Photo: t.me/SBUkr
via https://strana.today/news/485943-chto-oznachaet-ataka-ukrainskikh-dronov-po-stratehicheskoj-aviatsii-rf-i-ee-posledstvija.html
Since the strikes on Russian military airfields were carried out the day before the talks in Istanbul, most commentators link these two events. They write that in this way Ukraine “strengthens its negotiating position”, changing the humiliating trend for itself when it is forced to agree with the agenda proposed by the Russians, and even to the “accompaniment” of the accelerating offensive of the Russian army.
They also write in Russian publications that this was done in order to disrupt negotiations or ensure that Russia definitely did not make any compromises (there is a conspiracy theory that the United States and the Russian Federation have already agreed on all parameters of ending the war and the current strikes are designed to interrupt these agreements and toughen the position of the Russian Federation).
However, it is absolutely obvious that it is absolutely wrong to link attacks on Russian airfields only to negotiations.
Firstly, such an operation, according to sources in the SBU, has been preparing for a very long time – a year and a half. Even if this time is exaggerated, it can be said for sure that it took more than one week to prepare.
Secondly, it makes sense to strengthen the “negotiating” position if some result is expected from the negotiations. But so far, there have been no signs that the parties are even willing to make serious compromises that could lead to a cease-fire agreement. Russia has been repeating its conditions all week, which Kiev has already called unacceptable, and Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky today reiterated that he would seek an unconditional cease-fire.
Of course, Ukraine will use today’s strike in the context of the negotiation process. First of all, in order to put Moscow in an uncomfortable position, which had previously been clearly determined to delay negotiations and turn them into a platform for promoting its peace conditions, while continuing the offensive at the front. Now, after the attack on the airfields, the tactic of “negotiations just for the sake of negotiations” becomes questionable for the Russian Federation or requires some kind of powerful retaliatory strike.
However, the main objectives of the strike are certainly different. One of them is completely understandable and purely military – causing damage to Russian aviation, which is constantly striking Ukraine.
but there are others, informational and political, which in many ways resemble the same goals that the Kursk operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine had last year.
The first is to raise morale and faith in victory in Ukrainian society. Just like last summer, the situation at the front is now very difficult for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Ukrainian troops are retreating, and there has not been any big “victory” news for a long time, which affects the mood both in society and in the army. The attack on military aircraft caused a surge of “victorious sentiments” in the Ukrainian information field, as well as the offensive in the Kursk region last summer.
The second is the growing negativity and distrust of the military and political leadership of the Russian Federation within Russia itself – in society and among the elites. the same telegram channels that in 2023 prepared the ground for Prigozhin’s rebellion, and in August 2024 raised a wave of hysteria about the offensive of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region, are now dispersing the “propaganda” about attacks on airfields. although so far the scale of this wave is much smaller than in 2024 or 2023. and if it didn’t work out then, then it will be problematic now. At the same time, the response given by the Russian Federation will also play a role in the mood (but more on that below).
The third and main task is to convince the West that the thesis about the “inevitability of Ukraine’s defeat” (which is often promoted by US President Donald Trump and his associates) is false and that Ukraine can inflict significant losses on Russia, and therefore Zelensky should not be pushed to make strong concessions to end the war. Also, and even more importantly, Kiev is seeking to promote another thesis in the West: “Do not need to be afraid of Russia and its nuclear weapons.” The fear of a nuclear war with Russia is the main factor that determines the West’s attitude towards the current war. It is precisely because of that that NATO countries do not risk directly entering the war with Russia on the side of Ukraine, refuse to transfer certain types of weapons to Kiev, and do not dare to impose particularly harsh sanctions and other pressure measures. Kiev has been trying its best to destroy this fear for three years. This was also the goal of last year’s offensive in the Kursk region. At that time, one of the main theses of the Ukrainian government and its support group in the West was this: “You see, Ukrainian troops entered the internationally recognized territory of Russia, but Putin did not hit us with a nuclear weapon. Therefore, there is no need to be afraid of his threats, help us with all your might.”
Approximately the same topic is being pumped now: “Ukraine has hit strategic bombers, nuclear deterrence forces, and nuclear bombs have not yet flown to Kiev. Therefore, give us the Taurus, introduce 500 percent secondary duties and don’t be afraid of Putin – he won’t do anything to you.” During the Kursk operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, this thesis had almost no effect on the West. We’ll see what happens this time. By the way, the reaction may be exactly the opposite – the West will be even more afraid of the threat of nuclear war. Especially if the Russian Federation makes appropriate threats.
What Russia will do in response to the strikes is a separate and main question at the moment.
The attacked airfields belong to the Russian nuclear deterrence infrastructure. According to the nuclear doctrine of the Russian Federation, an attack on these facilities is a reason for the use of nuclear weapons. Will it be used?
We have already written that the real reason for the use of nuclear weapons for the Russian Federation may be the threat of defeat in the war. Such a threat may arise, for example, if NATO countries enter the war on the side of Ukraine, ports are blocked (which will deplete the economic resources of the Russian Federation), the main trading partners refuse to purchase Russian goods in the event of the introduction of 500 percent American secondary duties.
Is it a blow to the strategic aviation of the Russian Federation (even if we take estimates of losses, voiced by sources in the SBU) a factor that puts Russia in the face of defeat in the war?
No. Just as the operation in the Kursk region did not become such a factor last year, after which the situation for the Ukrainian Armed Forces only worsened.
The Russian Federation still has enough bombers left to strike at Ukraine. And it’s not them, but hundreds of thousands of soldiers and drones that are now ensuring Russian progress at the front. And the defeat of strategic aircraft will not have a strong impact on this.
Therefore, the threat of using nuclear weapons does not look too likely yet. Although much will depend on the reaction to the attacks on airfields in the West. If Moscow feels that these strikes were perceived there as an incentive to take a tougher stance against the Russian Federation and to cross the next “red lines”, then the likelihood of a “nuclear” scenario will increase.
However, the Russian Federation also has the possibility of a “non–nuclear” response, ranging from a massive missile strike to the use of “Hazelnuts.” The last strike was carried out, we recall, after an attack by American long-range missiles on the territory of the Russian Federation and was filed as a response to it. It cannot be ruled out that it will be used this time. However, if the strike is accompanied by heavy civilian casualties, it will be used by Kiev to try to increase Western pressure on Russia and push Trump to give the go-ahead to impose tough sanctions and to continue arms supplies. However, the image and military damage of today’s strikes on airfields is so great that such “deterrence arguments” may not work.
Finally, Russia may try to use the situation to dramatically raise the stakes in relations with the West, accusing the special services of NATO countries of organizing an operation to destroy aircraft. However, this is fraught with the complete cessation of any dialogue with Trump, to which, by the way, the Russian Federation is already being pushed through the “drains” in the media of information that the US president was aware of the strike in advance. But whether Putin is ready to escalate now is still unknown.
In general, of course, the attack on airfields, to put it mildly, does not bring the war closer to an end, but rather contributes to its intensification (just like last year’s offensive in the Kursk region). Voices in Ukraine are once again growing louder that there is no need to make any compromises with Russia. In Russia– there are voices of those who demand the destruction of Ukraine at any cost, and much less noticeable are the voices of those who say that what happened today (and Russia’s possible response to it) only shows the enormous price that each country will have to pay for the “war to the bitter end,” and therefore it must be ended. as soon as possible.
However, there remains very little hope that, as the conspiracy theory above states, all parties have already agreed in principle to end the war, and even today’s strikes will not be able to disrupt these agreements.
