All posts by Algora Blog

Maia Sandu, Moldova is Not for Sale

In the last week before the elections, the president of the Republic Of Moldova, Maia Sandu, launched a direct appeal to the citizens, warning that Russia wants to seize Moldova.

“If Russia gets to control Moldova, the consequences will be direct and dangerous for our country and for the entire region. All Moldovans will suffer, regardless of who they voted for. Europe will end at the border with Moldova. European funds will stop at the Prut. Freedom of movement could end.

Our land could become an infiltration ramp to the Odessa region. The Transnistrian region would be destabilized. These are their plans and they tell them openly.
We must keep Moldova peaceful, out of war and Russia’s attempts to attack or destabilize other states.

Russia does not act alone. The Kremlin has accomplices in Moldova. People who have shown many times in the past that for money they sell their country. They have no land, they have only Masters! They don’t believe in Russia or Europe. They only believe in money. They want a weak Moldova, a corrupt justice that will not hold them accountable for either corruption or betrayal of their homeland. We and you have already lived in times when those who buy votes today were at the helm of the country. Let us remember how much harm they did to Moldova and how hard it was to drove them from power.

After so many efforts, after so many generations sacrificed, we have no right to hand the country over to the corrupt and the traitors. The Kremlin thinks we’re all for sale. That we are too small to resist. That we are not a country, but a territory. But Moldova is our home. And our house is not for sale. Our house holds on to our worthy people — you are the wall on which peace and the future of our children are held. Our ancestors sometimes paid with their lives to defend Moldova”.

Moscow’s Interest in this Autumn’s Czech and Moldova Elections

by David Salvo & Nathaniel Myers , Washington via https://euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar5ca4cf82

In the coming weeks, both Moldova and the Czech Republic will hold elections. In Moldova, authorities estimate the Kremlin will spend €100m — €31 per registered voter — to influence the outcome.

In the Czech Republic, Kremlin-linked outlets are pumping out more content each day than the country’s major news outlets combined.

This is no longer unusual: Moscow interfered in elections earlier this year in Poland, Germany, France, and Romania.

Indeed, it would be more newsworthy if there was a vote Moscow didn’t attempt to manipulate.

And its influence operations have inflicted damage far beyond the ballot box, fueling civic unrest, harming national economic interests, damaging public health, undercutting core foreign policy priorities, and straining European unity (around Ukraine, above all).

It is continually testing new tactics and increasingly leverages offline actions like paid protests, vandalism, bomb threats against polling stations, and even vote buying.

Given Moscow’s ever-more brazen attempts to foster instability in Europe; it’s no wonder that its leaders increasingly see themselves, as German chancellor Friedrich Merz said at the end of August, “already in conflict with Russia”.

Europe needs to act now on this growing sense of alarm about the urgency of the threat Russia’s interference poses to European security and democracy.

While there are models of good practice for pushing back on Russia’s destabilising operations, far from every European nation has a strategy to address these threats.

Four fightback measures
Each country will need to develop a national information defence strategy, tailored to its own specific circumstances and constraints, but focused on the same four goals: build public resilience; detect and expose; close policy loopholes and vulnerabilities that facilitate Russian operations; and push back.

In each area, they will benefit by learning from one another’s experience.

To build resilience, European nations might look first to the Baltic and Scandinavian states, which have long integrated media literacy, critical thinking, and other relevant skills into their public education programs.

Estonia, for example, has a longstanding kindergarten-through-high-school curriculum which tailors its modules to the age of students; high schoolers, for instance, are required to take a 35-hour “media and influence” course.

Sweden’s Psychological Defence Agency is mandated with working not just in the school system but in broader society to educate citizens.

The Dutch Media Literacy Network offers another approach, leaning on more than a thousand organizations to advance media literacy among priority groups across society.

Detecting and exposing interference operations is essential for raising awareness among the public, as well as to minimise the impact of a particular operation.

Analytical and investigative capabilities should be developed inside a government, as France did when it established Viginum: a government agency which tracks, identifies, and exposes foreign nation-states’ malign influence operations targeting France and its interests.

Two State Solution, End of Trumpism?

Is this the writing on the wall for Netanyahu/Trump axis?

❗️First, Canada RECOGNIZES Palestinian state, to be followed by the UK and France.

PM Carney announces goal: ‘PEACEFUL future’ for 2 states, Palestine AND Israel.

Meanwhile Sumud Flotilla is closing in on Gaza. Watch the developments in the next few days.

The Trumpists seem very much on the defensive in Arizona while Putin’s majordomo, Kiril Dmitriev, is doing the rounds of homily to the would-be emperor of the world.

Lastly, brazen Orban is about to be bribed with 500 million euros to vote for the 19th round of sanctions against Russia.

Are we at a turning point for Trumpism?

Saudi Arabia’s Defense Pact with Pakistan Is A Strategic Loss For the U.S. of A.

via MoonofAlabama

Back in 2012 U.S. foreign policy analysts were concerned about a possible nuclear alliance between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Scholars from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and the Stimson Center wrote an essay about it:

The Pak-Saudi Nuke, and How to Stop ItThe American Interest, March 2012

The opening paragraph:

One morning, perhaps in the not too distant future, the President of the United States may wake up to an announcement that, given new dangers in the Middle East, the Saudi government has requested the stationing of Pakistani troops on Saudi soil. The announcement might go on to explain that these troops will also bring with them the full complement of conventional and strategic weapons necessary to ensure their security and that of Saudi Arabia. Word would quickly follow from Islamabad that Pakistan has accepted a generous aid package and low-priced oil from Saudi Arabia. Both parties would stress that the agreement simply reaffirms their decades-long special relationship.

As Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state one had to assume that any such a pact would supply Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons. It was something that the U.S. and its sidekick Israel were very concerned about.

It was assumed at that time that the reason for such a move by Saudi Arabia would be its concern over Iran and its nuclear program:

Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia’s threat perception has sharpened as the dangers from Iran have grown along with doubts about the reliability of U.S. protection.

The time to wake up to a new Saudi-Pakistani alliance has finally come today:

Saudi Arabia signs ‘strategic mutual defence’ pact with Pakistan (archived) – Financial Times

But the strategic circumstance under which the alliance happens are very different from those that had been envisioned in 2012 essay:

Saudi Arabia has signed a “strategic mutual defence” pact with Pakistan, signalling to the US and Israel that the kingdom is willing to diversify its security alliances as it looks to bolster its deterrence.

The agreement with the nuclear-armed south Asian state comes a week after Gulf states — traditionally reliant on the US as their security guarantor — were deeply rattled by Israel’s missile strikes targeting Hamas’s political leaders in Qatar.

“We hope it will reinforce our deterrence — aggression against one is aggression against the other,” a senior Saudi official told the Financial Times. “This is a comprehensive defence agreement that will utilise all defensive and military means deemed necessary depending on the specific threat.”

This is a NATO Article 5 like pact. ‘All means deemed necessary’, as empathized, undoubtedly includes Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

The U.S. was, the FT say, not at all involved in it:

Riyadh is believed to have informed Washington about the Pakistan defence agreement after it was signed.

Saudi Arabia already has a strategic missile force which is armed with Chinese DF-21 missiles which have a range of up to 1,700 kilometer. They can hit Tehran, but also Tel Aviv. The missiles are conventionally armed but can be fitted with nuclear warheads.

Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons had largely be financed by Saudi Arabia. The two countries have a long history of military cooperation:

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have a defense relationship stretching back decades, in part due to Islamabad’s willingness to defend the Islamic holy sites of Mecca and Medina in the kingdom. Pakistani troops first traveled to Saudi Arabia in the late 1960s over concerns about Egypt’s war in Yemen at the time. Those ties increased after Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and the kingdom’s fears of a confrontation with Tehran.

Pakistan developed its nuclear weapons program to counter India’s atomic bombs. However, there long have been signals of the kingdom’s interest in the program. Retired Pakistani Brig. Gen. Feroz Hassan Khan, in his book on his country’s nuclear weapons program called “Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb,” said Saudi Arabia provided “generous financial support” for its effort.

Today Saudi Arabia no longer fears a confrontation with Iran. In 2023, with the help of Chinese mediation, the two countries did bury their hatchets. The move was an early sign that the U.S. was losing ground in the Middle East.

The reasons why the is being closed these days is obvious:

The agreement was signed by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif in Riyadh. Sharif’s office’s reiterated that the agreement “states that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both”.

The Israeli attack on Doha, one of the US’s major non-Nato allies, exacerbated Gulf leaders’ long-running concerns about Washington’s unpredictability and its commitment to their defence, as well as fears about Israel acting unrestrainedly with its military across the region.

The Saudis had worked on, and hoped for, a deeper alliance with the U.S. But the genocide in Gaza, and the unlimited U.S. support for it, have made such an alliance impossible:

Riyadh had been hoping to seal a defence pact with the US, as well as co-operation with Washington’s nuclear plans, as part of a grand deal that would have led to it normalising diplomatic relations with Israel.

However, those plans were upended after Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, triggering the war in Gaza and conflict across the region.

Riyadh has become increasingly outraged by Israel’s 23-month war in Gaza and the conduct of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s far-right government.

Prince Mohammed accuses Israel of committing genocide, and has made it clear that normalisation is off the table unless Netanyahu ends the conflict and moves to establish a Palestinian state.

China, which is allied with Pakistan, will be happy about the deal. So will be Iran. It was likely already informed about it:

Before the defense pact was signed, Iran dispatched Ali Larijani, a senior political figure who now serves as the secretary of the country’s Supreme National Security Council, to visit Saudi Arabia. That may have seen the kingdom acknowledge the pact to Tehran, with which it has had a Chinese-mediated détente with Iran since 2023.

India will be concerned about the deal. A lot of the oil it purchases is coming from Saudi Arabia. With a Saudi-Pakistani alliance in place any conflict with Pakistan will likely cause it additional difficulties with the purchase of energy.

The U.S., and Donald Trump, are the big losers in this. The unrestricted support for Israel is coming at an ever increasing price. The Gulf countries are – slowly, slowly – moving away from it.

EuroSlavia, the Selling out of Europe by the US (my headline)

Ed. Note: So, the US is basically selling out Europe to the Russians. Wrote about it in my book EuroSlavia, in 1991, presented at the Academy of International Studies conference.

via MoA

In February 2025 the U.S. started talks with Russia over ending the war in Ukraine. The Europeans were against such talks. They were still dreaming of winning the lost war – of keeping control over Ukraine by providing it with security guarantees.

The Trump administration gave them a lecture in form of a catalog of questions. As I summarized the issue at that time:

The U.S. has recognized that there aren’t enough troops, money or will to achieve a better negotiation position for what’s left of Ukraine. The European ‘elite’ still fails to get that.

There are still dreams of ‘security guarantees’ which would be given to Ukraine after it files for peace or surrenders.

No such guarantees would make any sense. When peace is achieved there will be only one manner that can prevent a new outbreak of war: good behavior towards Russians and Russia by what will be left of Ukraine.

The U.S. negotiation team handed the Europeans a list of questions that will hopefully help them to come to grips with that ..

Here are the questions with answers by me in Italic:

1) What do you view as a Europe-backed security guarantee or assurance that would serve as a sufficient deterrent to Russia while also ensuring this conflict ends with an enduring peace settlement?

There is no Europe-backed guarantee possible that would be a ‘sufficient deterrent’.

2) Which European and/or third countries do you believe could or would participate in such an arrangement?

Each could provide a few dozen soldiers (plus rotations). None has the size of forces and/or stamina to really commit to the mission.

Are there any countries you believe would be indispensable?

The U.S. – if it would give nuclear guarantees to prevent the eventual annihilation of any ‘security guarantee’ force.

Would your country be willing to deploy its troops to Ukraine as part of a peace settlement?

No!

3) If third country military forces were to be deployed to Ukraine as part of a peace arrangement, what would you consider to be the necessary size of such a European-led force?

The purpose and point of the six questions the U.S. gave to the Europeans was to induce some realist thinking:

Applying such one will come to the conclusion that nothing but a long term peace agreement, which does not necessitate ‘guarantees’, makes any sense.

But they still did not get it.

It took the Europeans seven month of highly publicized discussion to finally acknowledge that there was no way for them to provide Ukraine with ‘security guarantees’. The only realistic variant they could think of was to threaten Russia with a nuclear war which they can’t but did wanted the U.S. to do. The U.S. wont do that. Neither Trump nor any other U.S. president will agree to risk New York over Kiev.

But the Europeans still do not want to make peace. Their new idea was to push the U.S. to put more sanctions on Russia:

The European Union is sending a delegation to Washington to ready new joint sanctions against Russia, European Council President António Costa said Friday.

“We are working with the United States and other like-minded partners to increase our pressure through further direct and secondary sanctions,” Costa said at a press conference in the western Ukrainian city of Uzhhorod, following a meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Costa added “a European team is traveling to Washington, D.C. to work with our American friends” but did not reveal who would take part in the delegation.

The Trump administration is now copying the February idea of the catalog of question about security guarantees.

Trump is telling the Europeans “you jump first”:

Donald J. Trump – @realDonaldTrump – Sep 12, 2025, 23:15 UTC

A LETTER SENT BY PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP TO ALL NATO NATIONS AND, THE WORLD: “I am ready to do major Sanctions on Russia when all NATO Nations have agreed, and started, to do the same thing, and when all NATO Nations STOP BUYING OIL FROM RUSSIA. As you know, NATO’S commitment to WIN has been far less than 100%, and the purchase of Russian Oil, by some, has been shocking! It greatly weakens your negotiating position, and bargaining power, over Russia. Anyway, I am ready to “go” when you are. Just say when? I believe that this, plus NATO, as a group, placing 50% to 100% TARIFFS ON CHINA, to be fully withdrawn after the WAR with Russia and Ukraine is ended, will also be of great help in ENDING this deadly, but RIDICULOUS, WAR. China has a strong control, and even grip, over Russia, and these powerful Tariffs will break that grip. This is not TRUMP’S WAR (it would never have started if I was President!), it is Biden’s and Zelenskyy’s WAR. I am only here to help stop it, and save thousands of Russian and Ukrainian lives (7,118 lives lost last week, alone. CRAZY!). If NATO does as I say, the WAR will end quickly, and all of those lives will be saved! If not, you are just wasting my time, and the time, energy, and money of the United States. Thank you for your attention to this matter! DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.”

Like with the catalog of questions about security guarantees Trump is trying to induce some realist thinking into the boneheaded European ‘elite’.

Nearly every country in Europe is still consuming Russian oil. It is either bought directly from Russia or through Turkey or India. Europe can not put high tariffs on China or India. The responses from those countries would be devastating for Europe’s economies.

There is no way to sanction Russia, directly or indirectly, into ending the war.

Trump knows this. It is why he is calling the Europeans bluff.

We can only hope that they will learn from it …

A Second 9/11 in 2025

The only problem with this hysteria is that Tyler’s family was and is a strong MAGA, Republican voter. No sign of support for “liberal” causes. None.

It looks to me another 9/11 in the year 2025.  Kill your own to justify repression against your opponents when no such action is justified. Trump’s support is flagging badly, Israel’s war against everyone is going from bad to worse, and even major supporters of Israel, like Kirk started to question Israel’s actions.

Why not blame Soros and the “liberal” professors and start a dark chapter of witch hunting against any dissent?!

I can only see a dark future ahead for the fair-minded, enlightened members of our society. The enlightenment of the nineteenth century is under assault for the last hundred years through world wars and more repression.

The European civilization of rationalism, scientific revolution and humanism is to be replaced by barbarism on an endless escalatory level in order to bring to power the Messianic minority.

See also this Tyler Robinson’s family is MAGA.

The Power Of Siberia 2 Pipeline Deal Signifies The Failure Of Trump’s Eurasian Grand Strategy

 

For more up-to-date posts please check our Telegram channels at

Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,

Trump’s escalatory signals in Ukraine, the Indo-US split that he induced, and the attendant alleviation of the Sino-Indo security dilemma freed Russia up to clinch the long-negotiated Power of Siberia 2 deal…

Trump’s Eurasian grand strategy has sought to preemptively avert Russia’s potentially disproportionate dependence on China in order to avoid having its natural resources turbocharge the superpower trajectory of the US’ only systemic rival. In pursuit of this, the US envisaged entering into a resource-centric strategic partnership with Russia upon the end of the Ukrainian Conflict, expecting that this shared goal would incentivize Putin into agreeing to significant territorial and/or security concessions.

Trump’s unwillingness or inability to coerce Zelensky into any of Putin’s demanded concessions paired with increasingly concerning reports about plans to deploy NATO to Ukraine to spook Putin into ditching his balancing act and pivoting to China. The successful clinching of their long-negotiated deal over the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, which will nearly double Russia’s gas exports to China to ~100 bcm a year and at a cheaper price than the EU receives, signifies the failure of Trump’s Eurasian grand strategy.

Putin might have held out for longer had Trump not inadvertently catalyzed the incipient Sino-Indo rapprochement via his hypocritically punitive tariffs that aim to derail India’s rise as a Great Power. That spooked India into patching up its ties with China, which alleviated their security dilemma that the US was exploiting to divide-and-rule them. This in turn reduced India’s worries about closer Russian-Chinese energy cooperation that it previously feared could lead to Russia becoming China’s junior partner.

It was never officially voiced, but astute observers and those who’ve talked to Indian thinkers know that India was worried that China might leverage its influence over Russia to get it to curtail or cut off military exports to India, therefore giving China a pivotal edge in their border dispute. The Trump-induced Indo-US split and attendant alleviation of the Sino-Indo security dilemma freed Russia up to clinch the Power of Siberia 2 deal without fear of spooking India into the US’ arms and thus dividing-and-ruling Eurasia.

The growing convergence between BRICS and the SCO, which aim to gradually reform global governance via their complementary efforts to accelerate multipolar processes, is due in no small part to India’s embrace of both in response to new strategic threats from the US. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first visit to China in seven years to attend the SCO Leaders’ Summit, during which time he held an important bilateral meeting with President Xi Jinping, is expected to lead to a new normal in Sino-Indo ties.

The roots of their tensions haven’t been resolved, but Russia expects that they’ll now be better managed, ergo why it clinched its deal with China over the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline right after also concluding that the US won’t try to help it obtain any of what it wants from Ukraine. To review, Trump signaled escalatory intent in Ukraine reportedly as the quid pro quo for the US-EU trade deal and then Sino-Indo ties improved as Indo-US ones worsened, thus making Power of Siberia 2 politically possible.

Trump’s foreign policy towards Eurasia has therefore indisputably failed. His team’s misguided approach towards Russia and India in demanding too much of them led to those two and China working out their differences, which exist amongst themselves bilaterally but also regarding their ties with the US, and consequently accelerated multipolar processes at the expense of the US’ unipolar interests. The Rubicon has clearly been crossed after this latest pipeline deal and it’s anyone’s guess how the US will respond.

Is Russia Really Winning in Ukraine?

IGOR STRELKOV: THE SMO FORMAT HAS COMPLETELY EXHAUSTED ITSELF

(on the letter dated 30.08.2025)

(machine translated)

Thank you for the summary! – As always, a very high-quality material with logical conclusions. I believe they can be further commented on (as well as the information itself).

1) My conclusion that “the SMO format has completely exhausted itself and no longer allows hope for a military/military-political/’any kind of’ victory over the so-called ‘Ukraine’ (and a ‘compromise peace’, in my conviction, is initially impossible)” is indirectly but clearly confirmed by Moscow’s “backtracking” on the issue of “future borders” – The refusal to demand the restoration/transfer to the Russian Federation of the territories of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions is only the first step “along the line of concessions,” but it vividly confirms the Kremlin’s inability to achieve on the battlefield anything more than small tactical successes “at great blood cost with minimal results.” Perhaps there are still illusions in Moscow that it will be possible to force Kyiv (by force or negotiations) to give up that “quarter” of Donbas that it still holds. Although, perhaps, such illusions no longer exist and Donbas is “the next stage of bargaining” and nothing more. But the problem is that:

a) ‘Ukraine WILL NOT AND DOES NOT MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS UNTIL ITS TROOPS ARE DEFEATED ON THE BATTLEFIELD’ (or close to defeat);

b) in the current state/format of the SMO, the Russian Armed Forces are not capable of defeating/bringing the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the brink of defeat. Thus, even now (not just “tomorrow”) we face the urgent need to resolve the dilemma: “start preparing for capitulation” or PROCEED TO REFORMAT THE SMO into a full-scale ‘total’ war – FOR THE COMPLETE DEFEAT of the so-called ‘Ukraine.’ However, as I have repeatedly written, the Kremlin will gladly prefer to “drag out time as long as possible,” hoping for a “maybe” (unless, of course, the Chinese comrades suggest (with due insistence) a solution that better suits Beijing at this particular moment) – Personally, I hope that such a decision will still be aimed at victory over the enemy coalition, and not at “surrendering everything and everyone” (because “once you start surrendering, it is almost impossible to stop”).

2) I remain convinced that without a ‘personnel revolution’ (‘from above’), we will never be able to win this war – even if the ‘transition’ from the SMO to a more urgent format is successfully carried out. We simply will not be able to because “you can’t get oranges from aspens,” and those “modest geniuses” who managed to lose in the most (seemingly) winning situations over 3.5 years will never do anything useful in even more difficult conditions. The desire to “keep everything as it is, changing nothing except the current slogans” is doomed in advance and catastrophically.

I would especially like to dwell on the epochal (without quotes) event coming to an end—the actual foundation of the “Axis” Beijing-Delhi-Moscow. If behind the slogans and “pictures” there follows a real consolidation and formalization of this strategic alliance, going beyond the SCO framework—then, one can say—the world will change beyond recognition, and the hegemony of the USA/NATO/Anglo-Saxons will be ended in the very near future not just in words, but in deeds. It is a pity that Russia—in its current deplorable state—will be assigned an “auxiliary” role in this alliance, but better so than otherwise—at least such an alliance saves us from capitulation to the “West” and the subsequent disintegration of the state and country. However, it is also clear: of the three named powers, only Russia is in the position of the “weakest link” due to the prolonged unsuccessful and bloody war, as well as the “wild” number of Western agents in all branches of power. And it is this weakness that the USA and their allies will inevitably try to exploit in their efforts to destroy the “alliance of the three powers.” Hence the conclusion—we should expect a greatly intensified “pressure” on our statehood very soon, both from external and internal enemies (embedded since the times of the so-called “perestroika” and even earlier). And—therefore—I return again to my long-standing (since 2014) thesis: without large-scale personnel changes in the highest state apparatus, we will not only fail to withstand the challenges of the time—we will be completely “crushed and devoured.” Including the very “elite” that has mindlessly “celebrated the holiday of life” from 1991 to the present day inclusive. They will be devoured ALL (except for the most “deserved agents,” like “Chubais or Abramovich,” and even that is not certain).

In general, we must prepare for a great war and new attempts at destabilization. Unfortunately, there is a high chance that our thoroughly ineffective government (“thoroughly penetrated” by enemy agents) will fight “destabilization” exclusively by fighting us—the patriots who are “not for money” and who really want to pull the country out of the “drug addiction,” now turning into the so-called “withdrawal.”

Respectfully, I. V. Girkin
03.09.2025
/fragment of a letter to comrade Getmanov Alexander/

Russia’s New Middle Class Can’t Afford for Putin’s War to End

‘Deathonomics’ is transforming Russian society. Few would welcome peace

By Eir Nolsøe economics Correspondent and Tim Wallace Deputy Economics Editor via The Telegraph (UK)
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/08/24/russias-new-middle-class-cant-afford-for-putins-war-to-end/

The Russian city of Volgograd was the location of one of the bloodiest fights in world history. The seven-month-long Battle of Stalingrad, as the city was known in 1943, claimed half a million Soviet lives.

More than 80 years later, the Russian version of Facebook is awash with government ads encouraging men in the city to join today’s war effort in Ukraine.

“Men aged 18 to 63, we consider those with diseases – HIV, hepatitis. We accept those on parole and convicts,” reads one such ad on Vkontakte, or VK, as it is known.

Having flat feet, an intellectual disability or being a foreigner also need not be a disqualifier, it adds. In return, big prizes await.

One advert offers 8m rubles (£74,000) for the first year of military service – more than 10 times the region’s average wage of 712,883 rubles (£6,592) last year.

This includes hefty sign-on bonuses, extra payments for those with children and other perks like priority nursery places, discounted mortgages and tax breaks.

The payments are one example of how Russia’s war economy has created a new middle class in the country’s industrial heartlands.

Military families are receiving big cheques while men are on the frontlines, many of them facing death.

Blue-collar workers’ wages have also surged in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine.

While money is a paltry way to make up for the death of a loved one, there are some Russians on the home front who do not want the war to end.

It comes as Donald Trump and European leaders try to broker a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine, seemingly with little success.

Running out of patience with Moscow’s tricks and bombardments, Volodymyr Zelensky warned: “They don’t want to end this war.”

While the comment was aimed at Vladimir Putin, Russians lifted out of poverty as a result of the conflict may also feel apprehensive. For many of the new middle class, they cannot afford peace.

‘They are getting respect’

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, many Western economists predicted it would face impending economic collapse in the face of the world’s harshest sanctions.

As the war approaches its fourth anniversary, the economy is under strain – but there has been no crisis. If anything, for some Russians life has improved.

The biggest benefactors are impoverished industrial areas that have suffered decades of decline, experiencing a fate similar to once-wealthy parts of the West.

Many towns and smaller cities across Russia that relied on a single industry such as defence or manufacturing never recovered after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

“In the years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these areas went into decline, and people struggled to find jobs. But the facilities were still there,” says Tatiana Orlova, from Oxford Economics.

A safer world meant the need for ammunition, guns and other types of manufacturing had faded. That was, until Putin brought war to Europe.

“All that changed three years ago when the Russian leadership realised that it could not wrap up the war quickly. So it started moving the economy into a different mode,” says Orlova.

“Suddenly, these mothballed industrial facilities were hiring new workers, and new investment started flowing. These enterprises were competing with other sectors for workers, and they were offering good wages.”

Factories under pressure to churn out goods to support the war – munitions, uniforms and so on – started running three shifts a day.

Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of working-age men joined the military, and Moscow restricted immigration – creating crippling worker shortages.

The result can be seen in wage data from Russia’s statistics office, Rosstat. Pay has surged in sectors related to the war effort, while other professions typically lucrative in peacetime have suffered.

Wages for workers making “finished metal items” rose by 78pc before accounting for inflation between 2024 and 2021, the fastest of any occupation.

In contrast, healthcare workers such as doctors and nurses and employees in the oil industry have seen the slowest growth, at 40pc and 48pc respectively.

“If you look at teachers or doctors, the increase is much, much smaller than in manufacturing,” says Orlova.

Putin has effectively done what Trump has promised American voters: creating well-paid factory jobs en masse in the poorest parts of the country. Workers with no education and few skills are benefiting.

“These people live in underdeveloped regions. They work in once underperforming industries. They don’t have higher education. But now these assets and skills are in demand,” says Ekaterina Kurbangaleeva, a visiting scholar at the George Washington University in Washington DC.

“They are getting higher salaries. Their savings are growing. And they are also getting social respect.”

It is a good time to be a Russian factory worker. But the real money comes if you join the military.

“When a man in the family joins the army on a military contract, first of all he gets his bonus and he starts getting monthly wages. The wages are decent. It’s something like $2,000 a month. All that money started flowing mostly into the Russian regions because people are less keen to sign up for the contractual army in the big cities,” Orlova says.

“I call this deathonomics,” says Russian economist Vladislav Inozemtsev. He co-founded the Cyprus-based Centre for Analysis and Strategies in Europe in 2023 alongside Dmitry Gudkov, one of the leaders of the Russian opposition in exile.

“This was actually a fascinating know-how on the part of Putin’s regime because he transformed the lives of – I’d say very impolitely – people [who were] kind of social waste, into a vehicle for economic development.

“These people were almost useless. Many of them had no work in the small towns and villages and were conducting a very anti-social way of life. Then all of a sudden, these people were taken out of the environment.”

The environment in which they now find themselves – a war zone – is a grim one. But Inozemtsev believes many of those left in Russia will have little sympathy.

“In some cases, I would say their neighbours were absolutely happy they disappeared from their lives. Their relatives got a lot of money and became quite prosperous people in their local communities.

“You take useless resources from the economy and you pour money instead of that. But of course, this all is only a temporary solution because the stock of these people is limited.”

Soldiers are offered big financial incentives to join the army, ranging from sign-on bonuses to debt forgiveness.

“Russian regions have been literally competing to sign people on military contracts. They got targets from above, and they had to fulfil them. They started offering sign-up bonuses in central regions, which reached something like $25,000-equivalent in rubles,” adds Orlova at Oxford Economics.

One can catch glimpses of how the lure of the big financial rewards is playing out all across Russia on Vkontakte.

A 23-year-old married father asks in a group discussing the military effort where he can get the most money by signing on, adding that he has heard in some areas families wait months for the payments.

Others express remorse. “I stupidly signed the contract, now I don’t need the money. I don’t know what to do, I’m not a warrior at all. I’m 21 years old,” despairs one man.

While the soldiers receive handsome salaries and bonuses, the biggest financial rewards come in death. Families of Russian soldiers killed on the frontline are entitled to payouts of up to 11m rubles – equivalent to around £100,000.

This includes an automatic “presidential” payment of 4.9m rubles, insurance worth 3.3m rubles and a “governor” payout of up to 3m rubles, according to independent Russian economic news outlet The Bell.

Officials from Russia’s ruling party have also been known to hand bereaved mothers and widows gifts, ranging from fridges, bags of onions to actual meat grinders.

On Vkontakte, a user whose account has been deleted replied to the 23-year-old father urging him not to sign up as he will be “cannon fodder”.

“Stay home, I buried mine, he died on his first mission. Enough deaths already,” another message reads.

Coming in from the cold

The influx of cash into Russia’s poorest regions has helped fuel a spending boom, as impoverished families have suddenly come into money.

“Many soldiers came from the very poor regions. This provoked a huge increase of real disposable incomes in very remote and poor regions in Russia like the Republic of Altai, the Republic of Tuva and some others – mostly North Caucasus and Siberia regions,” says Inozemtsev.

Families in tiny villages and small towns received “enormous” sums of money by local standards, he says. Many bought apartments in big regional cities with better schools and universities for their children, he adds.

The influx of cash has also fuelled redevelopment in some of Russia’s poorest areas.

“It gave rise to development of services in the poor regions where people previously, for example, could not even think of spending money on something like a monthly gym subscription,” says Orlova.

“Suddenly, new gyms and beauty salons started springing up. More cafes and restaurants opened as well. People really started spending on services.”

Visa restrictions and high costs mean foreign holidays are out of reach for most ordinary Russians. Instead, domestic travel has flourished.

“The number of hotel rooms is increasing 15pc-20pc per year. The whole hospitality industry – hotels, restaurants, catering – is growing. So the salaries of waiters, chefs and hotel managers are increasing too,” says Kurbangaleeva.

And so, a new social class is emerging.

Experts like Kurbangaleeva point out that what we refer to as middle class usually reflects three things: income levels, education and social standing.

In other words, becoming middle class isn’t something that happens overnight.

But there are signs of a bigger shift. One of the perks military families are entitled to is that soldiers and their children get priority access to Russia’s competitive public universities.

In families where no one has gone to university, the barriers have been lowered substantially.

“The Russian government imposed a special university admission quota for soldiers and their children. They can apply without contest,” says Kurbangaleeva.

“Before this quota, they had no chance. They don’t get a good education [growing up] or a high enough level of knowledge. So they could not compete with other children who live in big cities or go to better schools. They now face an obstacle-free road to apply to the best universities in the country.”

This year’s quota is 50,000 places across the country. Actual enrolment figures will only be available in September. However, last year nearly 15,000 students made use of the offer, up from 8,000 in 2023.

Kurbangaleeva believes it is the start of a bigger trend. “The social hierarchy is changing right now,” she says.

‘Social disaster’

Putin has achieved what many Western leaders have failed at: lifting the fortunes of some of the very poorest in society in a short period of time.

The price? One million Russian casualties, and counting.

In recent weeks, the promise of an end to the war briefly seemed closer than ever. The Russian leader flew to Anchorage, in Alaska, to meet President Trump on Aug 15, under the guise of peace negotiations.

Coverage was dominated by the images of Putin beaming as he strutted down the red carpet to engage in a warm handshake and chummy catch-up with America’s president.

If the war does end, Russians who have grown accustomed to much higher living standards may pay the price. Surviving soldiers returning from the frontline and their families are likely to quickly slip back into their old lives, believes Inozemtsev.

“These people are not accustomed to accumulate and to save money. They will spend it in a year or two, and return to the type of life they were accustomed to. The service in the army will not change your social behaviour,” he says.

“If 500,000 people will come back to the regions with very low wages and their savings from the service time will be exhausted in months, or in one or two years, it might be a huge social disaster.”

Such returns can prove hugely destabilising, as in Germany after the First World War in the 1920s. After returning from the war, Adolf Hitler founded the Nazi Party and assembled a private army made up of mostly unemployed and disillusioned veterans.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was in part driven by the end of the Afghan war, experts also point out.

“It’s a big question for the government, for Putin – how to take care of those people after the war is over,” says a Russian economist based in Europe who did not want to be named.

“I wouldn’t be that optimistic about their future. The government will do everything to disseminate those people and not allow them to turn into a powerful group. Cynically, the Russian political class have experience, or at least prior knowledge of how to deal with that.”

Other workers who have benefited from the war are also likely to take a hit once the economy normalises. Blue-collar workers, business people buying up stranded Western assets and state employees working in law enforcement are all likely to lose out in a demobilised economy.

“All these people are not interested in the return to peacetime,” says Kurbangaleeva. “It seems to me that the Russian authorities feel that. These beneficiaries would be more confident if they could sustain the current situation, because when and if the war ends, a lot might change.

“For them, it’s more beneficial to continue.”

While the summit in Alaska was billed as an effort for peace, Putin made sure to dangle the promise of lucrative commercial deals in front of Trump at the brief press conference that followed their talks.

“When the new administration came to power, bilateral trade started to grow. It is clear that the US and Russian investment and business cooperation has tremendous potential,” the Russian president said.

“My best guess is that Putin is trying to sow division between the US and Europe,” says Robin Brooks, at the Brookings Institution.

US exports to Russia so far this year have jumped by a fifth compared to the same period of 2024. Much of that is pharmaceuticals and medical products. Sales going the other way – including nuclear materials and fertilisers – are up by one third.

Putin’s strategy may be to make Zelensky’s and Europe’s concerns seem like a sideshow compared to the real business of carving up resources, whether in Russia’s far north or in newly conquered lands in Ukraine.

“Trump is a real-estate guy, and Russia has a lot of real estate and a lot of resources. Why don’t we strike a great deal on that?” says Holger Schmieding, at Berenberg Bank, of Moscow’s approach.

“From all we know about Trump, that appeals to his gut reactions – who cares about laws and rules, there is land, there is stuff you can make money on, there is someone with whom he can strike a business deal.”

As a result, many fear peace is no closer. That means more misery in Ukraine – but there will be those cheering in Volgograd.

“It’s easy to begin the war, but it’s so hard to end it,” says Kurbangaleeva

With Putin, ‘Ultimately, Trump Holds the Cards’

Stephen Kotkin, the pre-eminent historian of Russia, on Moscow’s long record of overreach, Biden’s Ukraine failure, and prospects that Kyiv can ‘win the peace.’

By Tunku Varadarajan via Wall Street Journal

Mr. Varadarajan, a Journal contributor, is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and at NYU Law School’s Classical Liberal Institute.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/with-putin-ultimately-trump-holds-the-cards-history-europe-russia-ukraine-war-8fdf5771

Excerpts

Few in the West have a deeper understanding of Mr. Putin than Mr. Kotkin, 66, a historian whose monumental biography of Joseph Stalin—one of Mr. Putin’s heroes—awaits its third and final volume. Mr. Kotkin is a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and a professor emeritus at Princeton.

His comments shouldn’t be taken as a show of admiration for Mr. Trump. At the Aug. 15 Alaska summit—which Mr. Kotkin disdainfully calls the president’s “surrender photo-op”—Mr. Putin “evidently told Trump that Russia is going to win anyway, so let’s just hand the territories taken over to Russia and save lives in the process.” But Mr. Trump “cannot surrender Ukraine,” he says. “The Ukrainians are not going to accede to that. And Mr. Trump cannot grant Putin a sphere of influence in his neighborhood because it’s been lost for good by Putin himself.”

Mr. Kotkin is similarly scornful of Monday’s White House summit with Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky, which he calls the “European rescue photo-op.” Europe’s leaders are “talking about providing security guarantees. Well, if they can do that, why are they flying to the White House to ask President Trump to make them do that? They were there to beg the president to help them deliver security. There was lots of theater, melodrama, and attention on President Trump, which, of course, is what he’s after. But I don’t know what, if anything, really happened in terms of Ukraine’s self-defense against Russia.”

Speaking by Zoom from his Hoover office, he’s keen to establish that we need to grasp three truths in the “big picture” of the war in Ukraine.

The first is a “paradox that people don’t usually put together”: Although much-smaller Ukraine may be “losing a war of attrition,” Mr. Putin “made an enormous strategic blunder and is damaging Russia severely for the long term.” He has lost his country’s old sphere of influence: “All his neighbors hate him and are afraid of him.” Even Alexander Lukashenko, the dictator in fraternal neighbor Belarus, is “looking for some distance, to get out of the stranglehold of Russia.” Mr. Putin has also “lost his civilian economy.”

Second, Ukraine is “an asset, not a liability—but we don’t seem to be able to appreciate how it’s an asset, and why.” He means that “Ukraine has an army”—a serious one, unlike, say, Germany. “We’ve been able to send a lot of our weapons and test them in battlefield conditions because of Ukrainian bravery and ingenuity.” As a result, “we’ve been able to see what a 21st-century land war looks like, and we’ve been able to change our defense industrial investments at home as a result.” He adds that military aid to Ukraine is “actually going to the American defense industry.”

Third, Mr. Trump is “correct” to seek an end to the war: “I applaud his forced imposition of a negotiation process.” But the president “lacks follow-through and patience. He lacks consistency. This is a hard problem. He promised to solve it in 24 hours,” but it’s “been going on since 1783,” when Catherine the Great annexed the Khanate of Crimea. Even so, “Trump’s instincts are correct. Ukraine, more than Russia, needs this war to end. And he’s groping towards that solution.”

Mr. Kotkin warns against facile obsessions with “winning.” We talk all the time, he says, about “who’s going to win the war. But what matters is winning the peace.” In Afghanistan, America won the war and lost the peace. In Vietnam, the other way around.

What does that mean for Ukraine? Russia is a “giant neighbor, armed with nuclear weapons, willing and able to build a war machine well beyond its GDP and ostensible means, and indifferent to the loss of its own lives.” Winning the peace isn’t easy against a foe like that: “That’s the conundrum we face, and have faced from the beginning. But we haven’t faced up to it,” he says, exasperated.

In the minds of most Ukrainians and many friends of Ukraine in high places, a win must include the return of Crimea, which Russia conquered in 2014. “We’re all talking about how Ukraine needs to get Crimea back, because Russia took it by force in a violation of international law.” Mr. Kotkin says with the laugh of an unsentimental realist. “Crimea is going back to Ukraine the day after Texas goes back to Mexico.”

Then he proposes a careful-what-you-wish-for exercise, inviting me to “fantasize” that Crimea is back with Ukraine. “Then Russia has two million ethnic Russians inside the Ukrainian state, and can mount a permanent insurgency and sabotage campaign with this gigantic population to recruit from.” There’s also the threat of external force. The return of Crimea to Ukraine would “incentivize Russia to attack again tomorrow, or 20 or 30 years from now. Regaining Crimea is terrible for Ukraine winning the peace in the long term.” The West needs to understand that “what makes sense to some people in terms of a violation of norms and the stability of the international order as a whole may not make sense for the Ukrainian cause they’re advocating for.”

So how could Ukraine win the peace? Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is out of the question, if only because the U.S. opposes it. The alternative is “joining the West through accession to the European Union,” Mr. Kotkin says. “They’ll need massive domestic reforms to be able to join. But it’s a great process for bringing countries into constitutional rule-of-law, open-society, and market-economy institutions.”

The other marker of a Ukrainian win is “some type of security, which some people call ‘security guarantees’, but which looks more like the ‘steel porcupine’ approach.” This is a phrase Kaja Kallas, the EU’s high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, introduced in March. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen defines it as fortifying Ukraine to make it “undigestible for potential invaders.” Mr. Kotkin says it would mean helping Ukraine set up a “strong defense establishment with weapons production at home and continued financing for that from its European partners. So you get both EU accession and a version of security where Ukraine is doing most of the heavy lifting.”

A win for Mr. Putin would have grave consequences for the West, Mr. Kotkin says. The Russian dictator is “looking for the surrender of Ukraine and the surrender of the United States.” He wants to subjugate Ukraine, to “destroy it as an independent, sovereign state. But more than that, he wants to destroy the Reagan-George H.W. Bush Cold War victory.”

Mr. Putin is at an advantage, Mr. Kotkin says, because he doesn’t need “the maximalist win”—a restoration of the Soviet empire or even the Soviet Union. “He wins by wrecking Ukraine, which is hurt by the continuation of the war.” He gains merely by keeping the war going: “Putin doesn’t need Ukraine. He’s already got Russia. But Ukraine needs Ukraine. They don’t have another state. And Putin’s saying, ‘If I can’t have Ukraine, well, then nobody can have Ukraine, especially the Ukrainians.’ ”

Thus Mr. Kotkin concludes “Trump is correct. Ending the war is Ukraine’s best hope. This is the only country they have, and it’s being devastated.”

Mr. Kotkin is critical of Mr. Biden’s Ukraine policy, though in a more measured way than Mr. Trump is. He says Mr. Biden “deserves credit for supporting Ukraine’s self-defense” and also for working closely with U.S. allies and partners. “But overall, the Biden strategy failed. Why? Because the argument was that we’re supporting Ukraine to put them in the best position to negotiate a more favorable settlement. But the problem was, there were never any negotiations.” The support, Mr. Kotkin laments, was “endless and pointless—there was no pathway for negotiations.”

Enter the 47th president: “He comes in. He forces the issue. Immediate negotiations!” Mr. Kotkin sums up Mr. Trump’s strategy as follows: “We’re not going to wait till Ukraine is, quote, in a better position for negotiations. We’re just going to impose an imperative that we have negotiations starting now.” This compelled Mr. Zelensky and the Ukrainians to become “more realistic about their war aims.”

The flaw in Mr. Trump’s approach “is that he didn’t put the same pressure on the other party,” Mr. Kotkin says. “He put all the pressure on the Ukrainians and, so far, next to no pressure on Putin and the Russian establishment to force the negotiations.” The result: “We’re kind of stuck. Even though Trump was correct to move away from the Biden strategy, he’s failed in part to execute a negotiation strategy where he’s built leverage with the Russian side.”

The bottom line, Mr. Kotkin says, is that there’s been insufficient pressure on Mr. Putin. “There’s been military pressure on a high level, thanks to the Ukrainians’ courage and ingenuity, but not on a scale that’s working.” Russia has a bigger army and support from China and North Korea, “which helps quite a bit.” Mr. Putin is also willing to sacrifice Russian lives: “Bleed and bleed and bleed, sending boys to their death on the battlefield in ways that most democratic countries—including a flawed democracy such as Ukraine—cannot do.” That leaves Ukraine in a war of attrition “where it counts lives and the other side doesn’t.”

Economic pressure has been severe, but oil revenue still flows to Mr. Putin, delivering a “massive cash flow that floats this war. So unless you cut off all oil revenues, your economic pressure is going to be insufficient.”

Most important, the West needs “very severe political pressure on Putin’s regime, and that comes in the form of alternatives to his rule.” Many prominent Russians “feel that Russia is on a self-defeating trajectory right now.” These are nationalists; “they are not democrats, they’re authoritarians. They don’t look like the kind of Russian opposition we might associate with in terms of values. They have no sympathy for Ukraine, but they have a lot of sympathy for Russia, and they feel that an end to the war would help Russia regain the civilian economy that it’s lost.” U.S. and European intelligence agencies are “recruiting them inside. We know who they are.”

These sentiments, Mr. Kotkin says, are widespread in the Russian establishment, and even in the armed forces, and became visible with the public comments of retired Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov, who in February 2022 accused Mr. Putin of engaging in “a criminal policy of provoking war” and urged him to resign. “Obviously sitting officers of the armed forces and security services cannot voice such public sentiments,” Mr. Kotkin says. “The vast increase during the war in cases brought for alleged treason indirectly testifies to the existence of the sentiments, and the regime’s knowledge and fear of them.”

Mr. Kotkin believes Mr. Trump should make an offer to these patriotic Russians “in exchange for retrenchment, defined as an end to the aggression against Ukraine and a turn to focusing on developing Russia, its people and economy, for the future.” If Mr. Putin refuses a deal, “maybe President Trump can appeal to others inside Russia who would be willing to do it or urge Putin to do it. Maybe the start of a ‘political bank run,’ or the fear of it, could destabilize the regime enough to force retrenchment.” It’s a long shot, “but military and economic pressure without political pressure has not worked.”

There are other things Mr. Trump could do. These include a removal of Russia’s Gazprombank from the Swift international banking system, to which it still has tenuous access, greenlighting the confiscation of $300 billion worth of Russian deposits in European banks, getting India to “buckle” and stop buying of Russian oil, and, most audacious, “cutting a deal with Xi Jinping behind Putin’s back to reduce China’s support for Russia in a bargain between the U.S. and China. It’s thinkable.”

Of all the threats Mr. Putin faces, Mr. Kotkin says again, “none is bigger than President Trump. Putin may smirk. He may walk down that red carpet in a strut. He may joke for the camera with President Trump. But ultimately, Trump holds the cards. And if the president uses those cards, he could unsettle Putin’s smirk, his self-confidence, and his maximalist demands. Will this happen? I don’t know. But it’s there for the taking.”