• analysis by Military Chronicle and Rybar

In October, European diplomatic chief Josep Borrell said that by the end of March, it was planned to train more than 11,000 Ukrainian soldiers at NATO training grounds. For the whole of 2023, their number may exceed 30 thousand people: the British have already trained 10 thousand people since June 2022, and it is planned to train another 15 thousand in other European countries.

The editorial staff of the Military Chronicle and the Rybar team looked into the subject and explained what is wrong with the training of the AFU according to NATO standards.

The main problem

It is difficult to apply the received skills on the battlefield. Numerous captives (including those from the elite 45th or 95th divisions), who were trained in NATO countries, have repeatedly questioned the effectiveness of training by Western methods. According to them, at best, the training was superficial and did not guarantee an advantage on the battlefield.

What’s wrong with the training?

Western countries have not participated in high-intensity conflict since the Vietnam War and, in some cases, since World War II.

Instructors of various specialties have only participated in local operations. The result is logical: people are being trained along the lines of the wars in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

The experience of combat

operations against bandit groups in the Middle East and Africa is barely applicable to the realities of the Ukrainian conflict. Infantry units are mostly trained not to fight in the woods and fields, but to clear houses and residential neighborhoods.

Trial and error

Another side of the problem is the lack of real experience in the live firing of different systems. For example, the NLAW, Panzerfaust 3, and Gepard anti-aircraft systems were used only limitedly in exercises before the air defense system.

NATO instructors do not have the necessary experience and knowledge to correctly use these weapons in intensive combat. Now NATO is actively adopting the experience of Gepard for the new training program, but it will take years to implement it.

Yes, Ukrainian formations are quite capable of mastering the whole range of weapons under combat conditions – and in a much shorter time than at Western training ranges. But training is often conducted almost by trial and error.

What about the training base?

For effective training of Ukrainian formations in the West, there is a lack of equipment, weapons, and material support. The NLAW or Javelin are taught to fire on special simulators that simulate a shot: real ammunition is out of the question. Before the beginning of the USO in the West, such simulators were ordered in exactly as many as were necessary to train the regular number of cadets. At the moment, there are not enough such complexes for everyone.

Machine gun fire during training abroad often does not exceed two magazines (50-60 rounds), and weapons are brought from the nearest units.

What follows?

Despite loud statements about the huge number of Ukrainian units trained to NATO standards, there are problems with the effectiveness of training. Moreover, they are accumulating like snowballs because in the West they rely on training the maximum number of people in the shortest possible time. There is no point in talking about the quality of training in such conditions.

From the initial 5-7 weeks, the training program for the AFU infantry units has already been cut to three, and in the case of the combined arms units, to two.

Probably by October or November, the number of Ukrainian formations trained according to NATO standards will really reach 30,000 men. But claiming to be trained according to NATO standards and commissioning fully combat-ready units that can turn the tide of war are two different things.

After returning to the battlefield, soldiers and officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine face real conditions that are strikingly different from the theoretical ones.

The pattern of use does not change – “human resources” packaged in a Western wrapper and costing considerably more, are subsequently plugged in the same way and try to buy time.

Here are some insights from Russian observers of the war in Ukraine.

The most important event of the winter was the absence of the big offensive of the Russian army, which everyone expected. Why is there no attack? There are several versions, from positive to negative.
1. Weather. Winter in the region was very warm. Therefore, muddy. Therefore, the offensive cannot make use of mobile groups. They are waiting for solid ground.
2. Russia needs a large grouping. And the Russian economy was not able to arm the army in time.
3. For the offensive you need air supremacy. To do this, you need to suppress the air defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This is what they were doing. So far they haven’t been able to complete the task.
4. Russia wants to advance after the defeat of the Ukrainian offensive. That’s why probably Russian army is waiting for.
5. There is a tactic of small strikes, probing where the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is weak. And it is strong everywhere. So the probing goes on for a long time. 6. Catastrophic loss of time is Russia’s style in this military campaign. 7. Russia is not capable of a major offensive.

Zelensky again gave the order not to withdraw troops from Bakhmut, despite the operational encirclement of Ukrainian troops. What does all of this mean?
1. In general, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are led by advisers from the Pentagon. For example, it is well known that Zelensky has long wanted to remove Zaluzhny from the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Zelensky is jealous of Zaluzhny’s popularity. Zelensky is afraid that the Americans might replace him with Zaluzny. But the Americans simply forbid Zelensky to remove Zaluzhny.
2. But wasting troops on the defense of Bakhmut is Zelensky’s personal decision. The Pentagon was in favor of withdrawing troops from Bakhmut, but decided to allow Zelensky to fight for Bakhmut.
3. Zelensky gave the order to put tens of thousands of lives of soldiers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in harm’s way in Bakhmut for political purposes.
4. Zelensky wants the Ukrainian army not to retreat. To cling to every piece of land as if it were its own. This is the assertion of his power. Own land is the one for which solders are ready to fight and give their lives. The Russians have shown everyone that they are not ready to fight for Kherson. It certainly was a huge political mistake.
5. And Zelensky needs a symbol of invincibility, a symbol of the heroism of the Ukrainian army. Severodonetsk, Mariupol, – the heroic symbol did not work out. Kherson, Izyum – somehow they were easily taken from the Russians. Heroism was not shown by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Zelensky wants to show heroism in Bakhmut.
6. Zelensky is a PR man. For him, the war takes place in the symbolic space, first of all. This is the cynical truth of the 21st century. 7. And Russia does everything in the style of the 20th century. 8. Now it is being decided which style will win, 20th or 21st century?

The main reasons for the failure of the fast SMO (Special Military Operation) in Ukraine, from a Russian analysis:

1. Russia greatly underestimated the strength of the artificial totalitarian Ukrainian regime. It withstood all the blows. And it even saw increased support from the population. The totalitarian regime of the neo-Banderites is very strong in Kyiv.

2. Russia underestimated the full control of the US intelligence agencies over all the power structures in Ukraine. Every attempt by Russia to negotiate surrender with the security forces immediately fell under the control of the US intelligence services.

3. Russia greatly underestimated the strength of the Ukrainian army. This army combines the strength of a Russian soldier, a motivated fascist officer and a very experienced American general. That’s a very strong combination.

4. Russia greatly underestimated the internal transformation of the West in recent years from a democracy to a new quasi-totalitarian regime. If the West were a democracy, as Moscow thought, it would not have supported the terrible terrorist regime in Kiev. But unsuspectedly it turned out to be no longer a democracy and hit Russia with all its totalitarian might. And unfortunately, Russia still idealized Europe, too.

5. Also, Russia overestimated the friendship between the people of Russia and Ukraine. It turns out that strong state systems and governments play a greater role than classes and peoples and religions.

It is expected that the attack by the Kyiv regime against majority Russian enclave of Transnistria could begin at any moment. There is a massive preparation for such an event in the Western media, while claiming that it is the Russian Army from Transnistria that wants to attack Ukraine. Despite the obvious absurdity of this version, it is still being circulated by hundreds of media outlets.

The Russian Army in Transnistria is only 13 thousand people strong. The grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, preparing to attack, is allegedly more than 30 thousand. Plus the troops of Moldova and Romania on standby. Russia will not be able to protect Transnistria.

The Russians are prepared, if necessary, to blow up the warehouses in Colbasna in case of attack.

The Armed Forces of Ukraine need these warehouses, where 20,000 tons of weapons are stored. The Armed Forces of Ukraine believe that they will have enough shells from there for the war with Russia for a year. And we know that the APU has a strong shell hunger.

The Russian Army in Transnistria is preparing these warehouses for an explosion as we speak and to immediately begin resettling people. Without these warehouses, the value of Transnistria immediately drops sharply.

The United States currently produces 14,000 155mm artillery shells per month, and plans to increase this to 90k in 2024.

Russia, meanwhile, produced 1.7 million until beginning of 2022, increased their rate to 3.3 million in 2022, and further plans for 5 million per annum by 2024. If the reports of China moving to directly supply lethal aid are accurate, the firepower advantage of the RuF will grow wider yet.

Meanwhile, NATO countries have transferred to Ukraine 1,170 air defense systems, 440 tanks, 1,510 infantry fighting vehicles, 655 artillery systems since December 2021, according to the data of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation.

Most of this equipment has already been destroyed, the department added.

Republished from IntelSlava:

Hello Intel Slava, I am an Armored officer of the French Army. I have been reading your page for some time to get a different view of the conflict in Ukraine. Thank you for what you do.

If I write to you today, it is to tell you exactly what it is like to be an officer in a Western European army in 2023.

In concrete terms, we are constantly being told about “high-intensity warfare” and “the return of modern warfare”. We, specifically, are told about the importance of our role as armored officers, because “tanks will play a major role against our enemies”. We are constantly being fed a pro-war arguments, very anti-Russian, very pro-NATO discourses (no surprise there). In other words, we are in an era like in 1872, when France had just lost against Germany, and the whole country was in propaganda mode to prepare the “revenge” (we call this “revanchisme” in France).

That’s kind of the feeling I get (even if I don’t really see the revenge we would have to take on the Russians, Lol).

But this bellicose speech is a facade, like a cat growling at a bear hoping to scare it. In reality our army is in tatters. We are unable to maintain our Leclerc tanks for example: only fifty of them are functional, a shame for “the first army in Europe”… A shame for an armored cavalry officer like me who is from ESM Saint Cyr and Saumur. It is not better in other sectors of the army, we have for example almost no more CAESAR (thanks Ukraine!). In other words, we have neither tanks nor guns. 

The French like to make fun of China, which they say is a “paper tiger”. The paper tiger is us. Our army was unable to eliminate 500 terrorists in Africa, it would not last 2 days in a real modern war.

But the most ridiculous thing is what? It is that our army is wallowing in this mediocrity. Like an old man who contemplates his reflection in the mirror, dreaming of his past glory. I’m thinking of a specific episode that happened recently and that justified my writing to you: an evaluation for my officer class that we just passed consisted in “eating properly” and “knowing how to set a table in a noble way”, to respect the tradition of armored cavalry officers (supposed to be particularly noble)… Funny if it was just some tradition. Except no: it was decisive. Those who misaligned knives and forks got very bad marks, which would be reflected in their career and choice of regiment. The French army breaks the ambitions of young people who have been preparing for 6 years to lead tanks, for a story of forks…

This army is ridiculous, it is only a shadow of its former self. It disgusts all the sincere French patriots: most of my comrades consider leaving the army as soon as they can. For this reason in particular, because the army brings nothing. But also because they do not want, for some of them, to be the minions of NATO while they enlisted to serve France…

TL;DR: you don’t have to worry about Western European countries, our arrogance is theater.

I give you my greetings, take care of yourselves and let’s pray (whatever our obedience) that this conflict will stop and that Europe will find again a peaceful and multipolar balance.

Russia’s Northern Fleet has begun to go to sea with nuclear weapons on board its ships and submarines. Norwegian intelligence writes about this in its report.

“The central part of the nuclear potential is located on submarines of the Northern Fleet and surface ships. Nuclear weapons pose a particularly serious threat in the options of operations in which NATO countries may participate,” the document says.

It is reported that this started for the first time since the end of the Cold War.

SafeNow says:

I have a theory. China saw that the Ukraine proxy war was escalating its way to Armageddon, and thought, “Armageddon bad, we need to do something. Specifically, we Chinese must furnish America with a putative alternate enemy threat; a substitute expensive military adventure. But we don’t want to do anything to spook these idiots too badly. Anyone? General Wang of the People’s Balloon Ministry, your hand is up…do you have an idea? “

“We (Russia) will take Odessa, Kharkov and Kiev, we are slowly moving forward and will reach Poland” – Chechen Republic head Kadyrov.

via @milinfolive

Of the really interesting things Sergei Shoigu said yesterday at a conference were the plans to create an all-weather remote sensing satellite system in the interests of the Russian Defense Ministry.

By the time the full-scale hostilities started in Ukraine, the Russian orbital constellation had only a few remote sensing satellites of the Kanopus-B type capable of providing at least some acceptable resolution of imagery and only one satellite with adequate resolution (Resurs-P). By comparison, western remote sensing satellite constellations not only had many times as many modern satellites, but they were also far superior to their Russian counterparts in resolution.

This caused the Russian army to fall behind in acquiring high-quality images of Ukraine’s territory in a timely manner using its own resources and forced it to look for workarounds to obtain materials from Western ERS satellites. Western countries, in turn, could afford to keep several RS satellites simultaneously over Ukrainian territory and Russian border areas (not counting military ones) in order to receive promptly the required images in high resolution and share them with the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This role of Western satellite intelligence in the success of Ukrainian counterattacks was repeatedly stated in the world press. In addition, many times we observed that the West photographed strategic Russian facilities before the subsequent attack by the AFU and then, after the strikes, repeatedly photographed them to confirm the result.

Despite the fact that at the moment the system announced by the Russian Minister of Defense is only at the stage of experimental development without providing a specific timeframe, it is undoubtedly a step in the right direction. It is obvious that this constellation most probably will not have time to be deployed in this conflict, but if such plans are implemented, Russia will get its own constellation of remote sensing satellites in sufficient numbers and with good resolution of imagery.