Ed Note: If this piece of news proves to be accurate, this a very significant telltale about the real state of affairs as far as Russia’s standing up to the West. Every hopeful pundit in support of Russia is focused on counting the Ukrainian villages taken by the Russians, and already predicting the winner, but why would Serbia give in and throw in the towel after so many decades of sacrifice since the late 1980s? Is it because, in the grand bargain foreseen between Trump and Putin, the latter may have secured a win in Ukraine as a face-saving token, while retreating in all other spheres?

by Andrew Korybko via Korybko Substack

This could easily lead to a more profound pivot that undoes decades of strategic ties with Russia in just a few years.

Chief of the Serbian General Staff General Milan Mojsilovic explained his country’s military calculations in light of last summer’s multibillion-dollar Rafale warplane deal and Western sanctions against Russia in a recent interview with local media. According to him, the first was “primarily based on a tactical study” that allegedly concluded that this was the best option for ensuring his nation’s security needs, which entails “complex preparations” with France that informally amount to a pro-Western military pivot.

After answering the question about that deal, he was then asked about the effect that Western sanctions have had on military-technical cooperation with Moscow, to which he responded by revealing that “We terminated some contracts and postponed some” since “the delivery of weapons” from Russia “is practically impossible at the moment.” Paired with his previous answer, it becomes clear that Serbia’s pro-Western military pivot is being carried out under sanctions duress, not purely anti-Russian reasons.

To be sure, Serbia had already been leaning towards the West even before last summer’s multibillion-dollar deal as evidenced by it voting against Russia on Ukraine at the UNGA and reportedly even arming Kiev through indirect means, but Mojsilovic’s revelation of terminated and postponed military deals takes this to an altogether different level. Before discussing the potential consequences, the reader should review these background briefings about Serbia’s clumsy “balancing act”:

Read more here

via Financial Times

Excerpt
Russian President Vladimir Putin conveys that he believes he has time to compel Ukraine’s western allies to accommodate his demands. However, the reality of Russia’s war economy is precarious, with concerns voiced by prominent figures like Sergei Chemezov of Rostec and central bank head Elvira Nabiullina regarding the impact of expensive credit on their operations. 

Russia is utilizing a mix of borrowing, inflation, and expropriation to fund the war, but this strategy is revealing inherent flaws as corporate debt surges and public finances remain concealed. A recent report indicates that corporate debt has increased by 71% since 2022, with state-controlled banks providing credit at below-market rates, essentially resulting in hidden money printing.

Putin is avoiding a significant budget deficit while managing high inflation through controlled interest rates. Yet, this approach risks creating a credit crisis as borrowing costs soar. The Kremlin must maintain stability to prevent a loss of legitimacy, which could occur if banks collapse or deposits lose value.

Ultimately, Putin does not have time on his side, as he faces a financial crisis. The West’s sanctions, which block access to $300 billion in reserves and disrupt oil trade, are crucial in limiting Russia’s resources. Intensifying these sanctions and transferring reserves to Ukraine would further strain Russia’s economy. The West must ensure that Putin understands that any relief from sanctions is not forthcoming, forcing him to choose between continuing the war and maintaining his power domestically.

Read more  Financial Times

By John Helmer, Moscow  via Helmer

Excerpt

In a single line expressed through a reporter, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov explained the defeat in Syria as a tactical withdrawal in preparation for a “military conflict with NATO in the next 10 years.” He emphasized that Russia currently needs solutions to ensure at least a long-term balance in the global confrontation. This statement appeared in the Kremlin-funded security analysis platform Vzglyad on January 3, with no mention of Syria. To highlight its significance, Vzglyad added an editorial note in italics: “In a prolonged confrontation with the West, it is essential to skillfully combine economic and military strategies. Judging by the initial results of economist Belousov’s activities as Minister of Defense, this is precisely what we observe.”

A political source in Moscow concurs: “Russia has to confront all of NATO head-on within the next ten years. If a deal can be made now to buy some time for rearmament, that’s a strategic choice that will have to be made.”

However, not all military sources in Moscow agree. Some believe that during discussions in October and November, when President Vladimir Putin listened to arguments from the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry against the Turkish plan to break out of Idlib and capture Damascus, the Kremlin underestimated the message that Russia’s acquiescence would send to the US and NATO allies. “Anyone now thinking Russia can be counted on as an ally,” comments one source, “is mistaken.”

These sources believe that the pressure on Putin to make fresh concessions in Ukraine will intensify. “The US and NATO used the time we conceded in Minsk to prepare for a war we weren’t as prepared to fight as they were in February 2022. Delay was our mistake. They want time now to rearm the Kiev regime for the next round. Our aim should be capitulation in Kiev and no future for the enemy. For us, that’s the strategy.”

In support of the Kremlin’s refusal to defend Syria and the government of Bashar al-Assad, the Kremlin’s supporters among Anglo-American podcasters have become experts on Arab, Syrian, and Iranian politics; one of them has even relocated to Beirut.

An independent timeline of events produced by French analyst Thierry Meyssan omits analysis of Russian actions but confirms that President Assad flew to Moscow on November 29. This was a secret kept by the Kremlin and the Russian press. “On November 30, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad went to Russia—not to attend his son Hafez’s exam at Moscow University, where he is continuing his studies, but to call for help. The Russian forces in Syria could only bomb the jihadists’ convoys because their capabilities were limited to aerial operations. Therefore, they tried to block the roads to HTS [Hayat Tahrir al-Sham] and Turkey but could not intervene on the ground against them. Aleppo was truly lost.”

An eyewitness, Kamel Saqr, provided a detailed account of what happened, in what sequence, and with what implications. Saqr is exceptional because he was present as a senior member of Assad’s staff at the secret meeting between Assad and Putin in Moscow on November 29. He listened to Putin’s telephone call with General Valery Gerasimov during the meeting and continued negotiating with Putin’s subordinates through the evening of November 29 and the morning of November 30, before Assad and his staff left Moscow at 4 p.m. that day.

Nothing comparable to this account has appeared in public from any other credible source. Saqr’s interpretation of what he calls “the state of disavowal” is disputable; the facts, however, are less so. Saqr states that Assad directly told him that when he was at his Moscow residence in the Four Seasons Hotel, Putin had sent him a message to keep the visit a secret, canceling Saqr’s negotiations with the Kremlin press office on a joint communiqué for public release.

Furthermore, according to Saqr, Putin’s message to Assad was that “the [Russian] military was not in a position to wage war, either psychologically or logistically.” In retrospect, Saqr interprets Putin as having decided, before the fall of Aleppo to the Turkish-led forces of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) on December 2, not to prevent their southward advance toward Damascus and to reject accepting Iranian reinforcements through the Khmeimim airbase. From Saqr’s record of the last meetings in Damascus between Assad and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi on December 5-6, he admits he does not know how coordinated the Russian and Iranian decision-making had been, or for how long. During that week, Saqr reports that Assad tried to contact Putin on December 3, 4, and 5, and on each occasion, Putin reportedly refused to answer. Assad then reached out to the French, asking them to inform Putin that he was trying to make contact. The French replied after several hours, stating that Putin was visiting Belarus “and therefore cannot talk to you.”

This was false. The Kremlin record shows that Putin was in Moscow on all three days.

On the evening of December 3, after Saqr claims Assad’s call had been rejected, Putin spoke by telephone with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had initiated the call. In their discussion, according to the Kremlin release, Putin asked Erdogan to “stop the radical groups’ terrorist aggression against the Syrian state and provide comprehensive assistance to the legitimate authorities’ efforts to restore stability and constitutional order across the country, including using Ankara’s capabilities in the region.” Erdogan reportedly agreed on “strengthening cooperation both bilaterally and within the framework of the Astana process, emphasizing the key importance of further close coordination between Russia, Turkey, and Iran to normalize the situation in Syria.”

Erdogan’s claims were misleading. According to Saqr’s account of what Assad had been told by the Iraqi Prime Minister, Mohammed al-Sudani, Erdogan had declared that the time for mediation was over.

Putin remained in Moscow to meet with the Security Council on December 5, without any acknowledgment in the communiqué that the situation in Syria was discussed. Putin then flew to Minsk on the afternoon of December 6 and continued meetings there the following day. The Kremlin record of his movements and meetings is then silent until December 9 when Putin returned to Moscow. So did Assad.

Saqr adds that the Russian military attaché in Damascus, Rear Admiral Oleg Kornienko, met with Assad at his residence “in the last hours of his rule,” on December 7-8. They appear to have discussed arrangements for Assad’s evacuation from Khmeimim and the terms of his asylum in Russia. Saqr’s publication is politically significant because his interpretation of Russian actions, particularly Putin’s decision-making, was broadcast on January 7 by the Saudi Arabian state-owned media platform, Al Arabiya.

Syria’s former media chief and top aide to Bashar al-Assad claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have “tricked” the ousted Syrian president in his final days as leader. Speaking to Mazeej Studios, a podcast produced by the Saudi channel Al Arabiya, Kamel Saqr stated that Assad was in Moscow in late November, just over a week before Syrian rebels captured Damascus. By that time, the rebels had already captured much of Aleppo.

There, Saqr said, Assad asked for Putin’s support in helping Iran transport equipment and support to strengthen his government’s positions against the opposition. “Bashar al-Assad’s request to Putin was for him to personally handle securing the aerial transportation necessary to deliver military aid to support or stop the advance of the Syrian opposition,” Saqr stated. This request came as Iran reduced its forces and militias’ presence in Syria, and Hezbollah suffered heavy losses in its battles against Israel in Lebanon. Saqr believes neither Russia nor Iran wanted to intervene heavily in this battle, but Assad informed him that Putin had instructed his chief of staff [General Valery Gerasimov] to prepare to support any transport needed for Iran at Russia’s Khmeimim base in Latakia.

“But what happened was that the Iranians told Bashar al-Assad, ‘We did not receive any signals to proceed with moving Iranian aircraft to the Khmeimim base [or to] fly through Iraqi airspace to land there,’” Saqr told Mazeej. “The question was relayed to Moscow, but no answer came.” When asked whether this was a “trick by Putin,” Saqr remarked that there was “no other explanation.”

Regardless, Saqr said the Iranians informed Assad that they had sent a plane through Iraq but were warned by the US that the aircraft would be shot down if it continued. Saqr claims Putin did not answer any of Assad’s calls between December 3-5, before his fall, and that despite having planned a 400-word speech addressing the situation, the former Syrian president ultimately decided against speaking to the public.

As rebel forces neared Damascus, Assad spoke to his media office for the last time on December 7, discussing a military meeting at the Khmeimim base between him and the Russians. Saqr believes Assad left “from Damascus airport via a private plane, taking the southern bypass road and then the airport road to reach the airport.”

Saqr added, “My information suggests that he stayed at the base for several hours until the plane was secured, prepared, and its takeoff and flight to Moscow were ensured.”

What were the Iranians thinking and doing in parallel? An audio recording, purportedly of a speech given by Brigadier General Behrouz Esbati of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) at a Tehran mosque on December 31, surfaced in Iranian media a week later. Excerpts of the speech, though not a full authenticated recording or transcript, have been highlighted in interpretations by the New York Times and the Israeli press, alongside anti-Russian commentaries from Kiev to Washington.

In the brief excerpt reported by Abdi Media, Esbati criticized Russian policy in Syria: “Russia was one of the factors that led to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s Syria. Russia turned off all radar systems so that Israel could strike the intelligence headquarters of Shahid Sadiq. The Russians were bombing the deserts instead of targeting the headquarters of Tahrir al-Sham [HTS].”

Longer excerpts of Esbati’s speech have been covered by the New York Times. In that report, “tensions surrounding these competing views on Syria preoccupied officials enough that they embarked on a campaign of damage control with the public last week. Senior military commanders and pundits close to the government held speeches and question-and-answer sessions with audiences in mosques and community centers in several cities…[Esbati] is a top commander of Iran’s Armed Forces, which includes the military and the Revolutionary Guards Corps, and has held prominent roles including commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces’ cyber division. In Syria, he supervised Iran’s military operations and coordinated closely with Syrian ministers and defense officials, outranking even the commander-in-chief of the Quds Forces, Gen. Ismail Ghaani, who oversees the network of regional militias backed by Iran.”

The following is a verbatim excerpt from the Times report.

General Esbati’s speech, on December 31 at the Valiasr mosque in central Tehran, addressed the rank and file of the military and constituents of the mosque, according to a public notice of the event titled “Answering Questions about Syria’s Collapse.” The session began with General Esbati telling the crowd that he left Syria on the last military plane to Tehran the night before Damascus fell to rebels. It concluded with him responding to questions from audience members. He offered a sobering assessment of Iran’s military capability in fighting Israel and the United States.

For the time being, Moscow analysts with military and intelligence sources who will not have overlooked Saqr’s and Esbati’s testimonies are not acknowledging them. Instead, Vzglyad has published a disclaimer regarding the Russian Army’s readiness under former Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the time and priority tasks required by his successor, Andrei Belousov. The following text is a verbatim translation into English, with added illustrations and captions to assist English readers in understanding the Russian references.

For the full article click here.

Ed. Note: Is this the first escalatory move towards naval blockade of Russia? Under the pretext of protecting the undersea cables are we now witnessing the militarization of the Baltic Sea?

via ZeroHedge

NATO is strengthening its military presence in the Baltic Sea in response to the Christmas Day severing of the Estlink 2 electricity cable and four telecom cables linking Finland and Estonia.

A month prior to that incident, in November, two other submarine telecommunication cables, the BCS East-West Interlink and C-Lion1 fiber-optic cables, were damaged. 

Soon after the alleged sabotage the West charged that a Russian ‘shadow ship’ intentionally dragged its anchor on the sea bed in order to damage the vital telecoms links. The vessel in Finnish custody is the Cook Islands-flagged Eagle S.

European media reported that as of days ago the initial cables which were damaged connecting Estonia and Finland have been repaired. However, another damaged cable, reportedly sabotaged later in December could yet to months more to be up and running.

“Estlink 2, the power cable damaged on December 25, has not yet been repaired, with work expected to take several months, according to Finnish operator Fingrid and Elering of Estonia,” DW reports.

On Friday Finland’s Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen announced that the NATO military alliance is sending “two vessels and we are also increasing other activities and presence in the area.”

At the start of this week the the British-led Joint Expeditionary Force had announced it would be ramping up its surveillance of undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.

“Finland has long been concerned about the risks to environmental and maritime safety posed by the shadow fleet used by Russia,” Valtonen said Friday. “It is clear that the shadow fleet is also a threat to critical underwater infrastructure.”

European authorities are still investigating the matter and questioning the crew. There have been reports that the anchor has been recovered from the bottom of the ocean floor.

The West has loudly condemned what it’s calling Russia’s ‘hybrid warfare’ targeting key infrastructure in European telecoms. However, officials also still speak in terms of ‘assumptions’…

Germany’s defense minister was quick to announce that “no one believes that these cables were cut accidentally,” hammering the point home by adding that “we have to assume … it is sabotage.”

The Kremlin has of course denied all of these allegations and has condemned what it calls a Russophobic witch hunt which blames any and all Western infrastructure failure on Moscow.

The seas of northern Europe have been closely watched ever since the biggest single sabotage event of the Ukraine war – the Nord Stream pipeline explosions. In the case of Nord Stream, the latest consensus is that it was not Russia… but either the CIA or Ukraine.

by Claudiu Secara

Interesting to read the reaction from Russian pundits close to the Kremlin in connection with the Trump Neo-neocons’ outrageous expansionist land-grab designs. 

One would expect the Russians to be on high alert for many reasons. Besides the purely economic threat of grabbing important natural resources for nothing, and the immoral act of snatching Greenland from a 1000-year history of being discovered, populated and developed by the European peoples of Denmark, such a demand by Trump would amount to another modern-day settler annexation of other people’s property, just what Israel is now openly pursuing in its own sphere.

But there is another dimension to this kind of appropriation of historical property rights. And that is the military value of Greenland. Yes, people like Sergey Markov are more afraid of China than of the US. The Chinese never had a history of expansionism, unlike Russia and the Anglo-Saxons – as the Russian like to recall. So, are we now seeing the first signs of Russia’s traditional turncoat policy of betraying its allies, as it recently  did when Russia threw Assad under the bus after he’d been a loyal friend in difficult times?

Where is Markov‘s outrage? Instead of reviling this proposition, he would be happy with getting back a rump, utterly destroyed Ukraine, a short-term gain in exchange for a long-term super Russia’s vulnerability only in order to hurt China a bit. Obviously, Greenland’s military significance is enormous first of all against Russia itself as a monitoring station targeting all of Russia’s commercial shipping and its navy, especially its submarine fleet. If this goes forward, all three of Russia’s exits to the Atlantic Ocean are vulnerable and could be shut on short notice. The Bosphorus Strait, the Baltic ports, and now the Northern routes. Russia is obviously surrounded, with no further recourse.

Greenland’s takeover alone should tell Russia that Trump is more dangerous than any attack through Ukraine perpetrated by the Biden administration. But, no, there is a nefarious idea that it is China that is bad. And why is that? Because China is smart, and strong, and unbeatable.

Trump and Greenland (by Markov)

Trump and Greenland. The world is in an uproar. Russia can support Trump’s intentions. They are reasonable. Trump, in his style, sets a tough goal – to annex Greenland to the United States. But Trump’s actual goal is different. It is to prevent China from establishing control over Greenland by taking advantage of Europe’s political and economic weakness.
Eventually, they will come to this model: Denmark will sign an agreement with the United States on cooperation in Greenland. According to it, the United States will establish a military base in Greenland, extract natural resources there, and ensure that the Chinese are not in Greenland. Rational goals. The United States has the right to participate in controlling its strategically important environment.
Russia also has the right to demand that Ukraine, as Russia’s neighbor, not have the right to be a member of NATO.
And China has the right to demand that there be no foreign military bases in neighboring countries.

Trump and the Panama Canal (by Markov)

Trump and the Panama Canal. And here Trump’s demands are reasonable. Trump does not want to allow China to take control of this most important canal for the US economy. It is through this canal that the coasts of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the Gulf of Mexico are connected. And there together 80% of the US economy.
And Trump also wants that US ships not be charged too high duties. And this is also reasonable. After all, the US built this canal.
But Russia can recognize the reasonableness of these demands only after the US gets out of Ukraine. The US must leave there and surrender its neo-fascist puppet junta at the feet of Russia.
Only after that can Russia recognize anything from the US. Until that moment, “Yankee, go home” should be heard from Russia every day and for any reason. The junta at the feet of Russia!

by Claudiu Secara

Let’s face it, the idea that Russia by itself can confront the West and win is not borne out by a realistic analysis. Let’s start with the population. Russia, as a country of 146 million people, is dwarfed by the 450 million European population. Furthermore, the actual ethnic Russians are only 103 million. The rest are very much restless subgroups. The Tatars are the second, with just about 3 percent, but the remainder is divided among dozens of ethnic groups, mostly of ambivalent loyalty. Now, the actual Russian population is also fractured between the nationalists, even some ultra nationalists, and a substantial percentage of philo-Westerners. A back of the envelope calculation shows that the big, supposedly domineering Russia is actually on a par with Germany. Yes, there are some 80 million Germans, just about the same as 80 million Russian nationalists.

And that is not even counting France and the UK, or any of the non-core European nations, like Poland.

Then, there is the economic power comparison. We learned that Russia is the Number One economy in Europe on a PPP basis, that is under 7 trillion dollars in 2024. Maybe. On the basis of its energy resources and vast natural resources, it is an equal match with Germany, let’s say. But then, the question is: are we comparing Russia to Germany ($6.5 trillion on the basis of PPP), or France, or are we looking at the rivalry between Russia’s nominal $2.182 trillion GDP vs. EU’s nominal $19.5 trillion GDP?

Let’s add to that the US economy, at $29 trillion, and you get the picture. Roughly speaking, it’s 2 trillion against 50 trillion, more or less, for the Transatlantic alliance. A weak hand. A very weak hand.

But that is not all. On top of that, there are some 52 countries which are directly allied with the West, from Japan to Australia. We don’t need to add their GDP to understand where the balance of power is, here.

Still, Russia could not be defeated and it would probably never be defeated militarily, on its own front. But the confrontation is not really military. So far, the West is only probing the Russian defenses without actually engaging in a shooting war with Russia. In that sense, Russia is able to claim victory by just standing its ground.

Now, we’re seeing the start of the next level of the economic war against Russia. All Russia’s international ties to the West are severed. All its exports of oil and gas are being cut. A full-spectrum embargo is being put in place. Yes, Russia can still defend itself. And it can still live under minimum interactions with the West, but at a very severe cost to its progress and its population in the long run. Just the same as happened to the Soviet Union.

So, where are we? Is Russia’s defeat a given?

Enter China.

Now, that’s the big gorilla waiting outside of the fighting ring. At 1.4 billion, China’s population dwarfs the entire population of the West, Europe and the US with all its Anglophone sphere combined. Its GDP, nominally at $18 trillion, is less than half of the EU and the US in dollar terms. But, in this case, the real PPP comparison is meaningful because on those terms, China’s GDP is on a different planet. At 37 trillion, according to reliable sources such as https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-the-worlds-20-largest-economies-by-gdp-ppp/, it is a good match for the entire sclerotic West.

So, now we can really compare apples to apples. An ultra dynamic economy, with a super-motivated work force, endless cohorts of educated engineering talent, and organized top-down in order to mobilize all national resources, China is quietly blazing ahead. Unlike the Russians, who are mostly provincial, traditionalist, uncouth country bumpkins — a semi-shamanistic society (with a population that spent more on fortune-tellers last year than on food) — China has penetrated every corner of the West. China’s diaspora is found in every walk of life in the Western societies. From Chinese restaurants in every hamlet to high-tech professionals in big companies, research universities and R&D positions at every level, the Chinese have acquired a deep understanding of the average American and they know how the Western economy and its political structure function. There are 60 million Chinese in this diaspora alone, which is equal to the entire population of the UK or France.

There are many ways to look at the US vs. China and highlight points of weakness. The national debt is one. The US accumulates roughly 8 trillion dollars extra debt every 4 years and at a rate that is still growing. It has reached the point where the interest payments alone, $1 trillion in 2024, are higher than the military expenditures. China’s debt? It is almost impossible to get a real number from the Western media. And that’s because it is always mixed with local government debt, corporate debt, other liabilities, etc. Strictly, China’s federal government debt at the end of 2023 was $4.2 trillion. Compare that to $35 trillion debt by the US federal government at the end of 2023. You get the picture!

So where is China vis-à-vis Russia’s confrontation with the West? Does it prefer a stronger Russia or a weaker Russia? In terms of the geopolitics and national interests, China should prefer a weaker Russia, unable to fight on its western borders and defend its vastly underdeveloped eastern territories.

While the West aims to diminish Russia, even to partition it, probably China does too. Given, of course, that Russia is not totally taken over and made into a Western colony. But China can partake in exploring Eastern Siberia, thank you very much.

In this scenario, one can envision the next-level confrontation between the Talmudic West and China taking place over the remains of a wounded Russia. And only then to be followed by the inevitable one-on-one between the West and China.

Ed. Note: German Chancellor Scholz will meet with Putin before the elections on February 23. And Trump plans to meet with Putin in March. This is being leaked by the Bundestag deputies. Why?

Chancellor Scholz has only one chance to win the elections on February 23 – to show himself as a supporter of peace in Ukraine by meeting with Putin.

Meanwhile, we have more speculation about the triangulation between Russia-Chine-US. See the article below by Korybko. 

In a few words: by forcing Russia into an economic blockade, the US brings great benefits to China’s turbo development fueled by cheap Russian energy. By allowing Russia access to the European energy market it fuels Russia’s strong arm influence over Europe. 

Hence the duplicitous American war vs peace deadly ballet. Ultimately, it is deceitful to both Russia and China, while moving one small step at the time in surrounding them both. Will this salami strategy succeed? Maybe, maybe not, but it will certainly bring a great deal of hardship to everyone.

Authored by Andrew Korybko via Substack,

Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak shared an update on the proposed Russian gas pipeline to China through Kazakhstan, which was analyzed here in November, shortly before the start of the year. He confirmed that “This process, so to speak, is underway. Estimates, the feasibility study and negotiations are now underway.”

This statement shouldn’t be misinterpreted as assuming that the project is a done deal like RT implied in its report, however, since it’s more of a message to the US at this point.

The previously mentioned analysis cited last summer’s about the continued Sino-Russo pricing dispute over the Power of Siberia II (POS2) pipeline, which boils down to China demanding bargain-basement prices (reportedly equivalent to Russia’s domestic ones) while Russia obviously wants something better. This impasse hasn’t yet been resolved, and while some like Asia Times’ Yong Jian consider the trans-Kazakh proposal to be an agreed-upon rerouting of POS2, that’s arguably a premature conclusion.

Pricing disputes still exist and the “process” that Novak described has only begun. It’s far from finalized and might still take a while to be completed, if ever, as suggested by the POS2 and Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline precedents. The first, which was earlier known as the “Altai Pipeline” before the decision to reroute it via Mongolia, has been discussed for a full decade already with no deal in sight. The same goes for the second, which was first agreed upon in 2015, but no progress has been made since then either.

Amidst the latest talk of the Russia-Kazakhstan-China (“RuKazChi”) gas pipeline, Russia’s last direct gas pipeline to Europe was just shut down after Ukraine’s decision to let their five-year transit agreement lapse. Russia can still indirectly export gas to Europe via TurkStream, and Europe can always compensate for this long-foreseen loss of 5% of its gas import total via more Russian LNG, but the writing is on the wall that the EU will continue diversifying from Russia under American pressure.

In that event, Russia’s lost budgetary revenue from energy exports to Europe can only realistically be replaced by China, but Russia is still reluctant to agree to the bargain-basement prices that China is reportedly demanding. Its decisionmakers’ thought processes can only be speculated upon given the opacity and sensitivity of these talks, but this might reasonably be due to the expectation that the US’ more muscular containment of China could coerce Beijing into agreeing to better prices with time.

Another possibility, which isn’t mutually exclusive at this point at least, is that they might also be holding out hope that some of their European exports could one day be resumed seeing as how the infrastructure still exists but their partners made a US-pressured political decision to cut off imports. The best-case scenario from their perspective would therefore be that China agrees to prices closer to the market rate while the EU resumes some of their Russian gas imports after the special operation ends.

The reality though is that Russia is unlikely to have its cake and eat it too, and there’s no guarantee that either of its two main gas partners – the EU and China – will behave as expected even at a later date. The EU won’t resume any pipeline imports unless it receives approval from the US while China is known to operate on a much longer timeframe than most so it might hold off on clinching a deal indefinitely until Russia finally accepts its bargain-basement price demands. This places Russia in a very bad position.

Unless something changes, Russia might very well be coerced by the unfortunate circumstances in which it finds itself into agreeing to China’s reported proposal to sell it gas at domestic prices, which could turbocharge China’s superpower rise while placing Russia in a greater position of dependence.

That might be preferred by Russian decisionmakers over sitting on these reserves indefinitely without receiving any financial benefit from them as sanctions start to create fiscal and monetary challenges.

From the US’ perspective, it’s worse for Russia to turbocharge China’s superpower rise and enter into a relationship of greater dependence with it that could be exploited by China to procure other resources at equally cheap rates than to allow the partial resumption of Russian exports to Europe. At the same time, such resumptions couldn’t be approved until after the Ukrainian Conflict ends, and this would be politically impossible in any case unless the US could spin the outcome as a victory of sorts over Russia.

 

Likewise, Russia couldn’t agree to this arrangement unless it too was able to spin the outcome as a victory, especially if the informal terms include a commitment not to build any new pipelines to China in exchange for the abovementioned proposed resumption overcompensating for that lost revenue. Therein lies the need for creative diplomacy of the kind suggested here last month and here the other day, the insight of which will now be blended, summarized, and built upon for the reader’s convenience.

The gist is that the US and Russia could agree to a series of mutual compromises culminating in the partial restoration of an energy bridge between Russia and the West for the purpose of depriving China of its envisaged decades-long access to ultra-cheap Russian resources for fueling its superpower rise. No one should assume that everything proposed below will enter into force, but these suggestions could help move their talks along.

From the US’ side, its possible compromises could take the form of:

* Ukraine finally holding elections as part of a US-backed “phased leadership transition” against Zelensky, who’s the top obstacle to a lasting peace, and then legitimizing the following two agreements;
* Ukraine restoring its constitutional neutrality in order to exclude itself from ever joining NATO and thus resolving the core security concern that provoked Russia’s special operation;
* Ukraine demilitarizing and denazifying everything east of the Dnieper in what had for centuries been Russia’s traditional “sphere of influence” (everything west had traditionally been under Polish influence);
* The US terminating its bilateral security agreement with Ukraine in order to assure Russia that any cessation of hostilities wouldn’t be a ruse for rearming Ukraine and reigniting the conflict at a later date;
* The US agreeing that no Western peacekeepers will deploy along the DMZ between Russia and Ukraine east of the Dnieper (all parties might agree to an entirely non-Western peacekeeping mission though);
* The US also agreeing that Article 5 won’t apply to any Western country whose uniformed troops in Ukraine, which would be unilaterally deployed there in this scenario, come under attack by Russia;
* The US approving the EU’s partial resumption of Russian gas pipeline imports in order to buoy the bloc’s struggling economy via an influx of low-cost fuel (but higher-priced than what China demands);
* The US and EU returning some of Russia’s seized assets as “compensation” for the West retaining control over the European portion of its pipelines;
* The US lifting its sanctions on the Russian-EU energy trade, including Russia’s use of SWIFT, and expanding this to include more countries and spheres as a reward for keeping the peace with Ukraine;
* The US waiving sanctions on Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project for itself, the EU, India, and Japan so that they can replace lost Chinese investment and ensure that they receive this gas instead of China;
* The US replicating the preceding policy on a case-by-case basis to squeeze out and ultimately replace all Chinese investment in Russian energy projects to preclude the possibility of more future exports to it;
* and the US building upon the trust that it hopes to regain with Russia through these compromises to resume frozen strategic arms control talks on a priority basis before the expiry of the New START in 2026.

From Russia’s side, its own compromises could take the form of:

* Agreeing to only the partial demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine west of the Dnieper (ideally with the first influenced by the Istanbul Agreement while the second might remain superficial);
* Limiting its control of Ukrainian-claimed lands to only Crimea and those four regions that voted to join Russia in September 2022’s referenda;
* Tacitly accepting that it won’t be able to assert control over the parts of Kherson and Zaporozhye Regions west of the Dnieper but nevertheless continuing to officially maintain such claims;
* Agreeing to limited military restrictions on its side of the DMZ as a trust-building measure for furthering the rest of the complicated negotiation process and then complying with these terms;
* Informally agreeing to prioritize the development of its Arctic and Pacific fleets over its Baltic and Black Sea ones in a tacit cession of influence to NATO that soberly reflects the current military realities;
* Formally acknowledging the loss of control over the EU and Ukrainian portions of its pipeline infrastructure (ideally in exchange for “compensation”, including the return of some of its seized assets);
* Tacitly accepting that the rest of its seized assets are lost, but possibly agreeing that they can be invested in rebuilding Ukraine and/or Syria or donated to the UN, perhaps to fund a new African project;
* Informally agreeing not to build new pipelines to China or expand energy exports to it so long as sanctions-waived energy investments from and exports to others overcompensate for that lost revenue;
* Unofficially preferring sanctions-waived investment from others (America, Europe, India, Japan, South Korea) in its resource-rich Arctic and Far East regions as opposed to that from China;
* Doing the same with regard to preferring tech imports from them (and Taiwan too, which was Russia’s main source of high-precision machine tools a year ago);
* Tacitly accepting that these sanctions waivers can be rescinded in an instant if Russia reneges on the Ukrainian or Chinese terms of this proposed grand deal;
* and negotiating with the US in good faith on strategic arms control, which could ultimately include restoring limits on intermediate-range missiles in Europe that lead to warehousing the mighty Oreshniks.

For as politically difficult as these compromises might be for each side, the US could spin them as having stopped Russia from controlling all of Ukraine and thus preventing it from planting its boots on the Polish border, while Russia could spin them as having stopped Ukraine from joining NATO and thus preventing that bloc from planting their boots on its exposed western border. Moreover, Russia would relieve pressure upon it in Europe, while the US Navy would control the bulk of China’s energy imports.

The key to this is the US offering Russia a decent deal in Ukraine with lucrative sanctions-waived energy and tech opportunities that would incentivize Russia into informally agreeing to deprive China of decades-long access to ultra-cheap resources for fueling its superpower rise at the US’ expense. This grand deal is Trump’s to lose, and the world will know that he fumbled it if Russia makes progress on new pipelines to China, which could accompany or be followed by him “escalating to de-escalate”.

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Zelensky’s strategy for 2025. Zelensky offers the West a plan to defeat Russia.

1. Russia, according to Zelensky, spent huge resources in 2024, but did not achieve any serious success.

2. 80% of the armored vehicles that Russia has are not new production, but modernized from Soviet warehouses. According to their calculations, the armored vehicles in Soviet warehouses will run out by the end of 2025. Therefore, the supply of armored vehicles will be sharply reduced.

3. If Putin goes for mobilization, the government’s rating will sharply decrease. If Putin does not go for mobilization, the Russian army will decrease.

4. Ukraine will lower the age of mobilization in early 2025. To 20 or to 18? It depends on the volume of weapons supplies. Ukraine will mobilize as many soldiers as the West gives weapons for.

5. It is important to fire missiles at Moscow. It is the strikes on Moscow that will break Russia’s will to war.

6. Ukraine plans to announce that it is creating its own different missiles that can hit Moscow. But it will hit with Western missiles, but declare them Ukrainian.

7. To destabilize the situation inside Russia. The main strike now is aimed at causing a conflict between Russians and Muslims.

8. According to Zelensky’s plan, the entire year of 2025 will be the same senseless battles from a strategic point of view in Donbass as in 2024 with minimal results.

9. And by the end of 2025, the Ukrainian Armed Forces will have new, fresh, well-armed troops and will go on the offensive.

This is exactly the plan that Zklensky is now proposing in negotiations with Western politicians.

Sergey Markov

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Mr. Orban of Hungary is in big trouble. Compared to some 9 bcm of gas in 2022, Hungary’s imports in January 2025 are down to about 2+ bcm: 1 bcm through the Croatian terminal at Krk, something less less than 1 bcm from Azerbaijan, 0.75 bcm through the Turkish pipeline from Russia (that’s only 3% Hungary’s needs) and maybe a bit more through Poland. All imports at much higher prices. 

These cuts come on top of the loss of 19 billions Euros of European funds, with more penalties to come. 

And all of that before the upcoming elections a year from now. 

Read more here.

As for Moldova, of the electricity needs in the Republic of Moldova, 62% will be covered by imports from Romania. In January 2025, Moldova’s electricity consumption needs (on the Right Bank of the Dniester River) will be covered by a combination of local production and imports from Romania, according to an announcement by SA Energocom. Thermal power plants in Chisinau and Balti will generate over 127,000 MWh, which represents about 28% of the forecast consumption. Also, renewable energy, coming from both fixed tariff installations established by ANRE and from the free market, will add another 46,000 MWh (about 10%). However, production from renewable sources such as wind and solar energy depends on weather conditions and cannot be considered a constant source. Of the total imports from Romania, 178,000 MWh (about 39%) will be purchased on the Opcom exchange, and 105,000 MWh (about 23%) will come from bilateral contracts.

Meanwhile, all the industrial production in Transnistria has been shut down. The local power plant has been converted from gas to coal still providing electricity. The existing reserves are expected to last 60 days.