so interest groups will also impose difficulties on any potential Russia-US talks, experts said.

But to what extent the economies of the US and other European countries can afford such large amounts of financial and military assistance is in question, and in 2023 the terrible economic situation and changing public opinion could weaken the Western support for Ukraine, analysts said.

Danger of greater conflict

With the deteriorating situation, some observers are concerned about a direct conflict between Russia and the US, as Washington has decided to deliver more weapons including Patriot air defense systems to Ukraine, and Russia has warned that it will destroy those US weapons once they have been transported to Ukraine.

“Of course, we’ll take them [Patriot systems] out, 100 percent!” Putin said in an interview on Sunday.

But some Chinese observers have different views on this.

Cui from East China Normal University said, “There is no necessity and no realistic condition for direct conflict between Russia and the US. It is in the interests of Washington to keep the conflict as a proxy war without massive US casualties.”

Song said there is one possible scenario where the US becomes directly involved in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. “If the US believes that targeting facilities in Russia and even its top leader will boost internal unrest to threaten the ruling position of the Putin administration, then Washington might take risky action to end the conflict, but this will surely cause an all-out conflict between two of the world’s major military powers.”

by U. S. Lt. Col. Alex Vershinin via Russia Matters

The war in Ukraine has dragged on for nearly 10 months. After an initial Russian cavalry dash seized over 20% of Ukraine, Russian forces then smashed into determined Ukrainian resistance, ending in an embarrassing retreat from Kyiv. From then, the war became an attritional contest between Russia on one side and Ukraine fighting at the head of a Western coalition on the other. During the summer, Russian offensives captured Lyman, Lisichansk and Severo Donetsk. In the fall, Ukrainian offensives recaptured Kharkiv province and Kherson city, shrinking Russian control to roughly 50% of the territories they had captured since Feb. 24, according to one estimate. The opposing sides have adopted two opposing strategies: Russians are fighting a traditional firepower-centric war of attrition; Ukraine is pursuing a terrain-focused war of maneuver. These opposing strategies are as much a product of national resource availability as a deliberate choice. As freezing ground ushers in the winter campaign season, both sides will follow their strategies into limited offensives.

So far both strategies appear to work. Ukraine has recaptured large swaths of territory but exhausted itself during the fall offensive. It suffered frightful losses and depleted key stockpiles of equipment and ammunition. There is still capacity to replace losses and establish new combat formations, but those are rapidly withering.

I believe that neither side will achieve spectacular territorial gain, but the Russian side is more likely to achieve its goals of draining Ukrainian resources while preserving its own.

The Ukrainian Strategy

The Ukrainians’ terrain-focused war of maneuver is constrained by two factors: limited artillery ammunition and equipment production, and coalition considerations. Ukraine started the war with 1,800 artillery pieces of Soviet caliber. These allowed firing rates of 6,000 to 7,000 rounds a day against 40,000 to 50,000 Russian daily rounds. By now this artillery is mostly out of ammunition, and in its place Ukraine is using 350 Western caliber artillery pieces, many of which are destroyed or breaking down from overuse. Meanwhile, Western nations are themselves running out of ammunition; the U.S. is estimated to produce only 15,000 155mm shells a month. This constraint has forced Ukraine to adopt mass infantry formations focused on regaining territory at any cost. Ukraine simply cannot go toe to toe with Russia in artillery battles. Unless Ukrainian troops close to direct fire fights with Russian troops, there is a significant chance that they will be destroyed at a distance by Russian artillery.

Ukraine’s second constraint is the coalition nature of its warfare. Since running out of its own stocks, Ukraine is increasingly reliant on Western weaponry. Maintaining the Western coalition is crucial to the Ukrainian war effort. Without a constant string of victories, domestic economic concern may cause coalition members to defect. If Western support dries up due to depletion of stock or of political will, Ukraine’s war effort collapses for lack of supplies. In some ways, Ukraine has no choice but to launch attacks no matter the human and material cost.

Ukraine built an infantry-centric army of highly motivated conscripted troops with limited to no training. They support the core fighting force of the prewar professional army and about 14 new brigades equipped with Western-donated weapons and vehicles. On the battlefield, strike groups attack quickly, penetrating deep and fast, then hand over captured areas to draftees to defend. This tactic worked well in areas where the shortage of Russian manpower prevented a solid front, such as in the Kharkiv region. In the Kherson region, where Russia had sufficient density of forces, this tactic resulted in large casualties and little progress, until logistic issues caused Russia to retreat.

The Achilles heel of this strategy is manpower. Ukraine started the war with 43 million citizens and 5 million military-aged males, but according to the U.N., 14.3 million Ukrainians have fled the war, and a further 9 million are in Crimea or other Russian-occupied territories. This means Ukraine is down to about 20 to 27 million people. At this ratio, it has less than 3 million draftable men.A million have been drafted already, and many of the rest are either not physically fit to serve or occupy a vital position in the nation’s economy. In short, Ukraine might be running out of men, in my view.

The Russian Strategy

The Russian forces are limited by manpower but strengthened by massive artillery and equipment stockpiles enabled by a robust military industrial complex. While there have been numerous reports in Western media that the Russian army is running out of artillery ammunition, so far there’s been no visible slacking of Russian artillery fire on any front. Based on these factors, the Russian side has relied on a traditional firepower-centric war of attrition. The goal is to force an unsustainable casualty rate, destroying Ukrainian manpower and equipment, while preserving Russia’s own forces. Territory is not important; its loss is acceptable to preserve combat power. At Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson, the Russian army refused to fight under unfavorable conditions and withdrew, accepting the political cost to preserve its forces.

To execute this strategy, the Russian army relies on firepower, particularly its artillery. Each Russian brigade has three artillery battalions compared to just one in each Western brigade. Paired with correction by massed quantities of UAVs and quadcopters, Russian artillery pulverizes Ukrainian forces before infantry mops up survivors. It is a slow, grinding war, but with a casualty ratio that is significantly in Russia’s favor. Russia couldn’t attack because it lacked the manpower to secure the flanks of advancing troops. Up to now, Russians could only advance in Donbas, where advance did not extend the frontline. Even here the intent was more to draw in Ukrainian forces and destroy themrather than capture the city of Bakhmut. Mobilization has the potential to overcome Russia’s manpower shortages and enable offensive operations, while equipping its forces is possible due to the mobilization of industry. Precision munition production is also up, despite consistent doubt in Western press. Video of strikes by Russian “Lancet 3” loitering kamikaze drones is up up by 1,000% since Oct. 13, according to one estimate, indicating a major increase in production.

The Coming Winter

If the Ukrainians decide to launch a major offensive, they could do so in two places, in my view. The first is in the north, in the Kharkiv region, but limited crossing over the Oskil River generates the same logistical challenges the Russians faced at Kherson. The second is in the south, to cut off the Russian land bridge to Crimea,eventually capturing the peninsula. This is unlikely to succeed. The Ukrainian army would be attacking in terrain ideal for Russian artillery. It could become a repeat of the battle at Kherson, but without Russian logistics difficulties, stemming from a limited number of crossings over the Dnipro River, with just as little gain and the same heavy losses marked by whole mechanized companies wiped out, endless scenes of ambulance convoys and new cemeteries all over Ukraine. The levels of attrition would play right into Russian hands. The political pressure on the Ukrainian government to justify the losses taken from Russian artillery in Donbas by retaking territory elsewhere, as well as the pressure from the Western coalition, may drive Ukraine to attack regardless.

For the Russian leadership the question is: When and where to attack? The timing depends on Russian artillery ammunition stocks. If they are high, Russia may attack in winter, otherwise it may stockpile and attack in spring after the mud season. Timing is also driven by the training requirements for the mobilized reservists. Longer training increases the effectiveness of the reservists and reduces casualties, thus lowering political risk for the Kremlin. Ultimately, the pressures that the Russian leadership views as most important will decide the outcome. Will the pressure from domestic politics for a quick victory win out, or will military considerations favor delaying until the end of spring mud season in March/April? So far, the Kremlin has gone with military considerations ahead of political ones, suggesting that Russia will launch only a limited offensive this winter.

Location is another factor. The Kharkiv front is heavily wooded, restricting the effectiveness of firepower, and it is strategically meaningless without attacking the city of Kharkiv. This major urban center would take months to capture at very high cost. A limited attack to regain the Oskil River line would improve Russia’s defensive line but present no strategic gain. In Donbas, the Russian army is already maintaining pressure. Extra manpower and artillery units won’t speed up that offensive much. For the Russian army, the Zaporizhzhia front holds the most promise. The Pologi-Gulai Polie-Pokrovskoye railroad is ideally placed to supply a Russian offensive driving north from Pologi. Eventually capturing Pavlograd would allow the capture of Donbas by cutting off two main railroads and highways supplying the Ukrainian army in Donbas and attacking the Ukrainian army there from the rear. The open terrain is ideal for the Russian firepower-centric strategy, and a chance to draw in and destroy the last of the Ukrainian operational reserves and further attrite its manpower is directly in line with Russian objectives. Lastly, the hard frozen ground would make new defensive positions hard to dig without heavy equipment. The limited attack vicinity of Ugledar could be a shaping operation to secure the eastern flank of the future offensive.

Conclusion

Wars of attrition are won through careful husbandry of one’s own resources while destroying the enemy’s. Russia entered the war with vast materiel superiority and a greater industrial base to sustain and replace losses. They have carefully preserved their resources, withdrawing every time the tactical situation turned against them. Ukraine started the war with a smaller resource pool and relied on the Western coalition to sustain its war effort. This dependency pressured Ukraine into a series of tactically successful offensives, which consumed strategic resources that Ukraine will struggle to replace in full, in my view. The real question isn’t whether Ukraine can regain all its territory, but whether it can inflict sufficient losses on Russian mobilized reservists to undermine Russia’s domestic unity, forcing it to the negotiation table on Ukrainian terms, or will Russian’ attrition strategy work to annex an even larger portion of Ukraine.

AUTHOR: Alex Vershinin

United States Lt. Col. Alex Vershinin retired after 20 years of service, including eight years as an armor officer with four combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and 12 years working as a modeling and simulations officer in NATO and U.S. Army concept development and experimentation. This included a tour with the U.S. Army Sustainment Battle Lab, where he led the experimentation scenario team.

There is an interesting article at a Russian site that claims NATO has taken the decision to enter the war when Russia begins its winter offensive, and perhaps even before that. This has apparently been reported by a number of high level (but anonymous) sources. The article claims that the U.S. will not accept defeat in Ukraine and it looks like its EU vassals in NATO will go along with the plan to enter the war.

 

via Rusre Info (Machine Translation)

According to several high-level sources (1), NATO has taken the decision to officially enter the conflict alongside Ukraine in the weeks or even days to come.

The main reason for this would be the very next general Russian offensive planned, according to NATO, and which, according to it, would decimate the Ukrainian army not only in the Donbass but also on the side of Kyiv (many Russian units are in a combat situation in Belarus on the borders with Ukraine).

But NATO has always been very clear: Ukraine CANNOT LOSE. For Washington, the only solution would therefore be for NATO forces to enter Ukraine, hoping that this would put an end to the Russian offensive. The calculation is that Vladimir Putin will not want to directly confront NATO with the possible (nuclear) consequences, and therefore will then back down.

But going to war may seem impossible in view of several things: On the one hand NATO itself speaks of the current shortage of ammunition and equipment following its massive deliveries to Ukraine. On the other hand the peoples of Europe are probably not ready to support a war, being currently more concerned about their winter survival.

We were able to interview, under various hats, several senior officers active in the French army:

1- “Currently, the French army is divided into three groups: the warmongers who are often office officers who have never seen a war near or far; those who want to be neutral because they consider that the army would do better to defend French interests; and those who have done the “field” in Africa or elsewhere who do not want to hear about it because for them this conflict does not concern us and we do not have to get involved in it.
The exercises to prepare for a “high-intensity war” have been going on since March. They first took place in central France on military bases in sparsely populated departments. The exercises consist mainly of urban guerrilla warfare and attacks!
If Macron wants a “truce” it is to replay it upside down to Putin. A truce will only serve to replenish the arms stocks of the USA and the EU which are almost bloodless and they need time to replenish them. This is the mistake not to commit because it will strengthen NATO. ”
According to him, if “Putin is smart” (and he has no doubt about it), he will strike massively now to prevent NATO from having time to turn around.
According to him, Macron sent 10 unfortunate Leclerc tanks to NATO. It seems to be the best (???)! Problem, spare parts come from China. So, if the Chinese play the game with Putin, we cannot fix them.
On the subject of ammunition: “Ammunition stocks being what they are, what are we going to fight with? »
In addition, the winter break would have been used to transfer Patriot and other systems that are not yet on the road.
2- According to other sources (French air base), Air Force officers receive intensive Russian language courses.
3 – According to other sources, (army) orders for ammunition for African countries have been canceled by the French authorities, instead ammunition was sent to Romania where French forces are stationed.
4- According to another senior officer in activity “There are 60 Rafale fighter planes left in France, of which at least 30 are no longer operational because we no longer have the financial means to maintain them. In fact, during the parade on July 14, all the airworthy planes gave their little demonstration to give the image of a country with a “strong” army, whereas we are completely exhausted. The American F35s have huge technical problems and are unusable. The 200 tanks in our possession are also not operational because they have been stored for a very long time in poor conditions and in addition, for lack of money, we cannot restore them”

The least we can say is that the French army is not very inclined to confront us. That said, the European and American governments have an agenda to follow, made urgent on the one hand by the predicted crash of the dollar and on the other hand by the current economic meltdown which will only worsen in Western countries. A state of war would trigger martial law and global population control as it has been developed in recent years under the pretext of “covid”. They may also think that a state of war would unite the citizens behind them.

We see today that Europe and the United States talk almost every daily about negotiations and the “Christmas truce”. This is of course a scam, such a truce would allow the Ukrainian forces to be refloated with new ammunition. In the United States the armament factories work day and night. Russia has repeatedly replied “no truce” and “there is nothing to negotiate as long as Ukraine remains on its positions”.

One hypothesis is that NATO imagines that its entry into the war will immediately make Russia capitulate out of “fear”. In this hypothesis, the Western countries will then take control of Russia and its resources, Putin having disappeared from the scene. A gigantic blow of bluff in short.

Another hypothesis is that all this is part of a NATO intoxication aimed at canceling the next general offensive of the Russian forces which already seems to be “terrorizing” the NATO forces.

In any case, this is a very bad calculation since it is clear that Russia will go through with the mission assigned by Vladimir Putin. Counting that our forces will retreat in the face of a few NATO regiments whose armament problems Russia knows is a ridiculous calculation… and which will very quickly prove to be extremely deadly.

On the ground, apart from the territories passed under Russian control, we are in fact in the same situation as at the beginning of 2022: Ukraine was heavily bombarding Donetsk and we knew that Ukraine was going to attack in March 2022; we therefore attacked the first, at the end of February. Today Ukraine is heavily bombing Donetsk and it seems possible that NATO is planning an all-out attack or trying to buy time while its stocks are replenished. What do you think we’ll do…?

We will be fixed very quickly and here is a small end-of-year gift which, I have no doubt, will interest the French authorities who read this article. Image extracted from a very complete file provided by French friends of Russia whom we warmly thank. This is just one example among many others and the French authorities will understand the situation of what will happen if (or when…) NATO enters the fray. French friends who live in the region should take a vacation…

I thank Valerya B. for her help in writing this article.

Boris Gennadevich Karpov
https://boriskarpov.tvs24.ru

(1) Sources: Senior active officer(s) in the French army Senior
managers of major French industrial groups
NATO General Staff
Polish
Ministry Ukrainian Ministry

Statement from Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at a briefing for foreign military attachés:

▫️Russian Federation estimates the amount of aid that Ukraine has received from Western countries at $ 100 billion.

▫️The United States, Britain, Poland and Romania make the most significant contribution to the supply of weapons to Kiev

▫️The aviation of the Russian Federation demilitarised more than 11 000 units of the AFU during the SMO, drones destroyed more than 600 Ukrainian objects.

▫️Since the beginning of the special operation, Western countries have supplied Ukraine with more than 350 tanks, 700 artillery systems, 100 multiple launch rocket systems, 30 helicopters, at least 5,000 drones, 1,000 armored fighting vehicles, at least 800 armored vehicles, 5,300 portable anti-aircraft missile systems

▫️The situation on the front line is stabilized, the main efforts of the troops are focused on completing the operation in the DPR

▫️Hypersonic missiles “Kinzhal” proved invulnerable to Ukrainian air defense

▫️Russian missile strikes have paralyzed the work of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex

▫️The fighting has been fierce from the very beginning of the Special Military Operation

▫️NATO’s actions increase tensions and reduce the level of security on the Russia-NATO relations

▫️The length of the front in Ukraine is currently 815 km

▫️The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the framework of its strike hit more than 1,300 critical objects of Ukraine, which significantly reduced the combat potential of Ukrainian troops

▫️Kiev uses civilians as a human shield, blocks the exit of civilians from cities, and tortures prisoners of war.

▫️Sweden and Finland want to be included in NATO under a far-fetched threat from Russia